Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendants in Missouri state court, on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated borrowers, alleging that defendants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Mo. Rev. State 484.020 when they charged certain fees in the course of refinancing plaintiff's mortgage. Defendants moved the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d) and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that she was charged any fees, directly or indirectly, for legal work performed by non-lawyers. Therefore, plaintiff had not shown injury and did not have standing to bring her claim. In light of plaintiff's lack of standing, the district court should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction rather than reaching the merits of the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Best Buy sued various commercial landlords and the landlords' property manager, DDRC, alleging that DDRC impermissibly charged Best Buy for insurance-related costs under various lease agreements. The court held that the district court did not err in deciding that the landlords breached their various lease agreements by charging Best Buy for the First Dollar Program in an attempt to meet its insurance obligations under the leases. Based on the unambiguous language of the leases, the court found the landlords' interpretation of the leases to be unreasonable. Because the landlords breached the leases, the court found that the district court did not err in determining that the landlords breached their contracts with Best Buy. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Best Buy on its breach of contract claims for 2005-2009. Because the court found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Best Buy, the court need not address the applicable pre-judgment interest rate until after the resolution of Best Buy's breach of contract claims for the 1999-2004 lease years. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Best Buy's remaining fraud claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Camelot brought this action against its tenant, AMC Showplace Theatres, seeking a declaration that section 3.4 of their lease was an option to renew if the parties agree on new, negotiated terms rather than an option to extend on the terms contained in their existing lease. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted Camelot's motion. The court affirmed and held that the terms of the option period were not readily ascertainable and that section 3.4 was an option to renew that required new, negotiated terms.

In this consolidated appeal, three sets of landowners asserted claims against Arrington for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment relating to Arrington's failure to pay cash bonuses under oil and gas leases. The district court granted summary judgment to the landowners on the breach of contract claims and thereafter dismissed the landowners' other claims with prejudice on the landowners' motions. The court rejected the landowners' assertion that the lease agreements could be construed without considering the language of the bank drafts; the drafts' no-liability clause did not prevent enforcement of the lease agreements; Arrington entered into a binding contract with each respective landowner despite the drafts' no-liability clause; the lease approval language of the drafts was satisfied by Arrington's acceptance of the lease agreements in exchange for the signed bank drafts and as such, did not bar enforcement of the contracts; Arrington's admitted renunciation of the lease agreement for reasons unrelated to title precluded its defense to the enforceability of its contracts; Arrington's admission that it decided to dishonor all lease agreements in Phillips County for unrelated business reasons entitled the landowners to summary judgment; there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Arrington disapproved of the landowner's titles in good faith. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claims.

Plaintiff sued in state court challenging the validity of both the foreclosure of his home by Chase and the redemption of his home by a junior lienholder, National. The district court subsequently granted Chase's and National's respective motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that Minnesota law required Chase to hold both the mortgage and the promissory note at the time of the foreclosure, and genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Chase held the note. Plaintiff also contended that National's redemption was invalid because the foreclosure itself was invalid. The court held that Chase was the party entitled to commence a foreclosure by advertisement under Minnesota law, even if the promissory note had been transferred to someone else. Assuming arguendo Minnesota law required Chase to possess the note, the district court correctly granted Chase's motion for summary judgment in any event because plaintiff did not raise any genuine issues of material fact showing Chase was not the holder of the note at the time of the foreclosure. The court declined to address plaintiff's argument regarding redemption because plaintiff never challenged it in the district court.

Appellants in these consolidated appeals were debtors in their respective chapter 7 cases. Creditor objected to debtors' homestead exemption claims and moved for relief from the automatic stay. Debtors then moved to avoid creditor's judicial liens. The bankruptcy court consolidated all of the motions and all three parties moved for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court overruled creditor's objection to debtors' exemption, denied debtors' motions to avoid creditor's judicial liens, and granted creditor relief from the automatic stay to allow it to foreclose its judicial liens. Debtors appealed. Because the court held that creditor's judicial liens were avoidable, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision to deny debtors' motion to avoid its liens. Because the bankruptcy court's order granting relief from the automatic stay was moot, the court dismissed the appeal as to that part of the bankruptcy court's order.

This case arose out of a dispute between Union Pacific, the owner of mineral rights to three parcels of land, and Linn Farms, the surface rights owner to the parcels who purchased the mineral rights from the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Union Pacific was unaware of the forfeiture of the mineral rights due to tax delinquency and leased the mineral rights to Chesapeake Exploration, who then recorded the lease. Discovering the lease, Linn Farms sued to quiet title to the mineral rights. The district court denied Linn Farms' motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Union Pacific and Chesapeake Exploration, concluding that the sale of the mineral rights by the state was invalid because the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice of the impending forfeiture in violation of Union Pacific's due process rights. The court affirmed and held that the notice provided by the Commissioner was inadequate under the circumstances of the case even though it complied with Arkansas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Trustee appealed a summary judgment order from the bankruptcy court in favor of Judgment Holders. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded the subject liens were not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. 547. The court held, however, that the district court erred in concluding Judgment Holders' post-petition registration of their judgments and the attendant creation of judgment liens against Northridge were not avoidable post-petition transfers of property of the bankruptcy estate under Section 549(a), and it did not fully assess whether the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a recovery under section 550(a) because section 551's automatic preservation of the avoidable judgment liens would not restore the bankruptcy estate's financial condition to what it was before Judgment Holders' judgments were registered on Northridge's certificate of title. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Chapter 7 Trustee appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's judgment in favor of debtor's parents on a fraudulent transfer action, holding that debtor could not fraudulently transfer property that would have been exempt. Because the court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Minnesota fraudulent transfer law to the count seeking relief under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court reversed and remanded for further findings.

Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in debtors' adversary action seeking, inter alia, to avoid defendant's mortgage lien on debtors' residence. The court held that summary judgment was improper in this case because there was a material issue of fact regarding whether defendant had possession of the original promissory note.