Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Allen and Mallet appealed their conviction of conspiring to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base. The court concluded that Allen's speedy trial rights were not violated where his trial began within the seventy-day requirement; Allen failed to establish a Sixth Amendment violation because he was unable to show the prejudice of pretrial delay and caused much of the delay himself; Mallett's Batson challenge was rejected where the prosecutor provided race-neutral justifications for striking Juror 19; there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine the conspiracy involved at least 280 grams of crack cocaine; and Mallett failed to demonstrate the necessary severe or compelling prejudice stemming from his joint trial with Allen sufficient to receive any relief on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Mallett" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana (Count I) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (Count II). The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions. The Government conceded that the district court's determination of a seven-year mandatory minimum in the absence of a jury finding violated the Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment quieting title to an interest in the Bakken formation that Phillip Armstrong purchased from Berco. Armstrong also filed suit against Encore for breaching a Letter Offer and for trespassing on, and converting the oil and gas attributable to, Armstrong's interest. Berco counterclaimed. The court affirmed the dismissal of Armstrong's quiet-title claim, based on the district court's conclusion that the Purchase Agreement and Assignment, taken together, conveyed to Armstrong a wellbore-only assignment; Armstrong's trespass claim was properly dismissed because Armstrong did not assert that Encore interfered with his use of the two wellbores; Armstrong's conversion claim was properly dismissed because Armstrong has an interest in only the Thompson and Yttredahl wellbores, the equipment associated with those wellbores, and the production through those two wellbores; the breach of contract claim was properly dismissed because Armstrong had no leasehold interest to transfer and thus could not comply with the Letter Offer; and the district court correctly ruled that Armstrong's unilateral alteration of Exhibit A before recording it rendered the recorded Assignment null and void. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Armstrong, et al. v. Berco Resources, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment excepting a debt owed to CFG from debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err by finding that debtor made a misrepresentation to CFG regarding how the proceeds of the loan would be used and that CFG justifiably relied on the misrepresentation. The court concluded that the misrepresentation was made with the requisite knowledge and intent to deceive where the bankruptcy court found that the debtor knew the representation was false. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Community Finance Group, Inc. v. Field" on Justia Law

AECI filed suit against the Union seeking to vacate the arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. Relying on the court's decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the district court ruled that the last chance agreement (LCA) superseded the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, when the arbitrator ignored the clear and unambiguous terms of the LCA, he imposed his personal standards of industrial justice. The court concluded that the district court read the Coca-Cola bottling decision too broadly. Where a CBA requires "just cause" to discipline or discharge an employee but fails to define the term, the arbitrator's broad authority to interpret the contract, to which the court must defer, includes defining and applying that term of the contract. Viewed from this perspective, the arbitrator's decision to sustain the Union's grievance must be enforced. Because the arbitrator specifically invoked and applied the just cause provision of the CBA, the contract between AECI and the Union that defined his authority, his decision "draws its essence" from the CBA. Accordingly, the arbitrator's decision sustaining the Union's grievance must be enforced. The court declined to enforce the portion of the award granting the employee back pay from the day he was suspended until the day he was discharged. The court reversed and remanded. View "Associated Electric Coop. v. IBEW" on Justia Law

First Tennessee and members of the Gregg family filed suit against Pathfinders and its assignees for breaching an oil and gas lease. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Pathfinder, finding the case analagous to Frein v. Windsor Weeping Mary, LP. The court concluded, as in Frein, the best evidence of Arkansas law, that a large-up front payment with a surrender clause creates an option to cancel the lease, which Pathfinder exercised. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Assoc., et al. v. Pathfinder Exploration, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of China, sought review of the BIA's denial of her motion to reopen her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where petitioner failed to produce documents that were previously unavailable to her 2010 merits hearing and that were material to the outcome of the proceeding. She failed to demonstrate the likely impact of any economic sanctions imposed for her violations of China's one-child policy or the probability that she would be subject to sterilization in her particular province. Petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for her substantive asylum eligibility. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the BIA evaluated her exhibits too strictly where the court noted that the BIA correctly found that petitioner's documents from China were not sufficiently authenticated in any manner and were therefore not considered genuine, authentic, and objectively reasonable evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chen v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

United filed a declaratory judgment action against Titan, seeking a declaration that United did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify Titan against a pending state-court lawsuit because the policy's absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage for the claims raised in the lawsuit. Titan counter-claimed for relief. The district court granted Titan's motion and denied United's, entering a judgment declaring that United owed a duty to defend and indemnify Titan against the state-court lawsuit. The court concluded that an ordinary person of average understanding purchasing the policy would consider TIAH, an acrylic concrete sealant, to fall unambiguously within the policy's definition of "pollutant." Because the district court premised its denial of United's motion for summary judgment exclusively on the erroneous conclusion that TIAH does not constitute a pollutant, the court vacated the district court's order. The court declined to direct the entry of summary judgment in favor of United. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Titan Contractors Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Bridgestone for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA), 407.020.1 RSMo. Plaintiff alleged that a shop supply fee was for profit, not supplies. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's Rule 56(d) motion because the affidavit supporting the motion provided only speculative hope of finding evidence to support her claim; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Bridgestone summary judgment before ruling on her motion for class certification; the fee was not an unfair or deceptive practice under the MMPA where the undisputed evidence showed that the fee covered costs for a variety of shop supplies; and, in regards to a case for money had and received, the fee was not unjust where the undisputed evidence showed that the fee covered costs for a variety of shop supplies and clearly disclosed that it was intended partly for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in granting Bridgestone summary judgment. View "Toben v. Bridgestone Retail Operations" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city, alleging claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701; and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA), Ark. Code 16-123-107. Both parties appealed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job for which he interviewed and that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support an inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the FMLA retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the city's motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's ACRA disability-discrimination claim where plaintiff introduced no evidence to demonstrate that the city knew about his conditions when he sought to be rehired; affirmed the district court's vacatur of the jury's award for emotional-distress where the ACRA claim submitted to the jury did not provide a basis for the jury's award of emotional-distress damages; and reversed the denial of liquidated damages because the city cited no evidence in support of the district court's finding that it acted in good faith in refusing to rehire plaintiff and the court could find none. View "Jackson v. City of Hot Springs" on Justia Law