Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued in state court challenging the validity of both the foreclosure of his home by Chase and the redemption of his home by a junior lienholder, National. The district court subsequently granted Chase's and National's respective motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff contended that Minnesota law required Chase to hold both the mortgage and the promissory note at the time of the foreclosure, and genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Chase held the note. Plaintiff also contended that National's redemption was invalid because the foreclosure itself was invalid. The court held that Chase was the party entitled to commence a foreclosure by advertisement under Minnesota law, even if the promissory note had been transferred to someone else. Assuming arguendo Minnesota law required Chase to possess the note, the district court correctly granted Chase's motion for summary judgment in any event because plaintiff did not raise any genuine issues of material fact showing Chase was not the holder of the note at the time of the foreclosure. The court declined to address plaintiff's argument regarding redemption because plaintiff never challenged it in the district court.

Appellants in these consolidated appeals were debtors in their respective chapter 7 cases. Creditor objected to debtors' homestead exemption claims and moved for relief from the automatic stay. Debtors then moved to avoid creditor's judicial liens. The bankruptcy court consolidated all of the motions and all three parties moved for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court overruled creditor's objection to debtors' exemption, denied debtors' motions to avoid creditor's judicial liens, and granted creditor relief from the automatic stay to allow it to foreclose its judicial liens. Debtors appealed. Because the court held that creditor's judicial liens were avoidable, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision to deny debtors' motion to avoid its liens. Because the bankruptcy court's order granting relief from the automatic stay was moot, the court dismissed the appeal as to that part of the bankruptcy court's order.

This case arose out of a dispute between Union Pacific, the owner of mineral rights to three parcels of land, and Linn Farms, the surface rights owner to the parcels who purchased the mineral rights from the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands. Union Pacific was unaware of the forfeiture of the mineral rights due to tax delinquency and leased the mineral rights to Chesapeake Exploration, who then recorded the lease. Discovering the lease, Linn Farms sued to quiet title to the mineral rights. The district court denied Linn Farms' motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Union Pacific and Chesapeake Exploration, concluding that the sale of the mineral rights by the state was invalid because the Commissioner failed to provide adequate notice of the impending forfeiture in violation of Union Pacific's due process rights. The court affirmed and held that the notice provided by the Commissioner was inadequate under the circumstances of the case even though it complied with Arkansas law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Trustee appealed a summary judgment order from the bankruptcy court in favor of Judgment Holders. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded the subject liens were not avoidable under 11 U.S.C. 547. The court held, however, that the district court erred in concluding Judgment Holders' post-petition registration of their judgments and the attendant creation of judgment liens against Northridge were not avoidable post-petition transfers of property of the bankruptcy estate under Section 549(a), and it did not fully assess whether the bankruptcy estate was entitled to a recovery under section 550(a) because section 551's automatic preservation of the avoidable judgment liens would not restore the bankruptcy estate's financial condition to what it was before Judgment Holders' judgments were registered on Northridge's certificate of title. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Chapter 7 Trustee appealed from the Bankruptcy Court's judgment in favor of debtor's parents on a fraudulent transfer action, holding that debtor could not fraudulently transfer property that would have been exempt. Because the court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Minnesota fraudulent transfer law to the count seeking relief under section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court reversed and remanded for further findings.

Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in debtors' adversary action seeking, inter alia, to avoid defendant's mortgage lien on debtors' residence. The court held that summary judgment was improper in this case because there was a material issue of fact regarding whether defendant had possession of the original promissory note.

The Chapter 7 trustee appealed from the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversing the bankruptcy court's judgment that the proceeds of personal property sold with a homestead were not proceeds of the homestead. The court held that the BAP committed two errors: first, the BAP required only "sufficient indicia" of an intent to convert non-exempt personal property into exempt homestead property where, as a matter of law, there must not only be an intent to convert non-exempt assets, but also an actual conversion; and second, in reversing the bankruptcy court, the BAP said "we find" an intent by debtor to convert non-exempt property into exempt property where findings of fact were the sole province of the bankruptcy court. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs sued Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. State. 408.231-.241, alleging, for a putative class, that Countrywide charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1. The district court granted summary judgment for Countrywide and plaintiffs appealed. The court held that because interest accrued for the two days before plaintiffs receive the loan discount and settlement/closing fee as a result of the alleged MSMLA violations, plaintiffs have raised a material issue of fact as to whether the alleged violations caused their loss. The court also held that because the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges, it violated the MSMLA. The court further held that because the document processing/delivery fee violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest Countrywide collected on plaintiffs' loan was an additional violation of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Debtor appealed from the Order of the Bankruptcy Court appointing a trustee in its involuntary Chapter 11 case. The court held that since the record supported a finding of cause under 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1), and that the appointment of a trustee was in the interest of creditors and the estate under section 1104(a)(2), the appointment of the trustee was mandatory. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court's order was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the conversion of a railroad line on plaintiffs' property to a public trail, pursuant to the National Trail System Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. 1241 et seq. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, brought suit against defendant, alleging claims of inverse condemnation and trespass under Missouri law. After defendant removed the case to federal district court, that court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the applicable statutes of limitations had expired on both of plaintiffs' claims. The court held that because plaintiffs did not file their suit until December 23, 2002, both claims were time-barred, absent a tolling a provision or some exception to the statute of limitations. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to allege a continuous trespass and their trespass claim was barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations.