Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty of two federal offenses: one count of aiding and abetting a violation of the so-called Medicare anti-kickback statute, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and one count of aiding and abetting the falsification of a document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2. Defendant raised several claims on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err in admitting testimony concerning statements made by defendant's wife during her interview with the FBI; in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that defendant stole funds from previous employers in the healthcare industry; in denying defendant's motion to dismiss count one of the second superseding indictment, which charged a violation of the anti-kickback statute; by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements and to declare his proffer agreement unenforceable; and by granting in part the spouse's attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena requiring one of the representatives to produce his entire file regarding the representation of the spouse who was now deceased. The court also held that the district court's jury instructions regarding count one were not erroneous. The court held, however, that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss under Guidelines 2B4.1 when it used the loss to the victims, rather than the benefit to defendant, as the measure of loss. Therefore, the court concluded that there was procedural error and defendant's sentence was vacated. The court finally vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims.

Defendant, manager of a kosher meatpacking company, was convicted of 86 counts of bank, wire, and mail fraud; making false statements to a bank; money laundering; and violations of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The court held that there was no evidence in the record that the district court's decision to remain on the case prejudiced defendant's verdict and concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in trying the financial charges first where the district court's order was a practical solution given the nature and number of the charges. The court further held that, with the exception of one count of false statements to a bank which was premised solely on violations of immigration law, any error on this evidence would have been harmless because it would have had no effect on the verdict. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in excluding evidence. The court finally held that, because defendant's offense was falsely stating that the company was in compliance with its laws, the court did not commit plain error with its instruction on harboring illegal aliens; defendant's money laundering convictions were lawful and did not merge with any other of his crimes; there was no error in the district court's loss calculation; and the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in imposing a 324 month sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendants, Brian Keith Ellefson and Mark Edward Ellefsen, were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing the IRS in the assessment and collection of federal taxes. Brian was also convicted of three counts of filing false income tax returns while Mark was convicted of three counts of aiding and assisting the preparation of false income tax returns. Defendants appealed their convictions and challenged the restitution order. The court held that because the undisclosed information at issue was not material, there was no Brady violation. The court also held that, although the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine a certain government witness regarding a tax-loss calculation and whether she considered Brian's additional payments, any error in denying the cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendants' proposed expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court also did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial where the record was replete with evidence to support the jury's finding that defendants acted willfully. The court finally held that there was no clear error in the district court's judgment of restitution where the government met its burden of proof and deducted Brian's additional payments from the amount of restitution owed to the IRS. Accordingly, the convictions and restitution orders were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of filing a false joint income tax return with his wife for calendar year 2007 and sentenced to twenty-four months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of willful false reporting, admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence of gambling expenses, and a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that the government's evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that defendant's casino activities were clear evidence that he personally spent a substantial amount of his business's reported income on expenditures that were not reportable as the business's costs of goods sold and that the evidence was unlikely to unfairly prejudice him. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion in imposing a presumptively reasonable sentence that was within the advisory guidelines range. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case involved a fallout of a $3.65 billion Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Minnesota businessman Thomas J. Petters. Appellants, investment funds (collectively, Ritchie), incurred substantial losses as a result of participating in Petters' investment scheme. Ritchie subsequently sued two officers of Petters' companies, alleging that they assisted Petters in getting Ritchie to loan over $100 million to Petters' company. Ritchie's five-count complaint alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(a), (c)-(d), common law fraud, and tortious inference with the contract. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Ritchie's action was barred by a Receivership Order. The court also rejected arguments challenging the sufficiency of Ritchie's pleadings in the common law fraud count and did not to address other arguments related to abstention, lack of causation, and absolute privilege. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted for the theft or embezzlement of funds from his employee's IRA accounts in violation of 18 U.S.C. 664. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because, at trial, the district court barred him from presenting evidence to the jury that he eventually repaid all of the embezzled funds. The court held that because the intent to permanently deprive was neither a required element of, nor a defense to, the conversion or stealing that section 664 criminalized, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of defendant's eventual repayment of his employees' funds in a bankruptcy proceeding as irrelevant.

Defendant was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and failure to file tax returns. The district court sentenced him to 90 months imprisonment and ordered over eight million dollars in restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for his wire-fraud and money-laundering convictions and that his sentence and the restitution were unreasonable. The court held that, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonable returned a guilty verdict. The court also held that the district court was authorized to consider the charged and uncharged conduct in awarding restitution and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution in an amount greater than the loss calculation. The court further held that the district court specifically acknowledged the relevant sentencing factors, that they were advisory, and that it was for the district court to determine a sentence which was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with those factors. The court finally held that the 90 month sentence was substantively reasonable.

The United States brought this civil action under 26 U.S.C. 7408 to enjoin defendant from promoting several fraudulent tax schemes. After a court trial, the district court permanently enjoined defendant from promoting his schemes, ordered him to advise the IRS of any tax arrangements or business entities formed at his discretion, and required him to provide a copy of its order to his clients. On appeal, defendant argued that the injunction was not supported by adequate factual findings and legal conclusions, and that it was overbroad, an impermissible delegation of Article III power, and an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court rejected defendant's hypertechnical criticisms of the district court's order where section 6700 was a linguistically complex and intricate statute and where the district court need not include the entire statutory language in each of its findings and conclusions. Therefore, the court held that the district court's exhaustive order more than satisfied each of the requirements in section 6700 and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted of four counts of tax evasion and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the government constructively amended the indictment through the evidence presented at trial; the instructions erroneously defined "taxable income" and "good faith"; and the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The government appealed defendant's sentence, contending that the district court erroneously relied on a fact rejected by the jury in imposing a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. The court held that neither a constructive amendment nor a variance occurred; the jury was properly instructed and defendant's arguments to the contrary were rejected; and there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant. The court also held that the district court did not commit a procedural error and that the sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of six counts of bank fraud and sentenced to 80 months imprisonment where defendant recruited other individuals to cash counterfeit checks. At issue was whether the district court erred by applying a two-level increase for possession or use of any device-making equipment or the production of trafficking of any unauthorized access device or counterfeit device under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1) and a three-level increase for his aggravating role as a manager or supervisor under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). The government conceded that the district court erred in applying the section 2B1.1(b)(1) enhancement where the enhancement could not be applied to offenses that involved a transfer originated solely by paper instrument. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in applying the section 2B1.1(b)(1) enhancement. The court held, however, that the district court properly applied the aggravating role enhancement under section 3B1.1(b) where the recruited individuals knew or were willfully blind to the fraud. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for resentencing.