Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and his colleague secured provisional patents for a medical device and created a new company, Caisson Interventional, LLC. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA. The parties dispute the meaning of LivaNova’s obligation to be “consistent with the efforts and level of care and business decisions [LivaNova] and its affiliates employ generally.” Plaintiff emphasized the obligation to act “consistent with” the (1) efforts, (2) levels of care, and (3) business decisions employed in LivaNova’s other projects. LivaNova stressed the authorization to act as it “generally” does.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that evidence that LivaNova treated similarly situated companies differently than it treated Caisson might carry Plaintiff’s claim past summary judgment. But Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presented evidence that Caisson was different than other projects. With only apples-to-oranges comparisons available on this record, Plaintiff cannot establish a “general” approach to developing the unique Caisson device and thus cannot show inconsistency with the UPA’s requirements. In short, the court held that the device did not work well enough to trigger a contractual obligation. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

The estate of Joseph A. Muff brings three conversion claims against Wells Fargo Bank for allegedly failing to detect that Joseph’s stepson, Josh Paige, was stealing money from Joseph by way of fraudulently endorsed checks. After denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on all three claims. The estate appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the estate’s motion to amend its complaint. Further, the court explained that because the Muff Corporate and Muff Farm accounts were not controlled by Wells Fargo, any injury to those accounts under a theory of conversion is not fairly traceable to Wells Fargo. In other words, the estate has not demonstrated a “causal connection” between the “injury”—Josh’s inappropriately removing funds from said accounts—and the “conduct complained of”—Wells Fargo’s allegedly allowing this to take place. Moreover, even assuming the existence of a confidential relationship under Iowa law could give the estate standing to sue, the factual record fails to support the existence of a confidential relationship in the first place. Because the estate has not demonstrated standing, the court wrote that it lacks jurisdiction over Count 3. As with Count 2, the district court should have dismissed the claim instead of entering summary judgment for Wells Fargo. However, unlike Counts 2 and 3, the estate has standing to pursue Count 1 in federal court. View "Larry Muff v. Wells Fargo Bank NA" on Justia Law

While in prison for dealing drugs, Defendant continued to run his operation from behind bars. At one point, he arranged for a shipment of marijuana to a relative. But when black-tar heroin arrived instead, a co-conspirator, C.H. sold it on his behalf. To protect his family, Defendant pointed the finger at C.H. and passed along his address to their suppliers. C.H. continued to sell drugs, including what he received through Defendant. He eventually sold those drugs in controlled buys, which led to federal drug charges. Defendant, for his part, pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court gave him a two-level enhancement for “making a credible threat to use violence or directing the use of violence.” Defendant challenged the enhancement on appeal. At issue on appeal is whether providing a co-conspirator’s address to dangerous people “directs the use of violence” or itself conveys “a credible threat to use violence.”The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that once danger came knocking on his family’s door, Defendant redirected the suppliers’ anger toward the person who refused to pay. It was “reasonably foreseeable” that this simple act, given how dangerous they were, could have led to the use of violence against C.H. Accordingly, the court held that the record supports a two-level enhancement for “directing the use of violence.” View "United States v. Luis Hernandez-Barajas" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on four drug-related charges stemming from his involvement in a narcotics-distribution ring in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which culminated in the overdose deaths of two individuals. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and two counts of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute heroin and 420 months imprisonment on each count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death, with all terms to run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) that the district court erroneously admitted text messages between one of the victims and himself and (2) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him on any of the three counts of conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the night before her overdose, the victim texted Defendant—her primary if not only supplier of narcotics—at 6:58 p.m. “presumably to make arrangements to purchase heroin.” Per their typical arrangement, the victim then withdrew the necessary funds from an ATM and drove to Defendant’s house, texting him at 7:48 p.m. that she was in his backyard. Her subsequent text messages to family members reveal that she then went home. The victim’s body was found the next day. Under these facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant distributed the fentanyl that resulted in the victim’s death. View "United States v. Jeffery Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her children, natives and citizens of Honduras, petitioned the Eighth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision ordering them removed and denying their claims for relief. In her petition for review, Petitioner claimed that the BIA erred (1) by finding that her due process rights were not violated when the IJ continued her case instead of terminating it and (2) by denying her application for asylum and statutory withholding of removal.   The Eighth Circuit denied their petition. The court explained that while Petitioner contends that by continuing the proceedings, the IJ “was engineering a preferred outcome,” the record demonstrates that the IJ “had not researched the issue before” and simply wanted “to give [DHS] a chance to address the issue.” Second, the court agreed with the BIA that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. By continuing the removal proceedings, the IJ provided Petitioner with exactly what she was promised: presence in the United States until November 10, 2018.   Further, the court concluded that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the gangsters’ threats did not rise to the level of past persecution. Here, the threats were telephonic, sporadic, and over a period of four years. Given that the record does not indicate that the gangsters ever acted, or attempted to act, upon these threats during this long period, the threats lack immediacy and appear exaggerated. View "Rosaura Brizuela v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of a six-count federal indictment -- carjacking resulting in death (Count 1); discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j) (Count 2); and two counts of witness tampering (Counts 5 and 6). The government agreed to drop Counts 3 and 4. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of 360 months imprisonment. Defendant timely objected to a statement in his presentence investigation report (PSR) that the sentence imposed for Count 2 must be consecutive to the other counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Defendant argued that violations of Section 924(c) and § 924(j) are separate offenses and that Section 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing. The district court overruled the objection, accepted the guilty plea but not the 360-month recommendation, and imposed a within-range sentence of 540 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing the court procedurally erred in imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 2 and that the sentence is substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Defendant’s disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal. Accordingly, the court held that, in light of the seriousness of Defendant’s crimes and lengthy criminal history, the district court was well within its substantial discretion in sentencing Defendant to a within-guidelines-range term of imprisonment. View "United States v. Anthony Jones, Jr." on Justia Law

Years after their father’s death, Appellees filed a diversity lawsuit against their stepmother, Defendant,and the executor of their father’s estate to adjudicate rights to property owned by their father and Defendant. Before the district court, Appellees argued that their father, H.C. “Dude” Crain, Jr. (Dude), breached a property settlement agreement (PSA) that he entered into with their mother, Marillyn Crain (Marillyn), pursuant to Dude and Marillyn’s divorce. The PSA— which the Logan County, Arkansas Chancery Court ruled was “contractual and nonmodifiable”—required Dude to maintain a will whereby he would leave “one-half of [his] estate” to Appellees. However, at Dude’s death, no such will existed. Instead, Defendant took sole possession of Dude’s separate property and retitled all jointly owned assets in her name. After the ruling that Dude breached the PSA, the district court imposed a constructive trust over all property Dude owned immediately prior to his death. The district court then used the principles set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution to equitably divide the property, valued at nearly $100 million. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although there is an open, ongoing probate action in Arkansas state court, the district court has never attempted to interfere with that court’s possession of any of the property at issue there. Rather, the district court adjudicated the parties’ rights to the property and imposed a constructive trust on it. Therefore, the court held that the probate exception to subject matter jurisdiction does not apply. View "Lisa Crain v. Shirley Crain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband purchased a ladder at Home Depot some years ago. Plaintiff’s husband was found dead near the ladder with injuries consistent with a fall. Plaintiff sued Home Depot, alleging that a defect in a ladder caused her husband’s death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Home Depot, concluding that Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to show causation. On appeal, Plaintiff asserted that she provided sufficient evidence that establishes her claims against Home Depot, and, at a minimum, her evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact making a grant of summary judgment improper.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Plaintiff has failed to negate other causes of the accident. In addition to the unaccounted-for 11-year period between the purchase of the ladder and the accident, the expert hypothesized that an electrical malfunction may have caused the fall. Plaintiff replied that this sort of malfunction would have given her husband electrical burns, which were not observed by the coroner. However, a minor spark that did not contact her husband could have startled him and caused him to lose his balance. Plaintiff has provided no evidence to refute this. The court concluded that there is no proof here sufficient to induce the mind to pass beyond conjecture. View "Martha Hunt v. Home Depot, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three counts of wire fraud, one count of theft of government money, and two counts of Social Security fraud. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had had the requisite criminal intent to commit the offenses. He also appealed the district court’s order for restitution in the amount of $168,456.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion, vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that a jury could reasonably disregard Defendant’s asserted reason for these inconsistencies—that he did not believe that he had to report “work” below a certain income threshold—and find that he acted with the intent to defraud the SSA by receiving benefits for which he was not eligible. Further, the court reasoned that reliance on the SSA’s determination alone does not allow the court to meaningfully review the calculation of the amount of loss when, as here, that amount is challenged by the defendant. The government was thus required to present evidence to show that Defendant engaged in substantial gainful activity in November 2009. The court held that the district court erred in accepting the statement of loss in the absence of evidence establishing the date that Defendant became ineligible for benefits. View "United States v. James Workman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law