Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a forty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico, first entered the United States in 1991 and, most recently, in 1996 without inspection. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution and torture in Mexico because of his membership in two Particular Social Groups (“PSGs”), “Married Homosexual Men” and “Homosexual Men in Mexico.” More than five years later, after evidentiary hearings but before Petitioner applied to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for a U-visa, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s motion for a continuance to file a U-visa application. Then, in a lengthy Decision and Memorandum, the IJ denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal and CAT relief on the merits. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s administrative appeal and denied his motion to reconsider. Petitioner petitioned for review of both BIA orders.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that under the deferential substantial evidence standard, evidence of “general, widespread discrimination” does not trump the BIA’s finding, based on specific facts in the administrative record, that Petitioner could avoid future persecution by reasonably relocating from his rural home town to another part of Mexico. The BIA pointed to Mexico City, where Petitioner’s husband is from and which is reported to have “taken the lead in . . . taking measures to protect the rights of the LGBT population.” View "Flavio Pacheco-Moran v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. He argued that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of the offense and when it responded to two questions from the jury during deliberations. He also contended that he had a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to possess a firearm as a convicted felon.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Stanko, 491 F.3d 408 (8th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury on the first element of the offense. Further, the court held that the instructions provided that in making the determination about knowledge, the jury may consider whether Defendant reasonably believed that his right to possess a firearm had been restored. The instruction allowed Defendant to argue and a jury to find that he lacked the requisite knowledge due to a belief that his rights had been restored. Further, the court concluded that the district court was correct that Section 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to Defendant based on his particular felony convictions. The court explained that legislatures traditionally employed status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms. Whether those actions are best characterized as restrictions on persons who deviated from legal norms or persons who presented an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, Congress acted within the historical tradition when it enacted Section 922(g)(1) and the prohibition on possession of firearms by felons. View "United States v. Edell Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. While in jail, prior to pleading guilty, he sexually assaulted multiple corrections officers. Later, following his guilty plea, jail personnel discovered him with a six-inch metal shank. At sentencing, one of the assaulted corrections officers testified. She described how Defendant, without her consent, rubbed her thigh and buttocks with his hand while she was serving breakfast. Another jail employee testified about the shank. Based on these accounts, the district court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and in determining that the attempted aggravated-assault offense is a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s deviant behavior while incarcerated—molesting corrections officers and carrying a shank—is hardly emblematic of a “sincerely remorseful defendant.” Further, the court wrote that Defendant does not dispute that if the assault offense is a crime of violence under the guidelines, an attempt to commit that offense qualifies as well. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault of a police officer with a deadly weapon was a conviction for a crime of violence that raised his base offense level under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). View "United States v. Christopher Chappell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff invented a medical device. He sold it to LivaNova USA, Inc. in order to develop and bring it to market. When LivaNova shut down the project, he sued. The district court granted summary judgment for LivaNova. Plaintiff argued that LivaNova breached section 4.3 of the UPA by shuttering Caisson.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim because LivaNova did not breach the UPA’s unambiguous requirements. The court explained that Plaintiff argued that LivaNova failed to act consistently with its general approach. However, Plaintiff points to no such evidence in the record—Caisson’s particularities undercut Plaintiff’s premise that a “general approach” to its development can be inferred from LivaNova’s other projects. When Plaintiff argued that Caisson was treated differently than other projects, LivaNova presents evidence that Caisson was different than other projects.   Further, the court found that Plaintiff’s claim that LivaNova shut down Caisson in part to avoid tax liability does not allege that LivaNova “generally” would not shut down projects to avoid tax liability. His claim that LivaNova chose inexperienced Goldman Sachs bankers for the sale does not aver that LivaNova “generally” chose better bankers. And his claim that LivaNova kept Caisson independent from the corporate structure does not establish that LivaNova “generally” integrated projects with independent-minded founders like Caisson’s. Further, applying the principles of contract interpretation outlined above, the court found that the section imposed upon LivaNova, at most, a limited future obligation to maintain enough capital to fulfill its UPA obligations. View "Todd Mortier v. LivaNova USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff loaded purchases he made at a Home Depot store in Maplewood, Minnesota, on two flat carts. A Home Depot employee assisted Plaintiff by pushing one of the carts out of the store while Plaintiff followed, pushing the other. The exit doors automatically opened for the Home Depot employee and then closed while Plaintiff was exiting the store, tearing Plaintiff’s right rotator cuff and causing other injuries. Plaintiff alleged his injuries were caused by the door prematurely closing. The doors at issue were manufactured, installed, and serviced by Stanley. Plaintiff alleged a negligence claim against Home Depot and claims of strict product liability, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties against Stanley. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff offered no evidence that Home Depot caused the alleged dangerous condition or that it had actual knowledge of the existence of the alleged dangerous condition. Instead, he argued that Home Depot should have known of the existence of the problem with the automatic doors. But Plaintiff did not retain an expert, nor did he offer evidence demonstrating that Home Depot should have known the automatic doors might close while a customer was entering or exiting the store. The court wrote that because Plaintiff did not submit any evidence indicating the automatic sliding doors were unsafe or an inspection of the doors would have revealed the alleged dangerous condition, Home Depot is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim. View "Michael Oien v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two brothers, were the sole shareholders of Crown C Corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When one brother died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value includes the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. The brother's estate argues otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court agreed with the IRS.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here the estate argues that the court should look to the stock-purchase agreement to value of the brother’s shares because it satisfies these criteria. But the estate glosses over an important component missing from the stock purchase agreement: some fixed or determinable price to which we can look when valuing the brother’s shares. Further, the Treasury regulation that clarifies how to value stock subject to a buy-sell agreement refers to the price in such agreements and “the effect, if any, that is given to the . . . price in determining the value of the securities for estate tax purposes.” 26 C.F.R. Section 20.2031-2(h). Here, the stock-purchase agreement fixed no price nor prescribed a formula for arriving at one. Further, the court explained that the proceeds were simply an asset that increased shareholders’ equity. A fair market value of the brother's shares must account for that reality. View "Thomas Connelly v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 19, 2020. She valued her residence at $130,000 at the time, and the parties stipulated that she claimed a $15,000 homestead exemption under section 513.475 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The bankruptcy court granted Appellant’s motion to convert from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. The parties stipulated that sale of Appellant’s residence would result in more than $62,000 in proceeds after satisfying the mortgage lien and paying the $15,000 homestead exemption and costs of sale. Prompted by indications that the Trustee planned to sell her residence, Goetz filed a Motion to Compel Trustee to Abandon Real Property of Debtor. The bankruptcy court denied the motion.   The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that postpetition preconversion nonexempt equity resulting from market appreciation and payments toward a mortgage lien accrue for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate upon conversion from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. Further, the court rejected Appellant’s claim that she benefits from the increase in equity in her residence because her residence was removed from the bankruptcy estate. The court explained the parties stipulated that sale of Appellant’s residence would result in more than $62,000 in proceeds after satisfying the mortgage lien and paying the $15,000 homestead exemption and costs of sale. The bankruptcy court’s determination that this sum is “of more than inconsequential value and benefit to the estate” was not an abuse of discretion. View "Machele L. Goetz v. Victor F. Weber" on Justia Law

A Missouri trial court declined to permit Petitioner to represent himself. After conviction at trial, an unsuccessful direct appeal, and an unsuccessful attempt to collaterally attack his convictions in state court, Petitioner filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 in federal court. The district court granted Petitioner’s petition, finding Petitioner had unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation, and the Missouri trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that given the state court’s factual findings, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court jurisprudence in finding Petitioner was not unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se. Petitioner conditioned his self-representation request on his speedy trial motions being denied and wanted counsel to depose witnesses even after being informed counsel could not do so if he was pro se. From these facts, a court could reasonably conclude Petitioner’s waiver of the right to counsel was not unequivocal. View "Darrell Bolden v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

17 people were killed a commercial tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm. The government charged the captain and the managers of the duck boat company, with felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. Section 1115 and misdemeanor counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner. The government alleged that the charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that concluded the prescriptive reaches of Sections 1115 and 2302(b) is defined by admiralty law and do not cover the alleged conduct. The government appealed the dismissal.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a review of the statute’s history leads to the conclusion that the origins of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts. Here, the government objected to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argued that the evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented, in this case, established that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards, the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the court wrote that it detects no clear error in the district court’s finding or conclusion. View "United States v. Kenneth McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for knowingly possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, and he appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant argued that he did not knowingly possess the meth because it was concealed in the rental car before he rented it. But the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, supports the conclusion that Young knowingly, and constructively possessed the meth. He was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Further, Defendant rented a car, traveled across the country, took $8,500 in cash advances, had two cell phones and text messages about buying and selling meth, and transported five bundles of meth—about five pounds—in concealed compartments in a rental car (with one bundle wrapped in a sack from WSS where Defendant had recently shopped). The evidence viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. Moreover, the court wrote that the government presented sufficient evidence linking Defendant to the concealed drugs. Thus, the evidence, viewed most favorably to the verdict, sufficiently establishes that Defendant knowingly possessed and intended to distribute the meth. View "United States v. Quennel Young" on Justia Law