Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against Green Tree to prevent it from foreclosing on plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs alleged that Green Tree lacked authority to foreclose. The district court granted Green Tree's motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs' lack of standing to challenge the assignment between creditors and concluded that plaintiffs' notice claim failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The court concluded that plaintiffs' invalid assignment claim is nearly identical to the claim in Quale v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, where the court determined the homeowners did not have standing to raise such a claim because they “were not injured by the assignment” and any harm to the homeowners was not fairly traceable to the allegedly invalid assignment. The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their amended complaint where plaintiffs failed to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

BN applied for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of a railroad line. The STB granted but then revoked an exemption prior to completion of the abandonment and instead authorized BN to enter into an “interim trail use/rail banking agreement” in accordance with the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), as implemented by the STB in 49 C.F.R. 1152.29. In 2014, plaintiffs, ranchers who own properties underlying and surrounding the railway right-of-way easement, filed two separate actions against the State and the Department, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. The district court consolidated the two cases and concluded that plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, and granted Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are not within the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction, but that the Amended Complaints - alleging that defendants “stand in the shoes” of the BN, and therefore defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on plaintiffs’ rights as servient landowners,- failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court modified part of the district court judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Trevarton v. South Dakota" on Justia Law

Quality Ag filed suit contending that it owns a sidetrack by means of adverse possession due to its continuous possession of the sidetrack from August 25, 2000 to August 25, 2010. BNSF has stored equipment on the sidetrack since one of its trains derailed near it on August 3, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, concluding that the adverse possession claim by Quality Ag was insufficiently pled, that BNSF owns the sidetrack, and that the agreement alleged by Quality Ag lacked consideration. The court concluded that Quality Ag's claim of adverse possession fails since it did not exclusively possess the sidetrack for at least ten years. Because Quality Ag has not shown that it owns the sidetrack, its breach of contract claim also fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Quality Ag. Serv. of Iowa, Inc. v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law

In 1966, DeBough purchased a Minnesota residence and surrounding 80 acres for $25,000. In 2006, DeBough sold the property for $1.4 million under an installment contract, secured by the property. Because the property was his principal residence,DeBough excluded $500,000 of gain from income on his 2006 tax return, 26 U.S.C. 121. DeBough received $505,000 from the buyers and reported $56,920 as taxable installment sale income for tax years 2006, 2007, and 2008. In 2009, the buyers defaulted. DeBough reacquired the property, incurring $3,723 in costs. DeBough kept the $505,000 previously received from the buyers as liquidated damages. On his 2009 tax return, DeBough treated this event as a reacquisition of property in full satisfaction of indebtedness under 26 U.S.C. 1038. In calculating his realized gain, DeBough again applied the $500,000 principal-residence exclusion. DeBough reported $97,153 as long-term capital gains related to the reacquisition for tax year 2009. The Commissioner sent DeBough a notice of deficiency, having determined DeBough had underreported $448,080 in long-term capital gain for tax year 2009 by applying the principal-residence exclusion in his calculation. The Tax Court and Eighth Circuit agreed that DeBough was not entitled to the principal-residence exclusion because he had not resold the property within one year. View "DeBough v. Shulman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own mineral interests in Chalybeat Springs and granted 21 oil and gas leases based on those interests. EnerQuest and BP America are the lessees. The property interests in Chalybeat, including the leases at issue, are subject to a Unit Agreement that establishes how the oil and gas extracted from certain formations will be divided and provides for a unit operator with the exclusive right to develop the oil and gas resources described in the Unit Agreement. In the late 1990s, PetroQuest became the operator of the Chalybeat Unit. Unhappy with the level of extraction, lessors filed suit against EnerQuest and BP, seeking partial cancellation of the oil and gas leases on the ground that EnerQuest and BP breached implied covenants in the leases to develop the oil and gas minerals. The district court granted the companies’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the lessors had not provided EnerQuest and BP with required notice and opportunity to cure a breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs’ earlier effort to dissolve the Chalybeat Unit constituted notice. View "Lewis v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Rogers’s 2005 mortgage on her Minnesota home was executed in favor of Countrywide and it listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as the mortgagee. In 2008, MERS transferred its interest in the mortgage to a securitized mortgage trust by assigning the mortgage to Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate holders. Bank of New York was party to a Pooling and Servicing Agreement between various entities. According to Rogers, that Agreement governed the mortgage trust and required “that all mortgages to be included in the corpus of the Mortgage Trust were to be transferred into the Mortgage Trust between June 1, 2005 and August 8, 2005.” In 2012, Bank of New York commenced foreclosure proceedings on Rogers’s house, and purchased the house at a sheriff’s sale. Rogers sought a declaratory judgment that the foreclosure was invalid, claiming that the 2008 assignment of her mortgage to the trust violated the Agreement. The district court dismissed, holding Rogers did not have standing to challenge the foreclosure on the ground that the defendants violated an agreement to which Rogers was not party. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Rogers lacked standing. View "Rogers v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

After refinancing a home mortgage in 2007, Beukes, mailed a notice of rescission in 2010, which was rejected. Beukes stopped making payments. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee for the lender, published notices of a mortgage foreclosure sale. MERS ultimately purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Beukes sued, seeking rescission and damages under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635(a), claiming that the amount disclosed as the finance charge on the loan understated the amount they were actually charged by $944.31. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit held an appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, (2015), then affirmed the dismissal. Because Beukes mailed notice within three years, the right of rescission had not expired, but the finance charge disclosed in 2007 did not vary from the actual finance charge by more than one-half of one percent of the total amount financed, so it must be treated as accurate. Therefore, the right to rescind expired three business days after delivery of the disclosures. Beukes did not timely attempt to exercise any expanded right to rescind arising from section 1635(i)(2) that might have been available after the initiation of foreclosure proceedings. View "Beukes v. GMAC Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

Smith sought a conditional use permit (CUP) to build a 300-foot-tall cellular tower on a Washington County site zoned "Agriculture/Single-Family Residential." There are homes within one-quarter of a mile of the site. The Zoning Code authorizes a CUP upon findings: That the proposed use is compatible with the surrounding area; will not be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare; and will not be injurious to use and enjoyment of other property in the area for purposes already permitted, nor substantially diminish and impair property values within the area. The Planning Board approved the application. Neighbors appealed to the Quorum Court with arguments focused on "safety," "property values," the tower's "fit" with the area, proximity to their homes, and having purchased their homes specifically because of the surrounding scenery and views. Hearing participants discussed cellular phone reception; potential safety issues, particularly in inclement weather; proximity to residences; and impact on nearby residents' views and property values. The application was rejected. The district court and Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Washington County failed to provide a legally adequate explanation of its reasons for denial and that the denial was not based on substantial evidence in violation of the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. 332(c)(7)(B). View "Smith Commc'ns, LLC v. Washington Cnty." on Justia Law

In 2004, Streambend signed agreements to purchase two units in a Minneapolis residential condominium development, Ivy Hotel + Residences. Completion of the units was delayed, two additional floors were added without proper disclosure, and earnest moneys were removed from the trust account to pay construction costs without Streambend’s permission. Mechanics liens were filed in 2008 and not removed. Streambend requested return of its earnest moneys in 2009, but, defendants claimed the deposits were non-refundable. Streambend sued, alleging state law contract, fraud, and statutory claims and violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSA), 15 U.S.C. 1703(a)(2). The initial defendants were the developers, their real estate agent, and the title company, as escrow and disbursing agent. The district court dismissed ILSA claims against the developers for failure to plead fraud with the required specificity; granted summary judgment dismissing the ILSA claims against the title company on the merits; and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding refusals to permit Streambed to re-add a party whose prior dismissal on the merits was not challenged in an earlier appeal and to permit further amendment of the complaint. View "Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy Tower Minneapolis, LLC" on Justia Law