Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop of a vehicle that she was driving. The district court denied the motion, and Defendant reserved the right to appeal that ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that there was no error in denying the motion to suppress. The court explained that the seizing officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant as she drove away from the residence on August 24. Officers had abundant reason to believe, based on informant reports and surveillance, that the owners were distributing methamphetamine from their residence. Police seized drugs from four short-term visitors who were stopped shortly after leaving the residence in June. As of August 24, investigators had reliable information that the owners were distributing a shipment of methamphetamine that arrived two days earlier, including a quantity that was seized from a downstream customer that very morning. A detective saw Defendant enter the residence at 10:00 p.m. and depart six minutes later. Although Defendant was previously unknown to investigators, her short-term visit to the suspected drug house conformed to the pattern of the drug trade and gave police reasonable suspicion to believe that she was carrying drugs as she departed. Accordingly, the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in criminal activity as she departed the residence, so the traffic stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Elizabeth Pounds" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant for conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Arrested on November 17, she was detained for 37 days before appearing before a magistrate judge on December 23. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress her statements from a post-arrest interview. The district court denied both motions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained the 37-day delay between Jones’s arrest and her initial appearance before a magistrate judge violated Rule 5(a). However, to determine whether a delay in presentment violates substantive due process, this court determines whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, the government’s conduct “offends the standards of substantive due process” and “shocks the conscience.” Defendant asserted that law enforcement officers in South Dakota have a “pattern” of delaying defendants’ initial appearances, citing two cases where defendants moved to dismiss indictments based on delays in their initial appearance. However, the court held two mistakes do not establish a pattern of outrageousness sufficient to show deliberate indifference and support a due process violation.   Further, Defendant argued that her Miranda waiver was involuntary because the agent’s pre-warning statements were an unlawful two-step interrogation under Missouri v. Seibert and that her confession was involuntary under United States v. Aguilar. The court held the district court properly concluded that these brief, narrow-scope pre-warning statements were not a two-step interrogation in violation of Seibert and that Defendant’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Tracy Jones" on Justia Law

At sentencing, the district court, varying upward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range, imposed a sentence of 120 months imprisonment plus four years of supervised release upon Defendant. Defendant appealed. He argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for resentencing. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court agreed with Defendant that the district court committed procedural sentencing error when it adopted the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) and, without adequate notice varied upward for reasons that contradicted the PSR’s factual findings. However, the court found that the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, the court did not disturb the jury’s credibility findings on appeal. Similarly, the court concluded that there is sufficient evidence to uphold Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court wrote that it cannot conclude that the inconsistencies between the PSR findings and the findings on which the district court based its upward variance, combined with the lack of prior notice, resulted in procedural sentencing error that was harmless. View "United States v. Deshonte Dickson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an O’Fallon City, Missouri council member, sued the City of O’Fallon (City), its mayor, Bill Hennessy, and the O’Fallon City Council (City Council) based on their alleged violation of her civil rights. The district court initially stayed Plaintiff’s suit because impeachment proceedings initiated by Defendants were underway. Plaintiff was eventually impeached by the City Council but declined to pursue any available state remedies. The district court subsequently lifted the stay. Defendants moved for dismissal on abstention grounds as well as claim preclusion. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case under claim preclusion principles based on her failure to pursue judicial review in the state courts. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court’s abstention under Younger was improper because an exception to Younger abstention should have been applied to enable the court to act before her impeachment proceedings concluded.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to challenge the dismissal below and failed to challenge it on appeal until her reply brief. Appellate courts “do not generally review arguments first raised in a reply brief.” The court held that Plaintiff’s contention that she did, in fact, raise the issue in her initial brief is belied by the brief itself. She only mentions that the district court dismissed the case on claim preclusion grounds for her failure to seek judicial review in state court in her recounting of the procedural history of her case. This is insufficient for the court to consider the challenge to be “meaningfully argued.” View "Katie Gatewood v. City of O'Fallon, Missouri" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with removability for two counts of being an aggravated felon and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of being admitted to the United States. Petitioner conceded her removability, making her inadmissible to the United States and subject to deportation. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioner applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. To qualify for the waiver, Petitioner needed to demonstrate statutory eligibility and that the equities warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her waiver of inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that although the BIA did not include hardship to Petitioner’s relatives when it listed Petitioner’s positive equities, it still considered hardship in its decision. The BIA recognized that Petitioner’s removal would “likely result in a considerable level of hardship to herself, her spouse, and her children.” Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner’s petition on this ground. Further, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s weighing of equities, specifically how it weighed her crimes. The court wrote that this is not a reviewable question of law. It is a challenge to “the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion,” which the court does not have jurisdiction to review. View "Aisha King v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted co-defendants K.S and T.H of conspiracy to distribute and distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Both challenged several district court rulings, and T.H. appealed his conviction. 
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that K.S. argued that, instead of co-Defendant’s testimony, the court should have admitted co-Defendant’s letter under the residual hearsay exception. The court explained the residual exception is to “be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.” To fall within the exception, the statement must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.” The district court concluded that the letter was not trustworthy. Although the court did not explain how it reached its conclusion, its “discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence is particularly broad in a conspiracy trial.”   T.H. argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The evidence established that the middleman bought methamphetamine from K.H. and sold it to the CI. The CI testified to arranging the buy, and the middleman’s phone records showed calls with T.H. on the day of the purchase. After the middleman bought methamphetamine from someone in the white S.U.V., officers identified T.H. as the driver. The plastic bag the middleman later sold the CI had fingerprints from all three men. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from K.T. and D.S. that T.H. sold drugs in the same car and the same location as the controlled buy. This evidence was sufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction. View "United States v. Kieffer Simmons" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 84 months imprisonment. Harrison appealed, challenging the admission of evidence of his prior firearm conviction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained Defendant’s knowledge is at issue here because he did not plead guilty. Thus, Defendant’s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was relevant to prove knowledge. Further, Defendant’s conviction was not too remote in time. Although it occurred 8 years before his arrest in this case, he was incarcerated for more than 3 of those years. Therefore, based on its compliance with the requirements of Oaks, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior firearm conviction. View "United States v. Robert Harrison" on Justia Law

I.M. and J.R. (collectively, “Appellants”) were convicted by a jury of charges alleged in a ten-count superseding indictment for offenses committed as part of a large drug conspiracy. The district court sentenced them to 360 and 336 months in prison, respectively. On appeal, I.M. challenged both the denial of his motion for severance and his sentence; J.R. challenged the denial of his motion for recusal, the denial of his motions to suppress wiretap and video surveillance recordings and his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained I.M. has given the court no reason to conclude that this was not an adequate safeguard in his case or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to sever. Thus, the denial of I.M.’s severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. Further, the district court’s statement that I.M.’s “criminal history consists of violent acts and possession of firearms” did not mischaracterize his criminal history. Thus, the district court did not commit procedural error.   Moreover, the court held J.R. has failed to point to any facts establishing that the district judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The district judge’s issuance of some of the warrants, in this case, does not, of itself, require recusal. Any other challenges to the wiretap recordings are also waived because J.R. has failed to meaningfully explain why his motion to suppress should have been granted. View "United States v. Isaac May" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a sentence of ninety-six months’ imprisonment imposed by the district court after Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by miscalculating his base offense level under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it has held that second-degree robbery under this Missouri statute is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the offense requires “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Because Defendant’s prior conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under USSG Section 4B1.2(a)(1), the district court did not err in determining a base offense level of 20 under USSG Section 2K2.1(a)(4). Accordingly, the court held that there was no procedural error. View "United States v. George Gordon" on Justia Law