Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Mellon, seeking to represent a class of Arkansas homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures by Mellon. After plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand to state court and then granted Mellon's motion to dismiss, the district court awarded Mellon costs despite Mellon's failure to file a verified affidavit substantiating the costs. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)'s one-year removal limitation is inapplicable in this case based on 28 U.S.C. 1453(b). Therefore, Mellon was not required to remove this class action within one year of plaintiff's original complaint. Because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the only named plaintiff was a citizen of Arkansas at the time of commencement and removal, and no defendant is a citizen of Arkansas, this class action falls within the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1332(a). Plaintiff's challenge to the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was foreclosed by the court's decision in Rivera v. JPMorgan Chase Bank. Finally, the district court legally erred in awarding costs to Mellon where Mellon provided no affidavit substantiating the costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to remand and dismiss the case, but reversed the award of costs and remanded with instructions. View "Reece v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, falsely accused of rape and jailed for seventeen days, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the County and police officers. Plaintiff alleged that the officers failed to account for certain evidence defendant claimed was exculpatory, both in investigating the claim and in drafting an affidavit used to obtain an arrest warrant. The court concluded that the officers' decision to focus on other investigative leads rather than pursue tenuous, circumstantial, and potentially biased testimony from bar patrons neither shocks the conscience nor indicates recklessness; the officers' reaction to the investigator's suspicion of the photos of the victim demonstrated the even-handedness of their investigation where they soon called in a forensic nurse and then confronted the victim; and plaintiff's remaining allegations of reckless failures on the part of the officers was without merit. Further, plaintiff failed to show any omissions in the affidavit that demonstrated that the officers were reckless. Without a constitutional violation by the officers, there can be no liability for the county. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, which found no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers committed any constitutional violations. View "Hawkins v. Gage County, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a justification defense and the district court did not clearly err in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6) based on its finding that defendant possessed the firearm in connection with another felony. Further, defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Robison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sun Life, alleging that Sun Life improperly denied him long-term disability benefits under a disability plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court concluded that it was reasonable for Sun Life to conclude that plaintiff's vitamin A supplements constituted a "medical treatment." The court held that Sun Life did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's claim for benefits under the Plan, in light of an ordinary understanding of what constitutes a "medical treatment" and the purpose of the Pre-Existing Condition clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded for entry of summary judgment to Sun Life. View "Kutten v. Sun Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions stemming from his involvement in a Ponzi scheme known as the "British Lending Program" (BLP). The court concluded that the government satisfied the particularity requirement for the search warrant given the ubiquity of the BLP within defendant's law office; even if the executing officers failed to leave a copy of Attachment A of the warrant at the scene of the search, any error would have been isolated inadvertence rather than indicative of a pattern of recurring negligence; and defendant failed to show any prejudice from a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(1)(C). The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's motion to suppress. The court rejected defendant's arguments relating to the authority of the AUSAs in this case to prosecute him; defendant's Brady claims; defendant's claims of other errors committed during trial; and defendant's claims of sentencing errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sigillito" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court affirmed defendant's conviction as an armed career criminal where the district court did not err in holding that defendant's prior Missouri convictions for first-degree assault and first-degree robbery were separate predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). View "United States v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Williams and Porter filed suit against law enforcement officers, alleging claims arising from a traffic stop. The court concluded reasonable suspicion that Williams was operating a vehicle while intoxicated justified the officer's investigatory stop of the vehicle; Officer Forck's mistaken perception that the driver, rather than the passenger, in a double-parked vehicle was consuming alcohol was objectively reasonable; an objectively reasonable concern for officer safety or suspicion of danger existed in this instance; the officers permissibly drew their weapons, handcuffed plaintiffs and performed a protective sweep of the vehicle; detaining plaintiffs for about 30 minutes was not an unreasonable amount of time; and, therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court judge lacked authority to adjudicate this matter due to her status as a senior district court judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Williams, et al. v. Decker, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit to collect fringe benefits owed to union employee benefit funds by a plumbing company under 29 U.S.C. 1145. The court concluded that O'Laughlin did not unequivocally express an intent to terminate its participation in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for two reasons. First, under the circumstances, the court's examination of O'Loughlin's conduct was paramount to the court's consideration of the two letters it sent to the Union. Here, O'Laughlin manifested an intent to abide and be bound by the terms of the CBA by continuing to make fringe benefit contributions on behalf of its employees throughout the 2011 calendar year. Second, the two letters O'Laughlin sent to the Union were ineffective to express an unequivocal intent to terminate participation in the CBA in any event. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that O'Laughlin unequivocally terminated its participation in the CBA and remanded for further proceedings. View "Twin City Pipe Trades Service v. O'Laughlin Plumbing & Heating" on Justia Law

Starr Indemnity filed suit seeking a determination of their rights and obligations under Continental Cement's insurance policies after the Mark Twain, a cement barge owned by Continental Cement, sank in the Mississippi River. Continental Cement counterclaimed for breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay under Missouri law. Determining that Continental Cement did not waive its appeal, the court concluded that the district court did not err by applying the federal doctrine of utmost good faith, a judicially established federal admiralty rule, instead of Missouri state law; Continental Cement waived its appeal of the denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Starr Indemnity's utmost good faith defense; and, apart from the issue of waiver, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the utmost good faith instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "New York Marine & General Ins., et al. v. Continental Cement Co., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, CSG, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging claims of gender discrimination and retaliation. The court concluded that, assuming without deciding, that plaintiff established a prima facie case of gender discrimination, CSG offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for terminating her employment where CSG identified substantial performance-related problems; plaintiff failed to prove there was pretext for the gender discrimination; and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim. Likewise, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that CSG's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was pretextual. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim as well. View "Fiero v. CSG Systems, Inc." on Justia Law