Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Counties sued to quiet title to section line rights-of-way within the Little Missouri National Grassland, a section of the Dakota Prairie Grasslands, and six roads located in McKenzie County. The State also sought to quiet title to section line rights-of-way in the Little Missouri grassland and two other parts of the Dakota Prairie Grasslands. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss all of the State’s claims and the Counties’ claim as to the Little Missouri National Grassland, and Plaintiffs appealed.The court found the statute of limitations began to run as to the Counties when they “knew or should have known” of the government’s claim. The statute of limitations would not begin to run as to the State until the government issued “public communications” that were “sufficiently specific as to be reasonably calculated” to give the State notice. Here, the Travel Plans and Public Notices were sufficient notice of the government’s exclusive claim to the 33 feet on either side of the section lines within the Dakota Prairie Grasslands over which Plaintiffs claim a right-of-way.Plaintiffs also argue that if the court finds that the Travel Plans and Public Notices did put Plaintiffs on notice, any such notice was only as to the section lines that fall within the specific areas where motor vehicle access was restricted. The court found that the Travel Plans and Public Notices made an adverse claim as to all the national grasslands within North Dakota, including areas over which USFS chose not to restrict travel. View "North Dakota v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the landlords' motion for a preliminary injunction in an action challenging the Minneapolis City Council's enactment of Ordinance No. 244.2030 under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (and similar provisions of the Minnesota Constitution). The Ordinance requires landlords to evaluate applicants for rental housing by either (1) "inclusive screening criteria" or (2) "individualized assessment."The court concluded that the landlords have neither demonstrated a physical-invasion taking nor a Penn Central taking. The court stated that, due to the individualized assessment option, the Ordinance is a restriction on the landlords' ability to use their property, not a physical-invasion taking. Furthermore, the district court properly ruled that the landlords offered nothing but conclusory assertions of economic impact and interference with investment-backed expectations. Finally, the Ordinance withstands rational basis review where it does not infringe a fundamental right and where the government had a legitimate purpose in ameliorating problems that often prevent people from finding housing. View "301, 712, 2103 and 3151 LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed Merechka's home, Vigilant denied his insurance claim, which sought $634,000 for the dwelling and $475,500 for its contents. During its investigation, Vigilant discovered that Merechka had filed for bankruptcy about four years earlier. According to his bankruptcy petition, he had around $9,000 in personal property, well short of the more than $600,000 (or $325,825, according to a third-party appraiser) that he reported to Vigilant. Without an explanation for the discrepancy, Vigilant suspected insurance fraud. Merechka assured Vigilant that he had acquired nearly all of his personal property after the bankruptcy using several sources of income: $700 per week he received for working for his brother, a $1,300 monthly social-security payment, and periodic payments from an investment account. The numbers did not add up, so Vigilant denied coverage under the policy’s concealment-or-fraud provision.Merechka sued. Vigilant filed a counterclaim, seeking reimbursement for the nearly $400,000 it had paid to Merechka’s mortgage lender. Applying Arkansas law, the district court determined that neither side owed anything. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and remanded Vigilant’s claim. No reasonable juror could believe that Merechka acquired so much property in such a short time on his modest income; the circumstances indicate that the falsehood was intentional. View "Merechka v. Vigilant Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit to build student housing on the Russellville property, next to Arkansas Tech University. The land is bordered by two waterways. Downstream from the tract, the Corps maintains the Russellville Dike and Prairie Creek Pumping Station to protect Russellville from flooding by pumping water into the backwaters of the Arkansas River, away from the city. Upstream from the station is a sump, 730 acres of low-lying land that holds water that then flows toward the pumping station, The Corps purchased flowage easements giving it the right to flood the land subject to those easements to a certain elevation. Part of the tract at issue lies within the sump and is subject to an easement, "that no structures for human habitation shall be constructed." The owner proposed four apartment buildings on land subject to the easement.The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of a permit. It is unlawful for anyone "in any manner whatever [to] impair the usefulness of any . . . work built by the United States . . . to prevent floods" unless the Corps permits it, 33 U.S.C. 408(a). The proposed construction would impair the usefulness of the Corps's pumping station. The Corps found that the structures would result in water velocities and depths that would be "a significant hazard that can deny escape," and "may threaten the lives and security of the people and property in Russellville.” View "Russellville Legends LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Bank of the West in state court, seeking to set aside the trustee's sale of his property. After the claim was dismissed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding U.S. Bank as a defendant. The case was removed to federal district court where it was ultimately dismissed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal orders, concluding that the federal law violations as alleged in the second amended complaint all occurred prior to the institution and maintenance of any foreclosure activity. Therefore, they were not defects in the trustee's sale under Nebraska law. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint where the motion was procedurally defaulted and granting leave would be futile. View "Anderson v. Bank of the West" on Justia Law

Jacqueline Mills was convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and bribery. These charges were related to a years-long scheme to defraud the United States of monies intended to feed low-income children. The jury found that fourteen properties and monies were traceable to the proceeds of Mills's fraud. Rosie and John Farr, Mills's mother and stepfather, filed third party petitions asserting interests in various properties to be forfeited, including monies from a Southern Bancorp account number. The forfeiture order became final as to Mills when she was sentenced, but it remained preliminary as to the Farrs until the ancillary proceeding concluded. In the two years between the Farrs filing their third party petitions and the government moving for summary judgment, the Farrs failed to present evidence supporting their claims of a superior ownership interest in the Southern Bancorp account.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, on this record, the Farrs failed to prove a prior interest in the property under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(A) because the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is committed, and when they come into existence, the government's interest under the relation-back doctrine immediately vests. Furthermore, the Farrs failed to present evidence that they qualify as bona fide purchasers for value under section 853(n)(6)(B). The court also concluded that excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) does not include ignorance or carelessness on the part of an attorney, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying that general rule in this case. Finally, as in United States v. Waits, it is clear that the Farrs as third parties had adequate notice the government intended to seek forfeiture, as their timely third party petitions confirmed. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

In 2017, Andeavor agreed with the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, known as the Three Affiliated Tribes, to renew the right-of-way over tribal lands, and to pay trespass damages for continued operation of an oil pipeline after expiration. Andeavor then began renewal negotiations with individual Indian landowners. In 2018, the Allottees filed a putative class action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for ongoing trespass and injunctive relief requiring Andeavor to dismantle the pipeline. The district court granted Andeavor's motion to dismiss, concluding that the Allottees failed to exhaust administrative remedies with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).The Eighth Circuit concluded that the case turns on issues sufficiently within the primary jurisdiction of the BIA to warrant a stay, rather than dismissal, to give the BIA opportunity to take further action. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court denied the Allottees' motion to dismiss Robin Fredericks as a plaintiff. View "Chase v. Andeavor Logistics, L.P." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City in an action brought by plaintiffs, challenging its enforcement of the City's zoning regulations against them. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from the City's enforcement of commercial zoning regulations.Even assuming zoning-enforcement decisions are susceptible to class-of-one challenges, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the City lacked a rational basis for its differential treatment of plaintiffs and other property owners. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they are identical or directly comparable to the comparator property owners in every material respect. The court also concluded that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence of affirmative misconduct to withstand summary judgment on their equitable-estoppel claim. View "Bruning v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's order that fully voided Waltrip's judicial lien on debtor's homestead. In this case, after Waltrip filed suit against debtor in October 2016 for breach of contract in Missouri state court, a fire damaged debtor's home. The homeowner's insurance policy paid debtor for damages and Waltrip obtained a consent judgment that gave Waltrip a judicial lien against the homestead property. The parties do not dispute that Waltrip had a valid, avoidable lien that was affixed to debtor's property before she filed her bankruptcy petition. At issue is the extent to which Waltrip's lien impairs debtor's claimed homestead exemption.The court concluded, under Missouri law, that when property is properly exempted under 11 U.S.C. 522, a debtor is the sole owner of the insurance proceeds covering the property. Without any precedent to support Waltrip's position, the court declined to include the amount of the insurance payout when calculating the fair market value of debtor's home on the petition date, and thus the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling using the $3,000 to $6,000 valuation of the unrepaired, fire-damaged property as determined on the petition date. The court also concluded that, because Waltrip's lien is smaller than the extent of the impairment, the entirety of Waltrip's lien can be avoided. Finally, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the case to avoid the lien or in denying Waltrip's requests for attorneys' fees and costs related to the reopening. View "David G. Waltrip, LLC v. Sawyers" on Justia Law