Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hardy filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. On her Schedule B, Hardy stated that she would be receiving a 2012 tax refund. On her Schedule C, Hardy claimed the majority of the refund as exempt. She noted that $2,000 of the refund was attributable to federal Child Tax Credit (CTC), 26 U.S.C. 24(d). She claimed that the CTC was a "public assistance benefit" that would be exempt from the bankruptcy estate under Missouri law. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee’s objection, finding that the CTC was not a public assistance benefit because the purpose of the credit was to "reduce the tax burden on working parents and to promote family values" and because the full credit was available to head-of-household filers with Modified Adjusted Gross Incomes (MAGI) of up to $75,000 and joint-married filers with MAGIs of up to $110,000. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, stating Hardy did not present evidence that only lower income families were eligible for the refundable portion of the credit. The Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Congress demonstrated intent to help low-income families through amendments to the Additional Child Tax Credit statute, sp the credit at issue qualifies as a public assistance benefit. View "Hardy v. Fink" on Justia Law

Jones owned SAM Packaging and owed several hundred thousand dollars in back taxes for 2006-2008. Jones refused to provide the IRS with bank statements, and later submitted statements, with blacked-out parts. He submitted financial disclosure forms, disclosing accounts at Mutual of Omaha Bank (MO), but not accounts at Community Credit Union. He directed his financial activity to the undisclosed accounts. When the IRS levied on Jones’s MO accounts, they were nearly empty. Jones commingled personal and business accounts, then began dealing in cash. He refused to turn over accounts receivable, stating that he would terminate the business before doing so. In 2010, he declared that SAM had been “suspended” and he was unemployed. He had started a new company to secretly serve his customers. The IRS summonsed customers and learned Jones had performed work without billing them, preventing levy on his accounts receivable. Jones pled guilty to tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The district court imposed a two-level enhancement for use of sophisticated means, as recommended in the PSR. After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months and sentenced Jones to 24 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Jones’s actions were typical of tax evasion offenses and did not make detection more difficult. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Butler sells agricultural and construction equipment, primarily for Caterpillar. In 2002, Butler formed North Central to take over its leasing operations. The companies are ultimately controlled by the same family and share space. Butler performs North Central’s accounting and ordering functions and initially pays the wages of its employees. Caterpillar assigned separate dealer codes, but Butler used its code to order equipment for itself and North Central. Under North Central's like-kind-exchange (LKE) program, North Central sold its used equipment to third parties, who paid a qualified intermediary, Accruit, which forwarded proceeds to Butler; Butler purchased new Caterpillar equipment for North Central and transferred it to North Central via Accruit, charging the same amount that Butler paid for the equipment. Butler's LKE transactions facilitated favorable Caterpillar financing terms. Butler essentially received a six-month, interest-free loan from each exchange. From 2004-2007 North Central claimed nonrecognition treatment of gains from 398 LKE transactions under IRC 1031, so that the gain was not included in gross income at the time of actual sale or gain. The IRS declared that the transactions were not entitled to nonrecognition treatment, reasoning that North Central structured the transactions to avoid the related-party exchange restrictions of section 1031(f). The district court analyzed Butler's unfettered access to the cash proceeds and the relative complexity of the transactions and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "North Cent. Rental & Leasing, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001, N.D. Laws 53-06.2-10.1 was amended to authorize “account wagering,” a form of parimutuel wagering in which an individual deposits money in an account and, through a licensed simulcast service provider authorized to operate a simulcast parimutuel wagering system, uses the balance to pay for parimutuel wagers. The legislature did not make corresponding changes to section 53-06.2-11 or otherwise alter the statutory takeout formulas to authorize a tax on account wagering until 2007. Racing Services (RSI), formerly a state-licensed horse racing simulcast service provider, filed bankruptcy. PW Enterprises, its largest non-governmental creditor filed suit on behalf of all creditors to recover money the state collected from RSI as taxes on parimutuel account wagering. The district court held that the money must be returned to the bankruptcy estate because North Dakota law did not authorize the state to collect taxes on account wagering before 2007. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Though some members of the legislature may have understood account wagering would be taxed similarly to existing forms of parimutuel wagering, that belief does not make the statute as written ambiguous or require a court to strain to infer a legislative intent that is entirely absent from the statutory language. View "PW Enters., Inc. v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Minneapolis imposes an annual vacant building registration fee on owners of vacant buildings “to recover all costs incurred by the city for monitoring and regulating vacant buildings, including nuisance abatement, enforcement and administrative costs.” If unpaid, the city can levy and collect the fee as a special assessment against the property. DRB owns a vacant building in Minneapolis and for several years failed to pay that registration fee. In 2011, DRB received notice the city intended to assess $6,550 for DRB’s unpaid 2010 fee. After a hearing attended by DRB, an administrative hearing officer levied the fee. This process repeated in 2012 and a fee of $6,746 was levied. DRB did not appeal either assessment, but brought a separate suit, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landowners. A magistrate judge recommended judgment in favor of the city, concluding the city had provided DRB with proper notice of the assessments and DRB did not bring its challenges to the assessments within the statutory 30-day appeal period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adoption of the recommendation. View "DRB #24, LLC v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the Commissioner's determination that the USDA's Conservation Program (CRP) payments that appellants received were taxable as income from self-employment. The court entered judgment in favor of appellants, holding that the 2006 and 2007 CRP payments at issue were consideration paid by the government for use and occupancy of appellants' property. Consequently, they constituted rentals from real estate fully within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. 1402(a)(1). The court reversed and remanded.View "Morehouse v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court, challenging the Commission's notices of deficiency regarding their farmhouse. The Tax Court denied the petition, disallowing $42,694 in claimed deductions because taxpayers failed to prove that the farmhouse expenses were tied to a real estate property rental business for purposes of 26 U.S.C. 162, or related to property held for the production of income within the meaning of IRC 212. The court affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court.View "Meinhardt v. CIR" on Justia Law

Swift County filed suit against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHFA, alleging that the federal agencies violated state law by failing to pay taxes on the transfers of deeds to real property. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the federal agencies' motion to dismiss because the Exemption Statutes, 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2) and 12 U.S.C. 1452(e), established an exemption from all state taxation. The court concluded that the Exemption Statutes are a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and the federal agencies are federal instrumentalities, not privately-held corporations. View "Vadnais, et al. v. Federal National Mortgage, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, a software engineer, filed no federal individual income tax return for 2007. The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency alleging unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest of more than $250,000 based on a substitute return prepared by the IRS. On appeal, appellant challenged the Tax Court's IRA rollover and business bad debt rulings. The court concluded that appellant's April 30, 2007 contribution was a qualifying partial rollover contribution under I.R.C. 408(d)(3)(D) and appellant was entitled to reduce his taxable IRA distributions by $120,000. Accordingly, the court reversed the Tax Court's decision as to this issue. The court concluded that the Tax Court did not clearly err in finding that appellant failed to prove that his dominant motivation for making the four loans in question made them deductible bad debts when they became worthless in December 2007. The court remanded for a redetermination of the deficiency. View "Haury v. CIR" on Justia Law

Appellants, two couples, challenged the Tax Court's decisions disallowing their claims of dependency exemption deductions and child tax credits for a child of each husband's prior marriage. For each couple, the only tax year at issue, a year in which the ex-wife, the custodial parent, failed to sign a document stating that she "will not claim such child as a dependent" that year, even though she had agreed to provide that document if her ex-husband paid all required child support. The court reviewed the Tax Court's interpretation of the governing statute de novo and concluded that its decisions were consistent with the plain language of 26 U.S.C. 152(e)(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Armstrong, et al. v. C.I.R." on Justia Law