Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action after her son was shot and killed by a City of Minneapolis Police Officer. The district court found Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to his initial use of deadly force but not the continued use of force after Jordan dropped his knife and had fallen to the ground. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant asserted he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the entire encounter, which lasted a total of about two seconds.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity. The court explained that its review of the videos of the incident establishes that Defendant never paused during the shooting, which lasted less than two seconds, and he continued shooting for only approximately one second after Plaintiff’s son fell to the ground, dropping the knife. Given the swift and continuous progression of the incident and Defendant’s limited time to observe and process the circumstances, a jury could not find Defendant had sufficient time to reassess the threat presented before he stopped firing. Further, the court explained that even if Plaintiff’s son’s emotional condition perhaps mitigated the threat he posed to the responding officers, a question we need not reach, this detail does not sufficiently distinguish this case from Cook such that Defendant would have had “fair warning” that his conduct violated a constitutional right. View "Florine Ching v. Ofc. Neal Walsh" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of possessing methamphetamine and firearms. Juneau appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence seized during searches of two residences in Columbia Heights and Coon Rapids, Minnesota.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the firearms were found in the garage near Defendant’s motorcycle, and, as the warrant explained, Defendant’s truck had been observed at the Coon Rapids residence. Thus, the officers had probable cause to believe the firearms belonged to Defendant. Because the firearms fit comfortably within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. John Juneau" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Sudan and citizen of South Sudan, petitions this Court for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering Petitioner removed and reversing the IJ’s decision granting Petitioner deferral of removal to South Sudan. Petitioner argued that the BIA erred by (1) limiting its review on remand to address only whether he had been convicted of a theft offense, (2) determining that the Nebraska shoplifting statute constitutes an aggravated felony as a theft offense, and (3) reversing the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal to South Sudan.   The Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded the matter to the BIA for further proceedings. The court explained that for Nebraska’s shoplifting statute to be a categorical match to the generic definition of theft, it must criminalize only those who act with the specific intent to “deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership.” The court wrote that contrary to the BIA’s order, that appropriation “necessarily deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership” does not mean that the offender acted with the specific intent for that deprivation to occur. Accordingly, the BIA erred in finding that Petitioner was removable for having committed a theft offense—and, thus, an aggravated felony—based upon his Nebraska shoplifting convictions. View "Ruachkuoth Thok v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

This case was brought by a class of sex offenders (Appellants) civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) pursuant to the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and Sexual Psychopathic Personalities, codified at Minnesota Statute Section 253D (MCTA). Appellants filed this action against various MSOP managers and officials, as well as the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (collectively, Appellees). On remand after a second appeal to this Court, the district court granted judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Appellants’ claims. Appellants appeal, challenging the district court’s judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that the district court erred by declining to address their treatment-related claims, alleging that the district court found them to be duplicative of previously decided counts. The court wrote that in making this finding, the district court did not dismiss or otherwise ignore any of the counts before it, which were all conditions-of-confinement and inadequate medical care claims. While Appellants attempted to “reanimate” these claims in a Fourth Amended Complaint, the district court denied the amendment, and Appellants do not challenge that decision on appeal. Accordingly, the court perceived no error in the district court’s treatment of Appellants’ treatment-related claims. Appellants additionally attacked the district court’s conclusion that the MSOP’s Behavioral Expectation Report policy is constitutional. But Appellants focused only on the impact of the policy on their treatment and fail to address the other legitimate government objectives it addresses—such as preserving institutional order at the MSOP. View "Kevin Karsjens v. Jodi Harpstead" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City, Inc. (Concord Baptist) sustained damage to its facilities in a severe storm. After disagreements with its insurer, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding the amount of loss, Concord Baptist initiated this action, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Concord Baptist failed to comply with a cooperation clause contained in the insurance policy, which precluded coverage. Concord Baptist appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Concord Baptist admits that it materially breached the policy, the court need not address Concord Baptist’s argument regarding whether the failure to submit to an EUO was a material breach. However, the court noted that Missouri courts have found a material breach where an insured failed to submit to an EUO before commencing an action against the insurer. Regarding the second element, whether Church Mutual suffered substantial prejudice from Concord Baptist’s material breach, the court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show that it did. Finally, as to the third element, whether Church Mutual exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to procure Concord Baptist’s cooperation, the court again agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts demonstrate Church Mutual’s diligence. View "Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from two orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and denying his request to reopen and reconsider the denial of his applications.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that although Petitioner argued the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his asylum application, Petitioner failed to challenge before the BIA the IJ’s alternative, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to asylum because his application was untimely, and the BIA deemed that this argument was waived. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner similarly failed to offer any argument regarding the timeliness of his asylum application before this Court. And, in any event, the court wrote that it will not disturb the BIA’s conclusion that this issue has been waived and is dispositive of the asylum application. View "Alexander Arroyo-Sosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

On April 18, 2018, a jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1153 and 2241(c). The court imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 30 years on each count. Defendant appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court on two issues and remanded for in-camera review on a single issue—that is, whether the refusal to allow defense counsel access to the victim’s mental health records was harmless in light of the victim’s testimony at trial that she was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) after the alleged sexual assault by Defendant. The district court reviewed the records and concluded that not ordering the disclosure of the victim’s mental health records was harmless, finding she received a PTSD diagnosis for the first time after Defendant sexually assaulted her, and her trial testimony was truthful.   The Eighth Circuit, upon de novo review of the claimed constitutional violation, reversed, vacated the convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to require the production of K.P.’s mental health records and its limitations on cross-examination after the government opened the door about K.P.’s mental health diagnoses was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Ira Alan Arias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged was assaulted by his daughter’s ex-boyfriend and the ex-boyfriend’s cousin outside his house in Camden County, Missouri, in December 2011. He reported the assault to the Camden County Sheriff’s Department the following May. After no charges were brought, Plaintiff filed a civil suit against the alleged assailants. While pursuing his civil suit, Plaintiff claimed he discovered that the sheriff’s department refused to investigate the assault because the assailants were related to the county’s clerk of court. This refusal meant that Plaintiff could obtain very little evidence of the assault. Plaintiff then filed an action against officials in the sheriff’s department for claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Missouri Constitution. He claimed that Defendants’ inadequate investigation deprived him of his equal protection and due process rights. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing. They also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants and denied their motion to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss these claims for lack of standing. The court affirmed to Plaintiff’s state law claims.  The court explained that it has not yet addressed whether a crime victim has standing to sue a government official for an inadequate investigation. However, the court has held that a crime victim cannot sue a government official for failing to prosecute his assailant. View "Jeffery Pratt v. Tony Helms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative of her brother, who was in pretrial custody at Phelps County Jail for about six months, filed a lawsuit for damages from inadequate medical care during her brother’s pretrial detention. The district court awarded the individual defendants and Phelps County summary judgment. Plaintiff argued the district court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on her claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. “   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent. A correctional officer’s deference to a medical professional regarding a pretrial detainee’s medical care, standing alone, does not create a genuine issue of material fact on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Plaintiff, however, points to nothing in the record showing Defendants deliberately disregarded her brother’s condition while he was in the holdover cell during the final weeks of his pretrial detention. Instead, Plaintiff points to evidence that Phelps County employees were generally aware that her brother was suffering. This evidence, however, does nothing to address the focus of the court’s inquiry: whether Defendants deliberately disregarded Plaintiff’s brother’s serious medical need. Ultimately, the court concluded there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Lady Maakia Charlene Smith v. Richard Lisenbe" on Justia Law

The United States indicted Defendant for illegal exportation of firearm parts from the United States to Mexico. Mexican authorities apprehended Defendant while he was living in Mexico. In conjunction with his arrest, Mexican authorities searched both his vehicle and his Mexican residence. They returned Defendant to the United States border, allowing him to cross the border into the United States, where he was arrested by United States authorities. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the searches. He also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged violation of his due process rights premised on his treatment by Mexican authorities. The district court denied both motions. The district court imposed an upward variance and sentenced him to 144 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression and dismissal motions, as well as the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the record reflects Defendant made his Miranda waiver “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Further, Defendant’s that the district court clearly erred in concluding he self-surrendered is merely an additional attempt to show a joint venture. In this case, the district court explained that it was going above the Guidelines range in order to serve as a deterrent to people going to Mexico to assist cartels. The resulting sentence, while significantly above the Guidelines range, was well below the statutory maximum of 240 months and based on applicable Section 3553(a) factors. Defendant has not shown the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Andrew Pierson" on Justia Law