Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Indianola (City) adopted a land-use ordinance requiring the enclosure of "figure eight cars," among other racing vehicles, when two or more such cars were present. Iowa Assurance Corporation and its co-plaintiffs (collectively referred to as "Watson") sued the City, arguing that the ordinance created an uncompensated regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. At issue was whether the district court erred in using the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York framework to analyze his takings claim. The court held that the district court correctly determined that the ordinance should not be analyzed under the standards of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., where the ordinance did not erode Watson's right to exclude others from property, which was central to establishing a Loretto claim. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that the takings test articulated in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission did not apply to the ordinance where the ordinance did not require Watson to dedicate any portion of his property to either the City's or the public's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the well-reasoned judgment of the district court in its entirety.

The Andersons appealed the grant of summary judgment by the district court in favor of Hess Corporation (Hess), the successor in interest to and lessee of mineral rights on the Andersons' land. The Andersons contended that the district court erred in construing the five leases at issue as requiring Hess to engage in "drilling operations" rather than actual "drilling" in order to extend the primary terms of the leases and granting Hess's motion for summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the Andersons' question regarding the meaning of the phrase "engaged in drilling or reworking operations." The court also held that this disputed lease language was not ambiguous and meant "engaged in drilling operations or reworking operations." Therefore, the district court correctly interpreted the disputed lease language and properly granted summary judgment in favor of Hess on the Andersons' quiet title claim.

Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, U.S. Bank, N.A. (U.S. Bank) seeking to invalidate the foreclosure and sale of his home. Plaintiff alleged that the mortgage that the lender relied upon in foreclosing on his home was defective and therefore could not provide a valid basis for foreclosure under Minnesota law and that the lender violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq., by failing to provide required notice to plaintiff of his ability to cancel the transaction and by refusing to cancel the mortgage when plaintiff exercised his right to rescind the mortgage on those grounds. The court declined to reach plaintiff's Minnesota Statute 523.23 argument where plaintiff conceded he never cited to this provision to the district court at trial nor in his motion for new trial or amended verdict. The court also held that plaintiff's wife was authorized to receive the Notice of Right to Cancel on plaintiff's behalf; plaintiff cited to no evidence or legal authority that the second Notice of Right to Cancel was required under TILA; plaintiff had no standing to challenge the lender's failure to send the second notice to his former wife; and plaintiff had not overcome the rebuttable presumption of delivery of the required notice to him. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from the replevin actions filed by Klein Bank against debtors. Klein Bank appealed from the Orders of the Bankruptcy Court denying its motions to remand its replevin actions which had been removed from the state court to the bankruptcy court. In denying the motions, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that replevin actions were core proceedings. While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court clarified that core proceedings were limited to those "arising under or arising in" a bankruptcy case. Based on that, the court now concluded that the matters involved in the replevin actions were not core proceedings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further findings on the question of whether the court was required to abstain under 28 U.S.C. 1334(c)(2).

After appellant defaulted on her mortgage, Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide) foreclosed on the property. Appellant filed suit, alleging that Countrywide violated Minnesota's Farmer-Lender Mediation Act (FMLA), Minnesota Statues 583.20-583.32, by failing to engage in mediation before foreclosure. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Countrywide. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the record failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that the 6.21 acre parcel was "principally used for farming," as defined in the FMLA. The court also held that appellant failed to plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and thus, summary judgment in favor of Countrywide was appropriate.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class, sued defendant under the Missouri Second Mortgage Loan Act (MSMLA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.231-408.241, alleging that defendant charged them unauthorized interest and fees in violation of section 408.233.1 of the MSMLA. At issue was whether defendants violated the MSMLA by charging plaintiffs a loan discount, settlement/closing fee, document processing/delivery fee, and prepaid interest. The court held that plaintiffs did suffer a loss of money when defendant charged the loan discount, although plaintiffs received the loan discount amount two days later as part of a loan disbursement. The court also held that it could not decide whether the loan discount and the settlement/closing fee violated the MSMLA and remanded for further proceedings. The court further held that the document processing/delivery fee was not included in section 408.233's exclusive list of authorized charges and violated the MSMLA. The court finally held that because the processing/delivery free violated the MSMLA, the prepaid interest was an additional violation of the statute. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued the Wild Rose Casino and an agent of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as state law claims for false arrest and imprisonment where plaintiff was arrested for trespass when she entered the casino after having signed two voluntary exclusion forms at the casino's predecessor establishment. Charges against plaintiff were subsequently dropped. Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the agent and the casino. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity where he had an objectively reasonable belief that plaintiff was trespassing. The court also held that the release contained in the 2005 form that plaintiff signed was valid and enforceable and therefore, absolved the casino of any liability from plaintiff's constitutional and state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued the City of Jonesboro, its mayor, and the members of its city council, alleging that methane gas from a city landfill invaded a tract of land owned by plaintiff and so reduced its value which amounted to a taking of the property by the city. Plaintiff sought just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff's claims were barred by issue preclusion and, in the alternative, that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court held that plaintiff's claims did not complain of injuries caused by the state court judgment, but of injuries caused by the invasion of plaintiff's land by methane emanating from the city's landfill. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply to those claims. The court found that the parties and the district court focused on issue preclusion, but the court held that the case was more readily resolved based on claim preclusion. Thus, the court held that plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion and that plaintiff did not avoid claim preclusion through the reservation of federal rights that he included in the third amended complaint in the state court action. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Following remand for consideration of the effect of 11 U.S.C. 544(a) on the trustee's motion to sell, the bankruptcy court entered judgment denying the trustee's request to sell jointly-owned real estate free and clear of defendant co-owner's interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 363(b) and (h). The Chapter 7 trustee appealed. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sell where, based on the record before it, the bankruptcy court concluded that the trustee had not met his burden of proving that the benefit to the bankruptcy estate of the sale outweighed the detriment to defendant and where the bankruptcy court's findings of fact regarding the benefit of the estate and detriment to defendant were not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

St. Charles Tower, Inc. (St. Charles) filed suit against defendants after they declined to issue St. Charles a conditional use permit necessary to construct a proposed cell-phone tower in Franklin County. After the district court entered a consent judgment, trustees of a homeowner's association that opposed construction of the tower (Intervenors) sought to intervene in the litigation in order to challenge the consent judgment on the grounds that it violated state law. The district court granted their motion to intervene but denied their motion to alter, amend, or vacate the consent judgment and intervenors appealed. The court held that the consent judgment impermissibly circumvented sections 32 and 81 of the Land Use Regulations. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in holding that the consent judgment did not violate state law and that any violation was justified as a necessary remedy for a violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B)(v). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of intervenors' motion and remanded for further proceedings.