Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against various municipalities and their employees under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-25, after municipal and state personnel had accessed plaintiff’s personal information approximately sixty times between 2003 and 2012. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice but allowed her to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff instead requested that the district court enter final judgment dismissing her case with prejudice. Then plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision without receiving the judgment she requested. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not obtain a final judgment following the district court’s dismissal of her complaint with leave to amend, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park" on Justia Law

BN applied for an exemption permitting expeditious abandonment of a railroad line. The STB granted but then revoked an exemption prior to completion of the abandonment and instead authorized BN to enter into an “interim trail use/rail banking agreement” in accordance with the National Trails System Act (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C. 1247(d), as implemented by the STB in 49 C.F.R. 1152.29. In 2014, plaintiffs, ranchers who own properties underlying and surrounding the railway right-of-way easement, filed two separate actions against the State and the Department, seeking a declaration quieting title to the right-of-way because the easement terminated by operation of law when BN ceased railroad operations. The district court consolidated the two cases and concluded that plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB, and granted Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims are not within the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction, but that the Amended Complaints - alleging that defendants “stand in the shoes” of the BN, and therefore defendants cannot impose non-railroad restrictions on plaintiffs’ rights as servient landowners,- failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court modified part of the district court judgment and otherwise affirmed. View "Trevarton v. South Dakota" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit against BNSF and its contractor, Massman, alleging that the loss they suffered when their family farm was flooded was caused by BNSF's maintenance of a railway embankment running across their farm. The Board concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), preempted petitioners' state law claims but that they retained a federal claim based on BNSF's alleged violation of federal regulations. The court concluded that petitioner failed to properly challenge the Board's use of the unreasonable-burden-or-interference test for as-applied preemption. Therefore, the court declined to overturn the Board's use of the test. The court also concluded that petitioners' state law claims unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation and the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Tubbs v. STB" on Justia Law

Mechanics, members of the Union and employees of Metro, filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 49 U.S.C. 5333, that Metro must establish a framework through which they could form a bargaining unit separate from the Union. The Union intervened and the district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that section 13(c) does not entitle mechanics to the relief they seek because Congress did not intend to provide a federal forum for disputes between unions and transit authorities; the language and structure of section 13(c) does not suggest that Congress intended to create a federal private cause of action; and the consistent theme in Section 13(c)’s legislative history was that “Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law[.]" Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stenger v. Bi-State Dev. Agency" on Justia Law

Around 4:20 a.m. Zhukov, driving a tractor-trailer on I-80, struck an object in the road. His vehicle lost air-brake pressure. Zhukov stopped with the trailer in the right-hand lane. Experts opined that he could have pulled completely onto the shoulder. Zhukov turned on his hazard lights and placed warning reflectors closer to the trailer than federal regulations require, in a formation that guided traffic to the right shoulder rather than the left lane. At 4:34 a.m., Johnson’s semi-tractor-trailer crashed into Zhukov’s trailer without slowing down, killing Johnson, causing a fire, and completely blocking both lanes. The Schmidts, traveling in two cars, safely stopped at the end of the traffic jam. Vehicles in the lineup -- including both Schmidt cars and the truck in front of them -- activated hazard lights; emergency vehicles had overhead lights flashing. At 5:14 a.m., Slezak’s semitractor-trailer smashed into Schmidt’s car at 75 miles per hour, propelling Christopher’s car into his wife’s car, which was pushed under a semi-trailer. The entire Schmidt family perished. A Nebraska State Trooper determined that Slezak did not brake or attempt to avoid the cars; he had been driving for at least 14 hours -- three more than permitted by 49 C.F.R. 395.3(a)(3)(i). The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Zhukov and Zhukov’s and Johnson’s employers. Schmidts’ injuries were not proximately caused by their negligence because the unanticipated negligence of Slezak was an “efficient intervening cause.” View "Baumann v. Zhukov" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation (tasked with regulating the transportation of hazardous materials) finalized extensive amendments to the regulations for the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, 7 49 C.F.R. 171-174 & 179). The regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments leading to tragic harms. Chemical and fertilizer entities sought to enjoin the railway (CP) from imposing a requirement that any TIH materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface Transportation Board should address whether CP's requirement is reasonable in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed without prejudice. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding no likelihood of irreparable harm. The court rejected an argument that CP's requirement would amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops. Any minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. Soo Line R.R." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Missouri Transportation Development District Act (Mo. Rev. Stat. 238.200), St. Louis City and University City passed resolutions and filed a petition, seeking to create the proposed District to build a trolley-car rail system and to fund the project by imposing up to a one percent sales tax on retail sales in the proposed District. Notice was published in two newspapers for four weeks. No one opposed the proposal or sought to join the suit. In 2007, the court found that the proposal neither illegal nor unconstitutional and certified a ballot question for registered voters residing or owning property within the proposed District. Voters approved the ballot question and, in 2008, the court entered final judgment. The sales tax was imposed and has been paid and collected since 2008. In 2013, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the District was not lawfully created and a permanent injunction barring the District from building and operating the trolley-car system. The district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing and granted the District summary judgment on another claim as precluded by state judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a plaintiff’s claim that he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice of the state lawsuit. View "Glickert v. Loop Trolley Transp. Dev. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701. View "Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 2007, while operating a truck, Yelder, an employee of Yelder-N-Son Trucking, collided with a Tri-National truck, causing extensive property damage. Tri-National filed a claim with its insurer, Harco, which paid $91,100 and retained a subrogation interest. Yelder was insured by Canal with an MCS-90 endorsement, mandated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793. In 2010, Canal sought a declaratory judgment against the Yelder defendants and Harco. An Alabama court entered default judgment against the Yelder defendants only, stating Canal had no duty to defend or indemnify them under the Canal policy. The court made no declaration about whether the MCS-90 endorsement requires a tortfeasor’s insurer to compensate an injured party when the injured party has already been compensated by its own insurer. Tri-National then sued the Yelders in Missouri and obtained a $91,100 default judgment. Tri-National sought equitable garnishment against Canal, apparently on behalf of Harco. Canal removed the action to the federal district court, which granted Tri-National’s motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the MCS-90 does require such compensation. The circumstance of Tri-National carrying its own insurance did not absolve Canal of its obligations under the endorsement View "Tri-National, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Union Pacific filed suit against Progress Rail, alleging that Progress Rail negligently reconditioned certain railcar axles, causing the axles to fail and two trains to derail. A jury returned a verdict for Progress Rail and Union Pacific appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Union Pacific's metallurgical engineer's opinion and in admitting the opinion of Progress Rail's expert. Progress Rail filed a conditional cross-appeal. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the engineer's opinion that the axle failures were caused by corrosion pits that Progress Rail failed to remove when it reconditioned the axles because the engineer could not say when the corrosion pits formed and could not trace the fatigue cracks that caused the axles to fail to specific corrosion pits. In this case, the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding the engineer's ultimate opinion as unreliable. The court also concluded that Progress Rail laid an adequate foundation for Progress Rail's expert's opinions and the district court acted within its discretion when it overruled Union Pacific's objections. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Progress Rail Serv. Corp." on Justia Law