Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed a class action claiming the right to title and possession of twelve square miles of land in southern Minnesota. Appellants allege that they are lineal descendants of the Mdewakanton band of the Sioux tribe who were loyal to the United States during the 1862 uprising, and that the Secretary of the Interior set apart the twelve square miles for the loyal Mdewakanton and their descendants. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that appellants failed to state a claim under federal common law as set forth in the progeny of Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida; the district court properly granted defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863, Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 9, 12 Stat. 652, 654, does not provide a private remedy to the loyal Mdewakanton; the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions, and the claims regarding the appellate-cost bond are moot; and, because the district court made no findings regarding the propriety of the Municipal Appelllees' motion for costs, the motion was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of appellees' motion to dismiss; vacated the order imposing sanctions and requiring an appellate-cost bond; and remanded for limited consideration of Municipal Appellees’ motion for costs Under Rule 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. 1920. View "Wolfchild v. Redwood County" on Justia Law

The utility and its insurers filed suit against BendTec for negligence, alleging that its pipes were the source of grit and had been improperly cleaned. The district court granted summary judgment to BendTec. The court affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the district court's conclusion that the negligence claim was barred under the two year limitations period in Minn. Stat. 541.051 since the installation of the turbine was an improvement to real property. Because the two year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. 541.051 applies and the subdivision 1(e) exception does not, and plaintiffs did not file this lawsuit within the limitations period, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to BendTec. View "Associated Electric & Gas Ins. v. BendTec, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Green Tree to prevent it from foreclosing on plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs alleged that Green Tree lacked authority to foreclose. The district court granted Green Tree's motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs' lack of standing to challenge the assignment between creditors and concluded that plaintiffs' notice claim failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The court concluded that plaintiffs' invalid assignment claim is nearly identical to the claim in Quale v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, where the court determined the homeowners did not have standing to raise such a claim because they “were not injured by the assignment” and any harm to the homeowners was not fairly traceable to the allegedly invalid assignment. The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their amended complaint where plaintiffs failed to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

BN applied for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of a railroad line. The STB granted but then revoked an exemption prior to completion of the abandonment and instead authorized BN to enter into an “interim trail use/rail banking agreement” in accordance with the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), as implemented by the STB in 49 C.F.R. 1152.29. In 2014, plaintiffs, ranchers who own properties underlying and surrounding the railway right-of-way easement, filed two separate actions against the State and the Department, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. The district court consolidated the two cases and concluded that plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, and granted Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are not within the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction, but that the Amended Complaints - alleging that defendants “stand in the shoes” of the BN, and therefore defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on plaintiffs’ rights as servient landowners,- failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court modified part of the district court judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Trevarton v. South Dakota" on Justia Law

Quality Ag filed suit contending that it owns a sidetrack by means of adverse possession due to its continuous possession of the sidetrack from August 25, 2000 to August 25, 2010. BNSF has stored equipment on the sidetrack since one of its trains derailed near it on August 3, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, concluding that the adverse possession claim by Quality Ag was insufficiently pled, that BNSF owns the sidetrack, and that the agreement alleged by Quality Ag lacked consideration. The court concluded that Quality Ag's claim of adverse possession fails since it did not exclusively possess the sidetrack for at least ten years. Because Quality Ag has not shown that it owns the sidetrack, its breach of contract claim also fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Quality Ag. Serv. of Iowa, Inc. v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

In 1966, DeBough purchased a Minnesota residence and surrounding 80 acres for $25,000. In 2006, DeBough sold the property for $1.4 million under an installment contract, secured by the property. Because the property was his principal residence,DeBough excluded $500,000 of gain from income on his 2006 tax return, 26 U.S.C. 121. DeBough received $505,000 from the buyers and reported $56,920 as taxable installment sale income for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. In 2009, the buyers defaulted. DeBough reacquired the property, incurring $3,723 in costs. DeBough kept the $505,000 previously received from the buyers as liquidated damages. On his 2009 tax return, DeBough treated this event as a reacquisition of property in full satisfaction of indebtedness under 26 U.S.C. 1038. In calculating his realized gain, DeBough again applied the $500,000 principal-residence exclusion. DeBough reported $97,153 as long-term capital gains related to the reacquisition for tax year 2009. The Commissioner sent DeBough a notice of deficiency, having determined DeBough had underreported $448,080 in long-term capital gain for tax year 2009 by applying the principal-residence exclusion in his calculation. The Tax Court and Eighth Circuit agreed that DeBough was not entitled to the principal-residence exclusion because he had not resold the property within one year. View "DeBough v. Shulman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own mineral interests in Chalybeat Springs and granted 21 oil and gas leases based on those interests. EnerQuest and BP America are the lessees. The property interests in Chalybeat, including the leases at issue, are subject to a Unit Agreement that establishes how the oil and gas extracted from certain formations will be divided and provides for a unit operator with the exclusive right to develop the oil and gas resources described in the Unit Agreement. In the late 1990s, PetroQuest became the operator of the Chalybeat Unit. Unhappy with the level of extraction, lessors filed suit against EnerQuest and BP, seeking partial cancellation of the oil and gas leases on the ground that EnerQuest and BP breached implied covenants in the leases to develop the oil and gas minerals. The district court granted the companies’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the lessors had not provided EnerQuest and BP with required notice and opportunity to cure a breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs’ earlier effort to dissolve the Chalybeat Unit constituted notice. View "Lewis v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Rogers’s 2005 mortgage on her Minnesota home was executed in favor of Countrywide and it listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee. In 2008, MERS transferred its interest in the mortgage to a securitized mortgage trust by assigning the mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate holders. Bank of New York was party to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement between various entities. According to Rogers, that Agreement governed the mortgage trust and required “that all mortgages to be included in the corpus of the Mortgage Trust were to be transferred into the Mortgage Trust between June 1, 2005 and August 8, 2005.” In 2012, Bank of New York commenced foreclosure proceedings on Rogers’s house, and purchased the house at a sheriff’s sale. Rogers sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the 2008 assignment of her mortgage to the trust violated the Agreement. The district court dismissed, holding Rogers did not have standing to challenge the foreclosure on the ground that the defendants violated an agreement to which Rogers was not party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rogers lacked standing. View "Rogers v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

After refinancing a home mortgage in 2007, Beukes, mailed a notice of rescission in 2010, which was rejected. Beukes stopped making payments. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee for the lender, published notices of a mortgage foreclosure sale. MERS ultimately purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Beukes sued, seeking rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), claiming that the amount disclosed as the finance charge on the loan understated the amount they were actually charged by $944.31. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit held an appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, (2015), then affirmed the dismissal. Because Beukes mailed notice within three years, the right of rescission had not expired, but the finance charge disclosed in 2007 did not vary from the actual finance charge by more than one-half of one percent of the total amount financed, so it must be treated as accurate. Therefore, the right to rescind expired three business days after delivery of the disclosures. Beukes did not timely attempt to exercise any expanded right to rescind arising from section 1635(i)(2) that might have been available after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. View "Beukes v. GMAC Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law