Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff underwent bariatric surgery to lose weight. A few months later, Plaintiff began working for Zimmerman Transfer, Inc. and became a participant in its self-insured employee benefit plan. Zimmerman is the plan administrator, and Benefit Plan Administrators of Eau Claire, LLC (“BPA”) served as the third-party administrator until January 2020. After exhausting his administrative appeals, Plaintiff sued BPA and Zimmerman for benefits under Section 1132(a)(1)(B). He then moved for summary judgment against BPA and Zimmerman. Both Defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the district court granted.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s plan specifically excludes coverage of treatment for complications of weight-reduction surgery, neither Iowa law nor the ACA requires that his treatment be covered. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s treatment was due to a complication of his prior bariatric surgery. Thus, Iowa law and the ACA do not require that his treatment be covered. Further, the court wrote that imposing and enforcing coverage limitations, even if it results in a plan participant paying large medical bills, is not inconsistent with the plan’s goal because the plan must allocate limited resources among all plan participants. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claim for benefits because the interpretation of the plan was reasonable, and the decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence. View "Darrin Shafer v. Zimmerman Transfer, Inc." on Justia Law

Several current or former members of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly and a legislative aide petitioned for writ of mandamus, seeking relief from orders of the district court directing them to comply with subpoenas for documents or testimony in a civil case brought against the State of North Dakota.   The Eighth Circuit denied the writ and directed the district court to quash the subpoenas for petitioner Devlin to testify and for petitioners Holmberg, Wardner, Poolman, Nathe, Devlin, and Ness to produce documents and other information. The court concluded that the district court’s conclusion to the contrary was based on a mistaken conception of the legislative privilege. In its order enforcing the document subpoenas, the district court reasoned that legislative privilege did not apply because the subpoena sought communications between legislators and third parties. The legislative privilege, however, is not limited to a bar on the inquiry into communications among legislators or between legislators and their aides. The privilege is not designed merely to protect the confidentiality of deliberations within a legislative body; it protects the functioning of the legislature more broadly. Communications with constituents, advocacy groups, and others outside the legislature are a legitimate aspect of legislative activity. The use of compulsory evidentiary processes against legislators and their aides to gather evidence about this legislative activity is thus barred by the legislative privilege. View "In Re: North Dakota Legislative Assembly v." on Justia Law

A handgun was found in Defendant’s jacket pocket while he was being treated in a hospital emergency room for a gunshot wound. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Conley conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued on appeal that because the Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) protection officers’ restraint of him in the stabilization room amounted to an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, evidence of the handgun found in his jacket pocket must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that under the balancing test, “the greater the intrusion on a citizen, the greater the justification required for that intrusion to be reasonable.” Noninvestigatory seizures are reasonable if they are “based on specific articulable facts” and the “governmental interest” in effectuating the seizure in question “outweighs the individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary government interference.” The court explained that here the HCMC protection officers’ seizure of Defendant in the stabilization room was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Further, Defendant voluntarily brought himself to HCMC’s emergency room to seek treatment for a gunshot wound that medical staff considered potentially life-threatening. Given those circumstances, Defendant should have reasonably expected the sort of intrusions that are inherent to the provision of emergency medical care, including the removal of one’s clothes to facilitate treatment and—if compelled by the need to maintain a safe environment—even temporary physical restraint. View "United States v. Dywan Conley" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant, a former sheriff’s deputy, on six counts: attempting to induce a minor to produce child pornography, enticement of a minor, and transferring and attempting to transfer obscenity to a person under the age of 16. Defendant pleaded guilty to a superseding information charging him with the conduct underlying Counts 3 and 4 under a single count. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the original indictment. The parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of 120 months imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court sustained Defendant’s objection to a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G1.3(b)(3)(A). Defendant challenged his sentence’s length.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court emphasized that the Guidelines did not adequately account for the seriousness of Defendant’s offense and the need to send an accurate message to the community. Given the clarity of the district court’s rationale for its variance, any procedural error in the upward departure was harmless. Accordingly, even if the district court erred procedurally in its departure analysis, any error is harmless considering the court’s rationale for its alternative variance. The court wrote that Defendant has shown no likelihood that his sentence would be more favorable should he be resentenced based on the alleged error. View "United States v. Francis Kistler" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Defendant challenged the jury instructions, an evidentiary ruling, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no reversible error and therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court first wrote that Defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can show that the error affected his substantial rights. To meet that prong of the plain-error analysis, Defendant must show a reasonable probability that the erroneous instruction affected the verdict. The court saw no reasonable probability that the jury would have found Defendant not guilty of touching C.W.’s genitalia if the instruction had excluded the extraneous terms. Further, Defendant contended the jury could have mistaken C.W.’s sexualized behavior for his own. Here, the district court reasonably declined to exclude the evidence under Rule 403. C.W.’s testimony about age-inappropriate sexual behavior was not presented in the abstract; she connected it directly to Defendant by explaining that she learned the behavior from him. Viewed in that context, the testimony was prejudicial to Defendant but not unfairly so. C.W.’s testimony, if believed, gave the jury reason to conclude that Defendant had sexually abused her. Finally, the court wrote that no physical evidence was required: “A victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” View "United States v. Garrett Waters" on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident in St. Louis, Missouri. One of the cars crashed into White Knight Diner, resulting in property damage to the restaurant. At the time, White Knight was insured by Owners Insurance Company (Owners)pursuant to a policy that provided coverage for property damage and loss of business income (the Policy). After the insurers brought several motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed all parties except for Owners and White Knight. White Knight then filed an amended complaint against Owners only, adding new causes of action, including breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Owners filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted Owners’ motion. White Knight appealed, arguing that disputed material facts remain as to whether Owners’ subrogation efforts were conducted in breach of the Policy.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming Owners’ actions were taken pursuant to the Policy, White Knight’s claim still fails because it does not establish that it suffered any damages as a result of Owners’ failure to abide by the contracted-for procedures. White Knight, as an insured party under the Policy, contracted for and paid premiums to receive insurance. And Owners settled White Knight’s claim under the Policy when Owners paid White Knight a total of $66,366.27 for property damage and business income loss. White Knight has not shown that it suffered any damages beyond the compensation it received from Owners. Without evidence of damages, a breach of contract claim fails. View "White Knight Diner, LLC v. Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Plaintiff alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. The information in the amended complaint was previously available to Plaintiff and should have been pleaded before the judgment was entered. Plaintiff was on notice of the deficiencies in his complaint when the Clinic filed its motion to dismiss. Despite this, Plaintiff inexcusably delayed filing the Rule 59(e) motion—waiting over five months after the motion to dismiss was filed and almost a month after the district court dismissed the complaint. The court ultimately held that Plaintiff failed to plead a plausible claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization because he did not allege a relevant geographic market. View "George Par v. Wolfe Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis. Nearly four years after his diagnosis, he and his wife sued FAG Bearings, LLC, alleging the company caused his condition by improperly disposing of trichloroethylene at a facility near his childhood home in Missouri. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of FAG Bearings after concluding the suit originated in Texas under Missouri’s borrowing statute and was time-barred under Texas law.The Eight Circuit affirmed. The dispute centers on Missouri’s borrowing statute, which provides: “Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state . . . in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of [Missouri].” Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that his claim rose in Missouri. The court held that Plaintiff lived in Texas when he learned he may have a claim against the company. And, under Texas law, Plaintiff's claim was subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Thus, the district court did not error in finding Plaintiff's claim was time-barred. View "Spencer Knapp v. FAG Bearings, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a forty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States in 1991 and, most recently, in 1996 without inspection. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in Mexico because of his membership in two Particular Social Groups (“PSGs”), “Married Homosexual Men” and “Homosexual Men in Mexico.” More than five years later, after evidentiary hearings but before Petitioner applied to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for a U-visa, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s motion for a continuance to file a U-visa application. Then, in a lengthy Decision and Memorandum, the IJ denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief on the merits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s administrative appeal and denied his motion to reconsider. Petitioner petitioned for review of both BIA orders.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that under the deferential substantial evidence standard, evidence of “general, widespread discrimination” does not trump the BIA’s finding, based on specific facts in the administrative record, that Petitioner could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating from his rural home town to another part of Mexico. The BIA pointed to Mexico City, where Petitioner’s husband is from and which is reported to have “taken the lead in . . . taking measures to protect the rights of the LGBT population.” View "Flavio Pacheco-Moran v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law