Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging claims under, inter alia, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), as amended by the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1602 et seq. Defendants are persons and entities involved in the transactions related to the financing of an addition to a house on plaintiffs' property. The court recently joined the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in holding that notice was not sufficient to exercise the right of rescission. In this instance, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs' notice was sufficient to exercise the right of rescission under section 1635 of TILA. Therefore, plaintiffs' right of rescission expired upon the sale of the property. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's finding that plaintiffs' notice was sufficient to exercise the TILA statutory right of rescission. The court affirmed, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment, the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, and the dismissal of the Hartmans as parties to the case. View "Hartman, et al. v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned a home previously owned by debtor. On appeal, the Trustee challenged the bankruptcy court's order holding that he recover nothing from defendants on his action to avoid a transfer which occurred when defendants perfected their liens on estate property postpetition. GMAC challenged the part of the order holding that the automatic stay was not violated and that GMAC lacked standing in the matter. The bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP) concluded that GMAC did not have standing to appeal any violation of the stay because, if GMAC was aggrieved, it was either by a wrongful foreclosure by U.S. Bank or by its own failure to protect its interests, not by the registration of the judgments or the order. Therefore, the court dismissed GMAC's appeal. In regards to the Trustee's claim, the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's awarding of nothing to the Trustee where the estate's interest had no value in and of itself, and the loss of a right to use some sort of "leverage" to get money to which the estate was not entitled was not the basis for a cause of action. View "Seaver v. New Buffalo Auto Sales, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Minnesota homeowners represented by the same counsel, brought thirteen separate claims against defendants, nearly all of which rested on a "show me the note" theory. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss nearly all of the claims and sua sponte sanctioned counsel, awarding attorney fees to defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court had diversity jurisdiction as the claims against the sole nondiverse defendant lacked a reasonable basis in fact and law; plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for relief sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss; the "show me the note" theory had been repeatedly rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court and this court applying Minnesota law; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions against counsel under Rule 11 where, at the very least, counsel had lacked a frivolous basis for appeal. View "Welk, et al. v. Ally Financial,Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals brought claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., related to their mortgage transactions. The court held that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of section 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court. Because neither plaintiffs accomplished rescission in this way within three years of their respective transactions, their right to rescind expired and the district court correctly entered summary judgment on these claims. Further, plaintiffs were not entitled, as a matter of law, to money damages for the banks' refusal to rescind, although their claim was cognizable, where the violation - that each set of plaintiffs were given one, rather than two TILA disclosures - was not facially apparent on the loan documents as set forth in section 1641. View "Keiran, et al. v. Home Capital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

In each of these consolidated cases, JPMorgan attempted to use the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act (SFA), Ark. Code Ann. 18-50-101 - 18-50-117, to foreclose on the borrower's home. At issue was whether a national banking association chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency but not registered to do business with the Arkansas Secretary of State or the Arkansas Bank Department could use the non-judicial foreclosure procedure provided by the SFA. The court concluded that an entity could be authorized to do business in Arkansas for SFA purposes pursuant to either state or federal law. In JPMorgan's case, federal law provided such authorization. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that JPMorgan was authorized to do business in Arkansas and could avail itself of the benefit of the SFA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

A bankruptcy court ordered that the Laurel Avenue house be vacated and authorized U.S. Marshals to physically remove plaintiff, the debtor's son, from the home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his suit, which alleged, inter alia, that his constitutional rights were violated when the house, its contents, and his person were searched and seized. The court found no error in the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the federal defendants where he did not allege a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics action in the amended complaint, nor did he seek to amend to add the claim; plaintiff's section 1983 claim failed against the city and the city's officers where plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the city's policy or custom and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; the district court did not err in dismissing his tort claims against the trustees under the doctrine established in Barton v. Barbour, which established that an equity receiver could not be sued without leave of the court that appointed him; and because the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims was proper, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. Hedback, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that Wells Fargo violated Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 by failing to record a notice of pendency of foreclosure before publishing the foreclosure notice. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute did not provide plaintiff with relief in this case because there was no dispute that Wells Fargo properly served plaintiff with notice in compliance with Minn. Stat. 580.03 and, since she received personal service of the foreclosure notice, she could not have been among those for whose benefit the separate notice requirement of Minn. Stat. 580.032, subd. 3 was enacted. View "Badrawi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, acting as trustee for certain farm property pursuant to a deed of trust, brought this interpleader action seeking a determination of rights to the sales proceeds from an auction of the farm. The court held that the district court properly denied CNH's motion for summary judgment where CNH did not have a valid contract to purchase the farm; CNH could not set aside the sale to Gittaway Ranch; CNH failed to offer any evidence that its attorney's fees were reasonable and necessary or incidental to the protection or improvement of the farm; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against defendants. View "Garden, Jr. v. Central Nebraska Housing Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Grinnell on their claim for equitable garnishment of a personal liability insurance policy issued to the sellers of the home. Plaintiffs claimed that the insureds' misrepresentations regarding the condition of the home qualified as a covered occurrence under the policy. The court concluded, however, that the policy provided coverage only for property damage caused by the occurrence. In this instance, there was no property damage caused by the asserted occurrence, and therefore, there was no applicable coverage. Plaintiffs' alternative argument failed where, even if plaintiffs were correct that the structural damage was caused by a covered occurrence, the damage would be excluded from coverage by the policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Payne, et al. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs' house was sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, they sued the lender, the holder of the Deed of Trust at the time of the sale, and the successor trustee. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Fannie Mae designation; the foreclosure sale's procedures complied with Missouri law; the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs' challenged to activities after the foreclosure sale lacked standing; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim; and the district court did not err in deciding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts that proved a duty to investigate the transaction on the part of the fiduciary trustee. View "Hallquist, et al v. United Home Loan, et al" on Justia Law