Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Claimant claimed $34,918 found in his car during a traffic stop. When he failed to fully respond to the government’s special interrogatories, the district court sanctioned him by striking his claim and entering a default judgment forfeiting the money to the government. Claimant appealed, arguing that the district court relied on an incorrect interpretation of Rule G(8).   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that an individual cannot “fail to comply” with an unknowable obligation. A party fails to comply with discovery obligations after a court order defines those obligations. Thus, Rule G(8) authorizes striking a claim for “failing to comply with” Rule G(6) only if the claimant has reason to know of and violates Rule G(6) special interrogatory obligations. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that Claimant knew or should have known that Rule G(6) obligated him to provide more information than he had provided. Claimant articulated a facially reasonable belief that the bank records and check receipts he supplied “firmly established” his relationship to the cash by “showing where the money comes from, [and] where the money was transferred and sent.” He claimed that additional documents requested by the government exceeded the scope of Rule G(6). Nothing in the record indicates that Hester had actual or constructive knowledge of additional obligations—the district court neither found that he should have known he was violating the Rule nor issued an order compelling him to respond to interrogatories. View "United States v. Christopher Hester" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging: (1) the admission of evidence (field tests and a photograph); (2) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (3) the sentence (an adjustment and an enhancement).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence was not inadmissible simply because it was prejudicial. Further, the court explained that the jury saw the pistol and photographs of it. An ATF agent, testifying as an expert, testified that it met the federal definition of a firearm. The pistol and the testimony are sufficient to prove that the pistol was a firearm. Accordingly, the court held that the evidence sufficiently proved that Defendant’s .45-caliber pistol was a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 921(a)(3) and 922(g). Finally, the district court found that Defendant was a drug dealer—not merely a drug user—due to the packaging of the drugs, the evidence found in the search and police investigations, and his own testimony that he intended to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Gregory McCoy" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. He argued that evidence should have been excluded from trial due to an unlawful search and seizure, that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that none of the contentions has merit and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court found that the officer’s action was permissible under the Fourth Amendment on at least two bases: as an investigative search based on reasonable suspicion of crime and danger and as a search for evidence-based on probable cause under exigent circumstances. Further, the court held that the longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is constitutional, and the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the court wrote that there was ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. Finally, the court explained that a rational jury could have found that the firearm was placed strategically in a location where it was hidden from view but readily accessible to one who was seated in a wheelchair and carrying drugs in his undergarment. View "United States v. Sylvester Cunningham" on Justia Law

Dr. Robert P. Rothenberg (Rob) tragically suffered a fatal heart attack prior to paying the initial premium on his term life insurance policy issued by Principal National Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal filed this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant— the policy’s intended beneficiary—was not owed death benefits in light of the nonpayment. Appellant filed a counterclaim, asserting claims against Principal for breach of contract, vexatious denial of proceeds, and negligence, as well as claims against Appellee, the couple’s insurance broker and financial planner, for negligence. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Principal and Appellee, finding, in part, that the policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding (1) that the Policy was not in effect at the time of Rob’s death and (2) that, assuming the Policy was not in effect, neither Principal nor Appellee were negligent because neither owed a duty to Appellant.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant did not pay the initial premium until after Rob’s death, at which time he was not in a similar state of health as when he applied for the policy. Moreover, any “privileges and rights” Rob (or Appellant) had to retroactively effectuate the Policy were terminated at Rob’s death pursuant to the Policy’s termination provision. Second, Rob’s signature on the EFT Form alone did not render the Policy effective on April 26, 2019, or earlier. View "Principal National Life Insurance Company v. Donna Rothenberg" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing a controlled substance near a protected location, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Defendant to 380 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and challenges the reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant specifically requested separating the protected location element—Proposed Instruction No. 15—from the remainder of the elements of Count 1—Proposed Instruction No. 12. Defendant then filed objections to certain instructions but failed to object to either Instruction No. 12 or 15 prior to trial. He further failed to do so at trial or in his post-trial motion. Defendant “cannot complain that the district court gave him exactly what his lawyer asked.” Further, the court wrote that Evans controls here. Henderson’s interpretation of the career offender enhancement was “neither unexpected nor indefensible” and “had a rational basis.” The district court did not err in applying this enhancement. The court also explained that “when a district court varies downward and sentences below a presumptively reasonable Guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still further.” Here, Defendant offered no convincing reasoning to rebut this presumption. View "United States v. Patrick Webb, Jr." on Justia Law

Police officers shot and killed a teenage boy. His parents, Plaintiffs, sued the officers and the City of Benton, Arkansas, under Section 1983 and state law. After the district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, the Eighth Circuit court reversed and remanded in part. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The parents argued that the parties genuinely dispute how their son moved the gun before being shot and that this dispute is material.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the parents identified a genuine dispute of material fact about whether their son pointed his gun at the officers. A jury could conclude, based on the expert’s testimony, that Plaintiffs’ son “never pointed the gun at the officers” but instead “moved his gun in compliance with commands to drop his gun.” This precludes summary judgment. The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is reversed. Because the district court relied on its excessive-force conclusion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell and state-law claims, those decisions are vacated. View "Piper Partridge v. City of Benton, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe failed to warn motorists of unsafe road conditions. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit. It has waived immunity in some FTCA cases but expressly retains immunity in cases involving “a discretionary function or duty.” If the discretionary function exception applies, “it is a jurisdictional bar to suit.” The court wrote that Plaintiffs “have failed to rebut the presumption that the Tribe’scdecision not to post warning signs was grounded in policy.” Accordingly, the court concluded it lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Jade Mound v. The United States of America" on Justia Law

Ritchie Capital Management, LLC fell victim to a massive Ponzi scheme. Ritchie sought recovery outside the receivership. But settlement agreements and bar orders prevent recovery. The district court approved the receivership’s final accounting and a previous bar order. Claiming abuses of discretion, Ritchie appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court ordered the receiver to prepare and file a final accounting. The district court established the requirements that, in its sound discretion, the receiver satisfied in the final accounting. Ritchie fails to identify a clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s approval of the final accounting and, regardless, waived its right to do so. Further, the court held that because bankruptcy-standing doctrine independently prevents Ritchie from bringing claims related to the bankruptcy estate, and because Ritchie can still pursue personal claims against JPMorgan, Ritchie cannot identify a protected right that is deprived here. View "United States v. Ritchie Capital Management, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Debtor’s recent history of prior bankruptcy filings implicated 11 U.S.C. Section 362(c)(4)(A)(i), which provides that—by operation of law— the automatic stay shall not go into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy case if a debtor had two or more bankruptcy cases that were pending but dismissed in the previous year. Debtor timely filed a motion to impose the stay in accordance with Section 362(c)(4)(B), which the standing trustee opposed and which the bankruptcy court denied. Debtor timely appealed. While the appeal was pending, Debtor’s bankruptcy case was dismissed.   The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that an appeal is considered constitutionally moot where there is no longer any live case or controversy to be decided. In ordinary parlance, an appeal is considered equitably moot and will be dismissed if implementation of the judgment or order that is the subject of the appeal renders it impossible or inequitable for the appellate court to give effective relief to an appellant. With the dismissal of Debtor’s bankruptcy case, this appeal is constitutionally moot. View "Timothy Davies v. Diana S. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 108-month sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon. He challenged the base-offense-level calculation, a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense, and the overall length of the sentence. At issue on appeal is whether the crime of assault while displaying a dangerous weapon is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that each of the three ways of committing assault in Iowa requires intent. Thus, contrary to Defendant’s contention, the holding in Borden v. United States is of no help to Defendant. Further, beyond the base offense level, Defendant believes that he did not deserve a four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” The court held that there is Defendant’s guilty plea, which necessarily required him to admit that he possessed the gun. Second, there was a video of him wielding what appeared to be the same gun just days earlier, which shows that he had “authority” and “control” over it. Third, no one disputes that the gun’s location under the front passenger seat placed it within arm’s reach of him. On these facts, the court could not say the district court’s finding that he was “armed” was erroneous. Finally, Defendant challenged the substantive reasonableness of his 108-month prison sentence. The court held that given the 12-month downward variance he received, “it is nearly inconceivable” that the district court “abused its discretion in not varying downward even further.” View "United States v. Catrell Green" on Justia Law