Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Milam applied for disability insurance benefits in 2011, identifying conditions of back pain, knee pain, hip pain, and osteoporosis and a 2009 disability onset date—the same day she was laid off. Milam had worked for 20 years, most recently as an administrative assistant. The ALJ noted his general suspicions about claimants who are "laid off—they work until the last day and then all of a sudden they're disabled," noting that after alleged onset date, Milam received unemployment benefits and looked for a new job. Milam testified that she can drive for only 20 minutes without back and hip pain, can sit for only 30 minutes continuously before needing to stand, can lift five to ten pounds, has limited ability to bend her back, and has difficulties rotating and squatting. She testified that she is in pain "24/7" and sleeps four to five hours per night. She submitted letters from three former coworkers stating that Milam was absent from work up to five days per month. The ALJ found that Milam was not disabled, but could perform sedentary work with restrictions. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Milam v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Lemons applied for social security disability benefits after being diagnosed with a pain disorder caused by inflammation of a membrane that surrounds the nerves of the spinal cord. An ALJ awarded benefits and Lemons began receiving $802 per month. The ALJ, advised that Lemons’s condition was expected to improve, recommended follow-up review. The Administration failed to conduct the review and never contacted Lemons until it received an anonymous letter, including photographs of Lemons engaged in various activities. Investigators conducted surveillance. The Administration initiated review. Lemons responded that she could not pick up anything over 20 pounds nor sit more than 30 minutes without causing increased pain. The Administration discontinued benefits. Lemons appealed and chose to continue benefits during the process. Investigators met with Lemons’s treating physician, and showed her surveillance videos; the doctor revised her assessment and concluded that Lemons could perform some work. A cessation of benefits decision recorded a finding of “Fraud or Similar Fault.” Lemons was convicted of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001, and theft of government funds, 18 U.S.C. 641. The district court calculated a guidelines range of 27-33 months’ imprisonment, based on an intended loss totaling $284,018.64, varied downward, and sentenced Lemons to 12 months and one day. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Lemons" on Justia Law

Andrews, born in 1976, has a GED and work experience as a cashier, retail sales clerk, and a secretary/receptionist, all of which are classified as sedentary or light duty work. In 2010, Andrews applied for both DIB and SSI, claiming a disability onset of 2007, as a result of fibromyalgia/chronic pain syndrome, cervical disc disease, migraine headaches, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder and borderline personality disorder. The Commissioner denied her application. Andrews submitted extensive medical records to an ALJ. Her doctor’s opinion of Andrews' limitations, if deemed controlling, would have resulted in a finding of total disability. The ALJ placed little weight on his opinion, but placed great weight on the opinions of state agency medical consultants and credited the vocational expert's testimony in her final decision to deny Andrews' benefits. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Eighth Circuit found that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. View "Andrews v.Colvin" on Justia Law

Wright, a 50-year-old man, suffers from back and knee pain. Wright suffered a shoulder injury and complained of low back pain after being involved in a severe car accident in 2000. Wright suffered from another severe automobile accident in 1987. Wright has not reported earning any income in the years 2006–11. When he has earned income, it was seldom over $10,000 for the year. In his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits Wright testified that his average day consists principally of laying on his back trying to get comfortable and spending around 30 minutes cooking basic meals for himself. His physician noted that Wright had "type 2 diabetes, vitamin D deficiency, tobacco abuse, obesity, [and] bilateral knee arthritis." The district court upheld the Social Security Commissioner's denial of benefits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the administrative law judge erred by discrediting the opinions of two examining physicians, discrediting Wright's testimony, not considering Wright's mental condition as a severe impairment, and not considering the record as a whole. View "Wright v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Johnson has severe impairments, including chronic asthma, morbid obesity, borderline intellectual functioning, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She has never worked, has a ninth grade education, and does not have a drivers’ license. At the request of the Social Security Administration, a Ph.D conducted cognitive tests and reported Johnson was not “functioning within or near the mentally retarded range” and could “sustain concentration and persistence in completing tasks,” and Johnson’s “[m]ental impairments d[id] not significantly interfere with her day to day adaptive functioning.” To determine Johnson’s eligibility for Vocational Rehabilitation Services, another Ph.D., conducted a psychological evaluation o and concluded Johnson had a full scale IQ of 67, found that “a Mild Mental Retardation diagnosis [wa]s warranted,” and suggested Johnson “be encouraged to find employment … that is mechanical in nature, as she showed strength on tasks that require ability to analyze and synthesize abstract stimuli.”, Johnson occasionally attended counseling. Johnson’s counselors estimated she was of “low average” intelligence and education. Johnson was denied supplemental security income benefits, 42 U.S.C. 1381; an ALJ denied benefits, finding that Johnson had “residual functional - capacity to perform light work” with some restrictions. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. View "Johnson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Papesh had a GED and worked as a bakery helper. She reported long-term, low-back pain, which radiated to her hips and legs. She said the pain “is worse with working” because the bakery has concrete floors. She began treatment in 2009 (the year she turned 50) with Dr. Cash, who observed “tenderness throughout the lumbar spine to palpation, as well as pain with some spasm in the low back.” Papesh was also caring for her mother, who had severe dementia and suffered “worsened depression and anxiety” after her mother’s death. Papesh applied for disability and for supplemental security income in early 2010, alleging she was disabled due to degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, and other impairments. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the denial of benefits because the record contained two substantially similar residual function capacity opinions from a treating physician and neutral medical expert plus a consistent opinion from a second treating physician—all consistent with Papesh’s descriptions of her daily functioning. The ALJ’s determination that Papesh can perform light work was outside the available zone of choice. The substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding that Papesh is capable of sedentary work only. View "Papesh v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Miller suffered: a brain injury in a 1998 car accident and had back surgery in 2004. Although his doctor described his brain injury as stable, but Miller complained of memory and balance problems and pan. Miller claims these injuries caused him to become disabled starting in 2007. In 2008, Miller requested disability insurance benefits as well as supplemental security income. He received a hearing before an administrative law judge, who denied his claim, finding that Miller had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The Appeals Council denied Miller’s request for review. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the ALJ’s decision to give “little weight” to some of Miller’s medical evidence. View "Miller v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Draper, age 18, suffered traumatic brain injury in a 2006 car accident. Draper executed a durable power of attorney, authorizing her parents to collect money; compromise claims; and “fund, transfer assets to, and to instruct and advise the trustee of any trust wherein [Draper is] or may be the trustor, or beneficiary.” Draper began receiving Supplemental Security Income payments. In February 2008, father signed a personal-injury settlement. Draper received $429,259.41. Her parents signed documents creating a Special Needs Trust, intended to qualify under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(A), to provide for Draper’s needs without “displac[ing] or supplant[ing] public assistance or other sources of support that may otherwise be available” and transferred $429,259.41. In September 2008, Draper received notice that she had been overpaid $3,000 in SSI benefits because her trust exceeded the SSI-eligibility limit of $2,000, and that her SSI payments would cease. An ALJ found that for the trust to be exempt from consideration as a personal asset, Draper’s parents had to act as third-party creators when establishing it, but instead acted as agents under the power of attorney. Draper’s parents obtained a state court order modifying the trust, which retroactively listed the state court, rather than Draper’s parents, as the settlor. The Appeals Council denied review, finding that the order did not provide a basis for altering the ALJ’s decision. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Draper v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Johnson began working for U.S. Steel in 2004. On May 12 2011, he left work, complaining of a headache, and went to a clinic where a physician’s assistant indicated that he had high blood pressure. The next day he provided a note that was deemed insufficient by his employer. His regular physician later indicated that Johnson's blood pressure was normal. Emails, memoranda, and letters indicate that Johnson was suspended on May 16 and then terminated for altering, falsifying, or forging the work excuse. U.S. Steel never provided him with notice of his FMLA rights and obligations. Nor was such notice included in the employee handbook. Johnson filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, alleging that U.S. Steel retaliated against him for taking protected FMLA leave, failed to reinstate him after a period of protected leave, and otherwise unlawfully interfered with his FMLA rights. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Johnson did not demonstrate how any alleged technical violations could have prejudiced him if his condition was not a serious health condition and did not qualify him for FMLA leave in the first place. View "Johnson v. Wheeling Mach. Prods." on Justia Law

Todd, born in 1963, was a high school graduate, and worked primarily as a laborer, often for temporary services. Todd’s last employment before seeking disability benefits ended in April 2007 because the temporary job was completed. Todd claimed inability to work due to anxiety, cramping in his feet, and difficulty breathing. Until his death in July 2009, Todd was treated for major depressive disorder, alcoholism, alcohol dependence, emphysema, and generalized anxiety disorder. Todd also experienced tremors of unknown etiology. An ALJ decided: Todd had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 14, 2007; Todd suffered from emphysema, tremors, an affective disorder, an anxiety disorder, and alcohol dependence; Todd did not have an impairment or combination of impairments so severe as to meet or equal the criteria of a listed impairment; Todd had the residual functional capacity to perform light work and was capable of performing his past relevant work as a laborer; and Todd was “not under a disability.” The district court agreed. Although the ALJ improperly weighed the medical professionals’ opinions, the error was harmless because substantial evidence supported a finding that Todd’s limitations would not be disabling if he stopped using alcohol. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Bernard v. Colvin" on Justia Law