Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found guilty by a jury on a three-count indictment charging him with failure to file a tax return and tax evasion for personal returns in 2014 and 2015. After considering and denying Defendant’s post-trial motions for a new trial and acquittal, the district court sentenced Defendant to 36 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay over $350,000 in restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it (1) allowed for the expert testimony of the Special Agent (SA), (2) denied Defendant’s motions for a new trial and acquittal, and (3) ruled for the government on a Jencks Act issue.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that here, the SA did not directly testify to Defendant’s mental state but rather to the modus operandi of tax evasion criminals. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the SA’s expert testimony. Further, the court found that had the SA testified about specific cases that he had worked on in the past, these statements may have been related. But the general testimony given by the SA describing common types of tax evasion does not trigger Jencks Act disclosure of all statements from prior investigations related generally to tax evasion. Finally, the court explained that regardless of whether the government was required to prove that UAD was a C corporation or “a corporation not expressly exempt from tax,” the court held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict on the indictment. View "United States v. Gary Primm, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on her claim under the Equal Pay Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Daugherty Systems, Inc. (“Daugherty”) on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because almost all her alleged comparators were either paid less than she was or did not perform equal work.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the pay disparity was justified by a legitimate factor other than sex. The court explained that Daugherty’s explanation for the pay differential—the differences in skillsets and experience and the desire to incentivize Plaintiff to grow in the position—is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proving the pay differential was based on a factor other than sex. The court wrote that because “no reasonable jury” could find other than in Daugherty’s favor on the affirmative defense, Plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute for trial, and Daugherty has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Tamara O'Reilly v. Daugherty Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Defendant. He moved to dismiss for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied his motion. A unanimous jury found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute (and distribute) a controlled substance. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the motion to dismiss, and even the limited evidentiary hearing, addressed only contested inferences and legal conclusions, not facts. Further, the period from Defendant’s indictment to his arrest is 19 months of the total 29-month delay. The 10-month period of post-arrest delay was primarily due to motions for continuance submitted by the government and Defendant’s co-defendants (for health concerns). For 8 of the first 19 months, Defendant’s warrant had been removed from the NCIC database. The district court found no evidence that the government negligently or intentionally delayed prosecution. Although this court treats this finding with special deference, human or technical error resulting in the removal of Defendant’s warrant from the NCIC database was the fault of the government. But this error is attributable only to negligence. There is no evidence that the government intentionally caused any delay. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant did not offer evidence that the delay resulted in a loss of evidence or witness testimony or any impediment to his ability to mount a defense. View "United States v. Roger Cooley" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. The parties stipulated in the plea agreement that his offense level would be reduced by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2G2.2(b)(1) because he did not intend to distribute the illegal material. The district court sentenced Defendant to 120 months of imprisonment, a sentence within the calculated Guidelines range of 97–121 months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by arguing at sentencing that he had distributed the material. Defendant did not object at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not plainly err. The court explained that Defendant bears the burden of proving that his substantial rights were affected. Defendant pointed to no evidence that the district court’s ultimate sentence of 120 months was the result of the government’s statements about distribution software and the neutral state of the evidence. The language of the district court specifies the quantity of images, the nature of the images, and the victimization of the family friend’s daughter as the basis for its sentence. It would be speculation to assume the court’s phrase “attendant circumstances” meant it relied on the government’s mention of torrenting software. The specific facts mentioned, without more, support the sentence imposed. Defendant received the benefit of his plea bargain—the two-level reduction in offense level for not distributing. Because Defendant cannot show that the result would have been different in the absence of the alleged error, he fails to show entitlement to reversal on the basis of plain error. View "United States v. Jonathan Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and tampering with evidence. A jury acquitted Defendant of the murder charge but found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense, and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced Defendant to a total term of 300 months imprisonment. Defendant raised three issues on appeal: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress custodial statements; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence on the manslaughter and tampering counts; and (3) the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. Considering all the circumstances surrounding the ongoing search for the victim and conditions in which Defendant was held and questioned by law enforcement, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court explained that a close review of the record establishes that a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant was guilty of manslaughter. The jury heard evidence that Defendant and the victim were the only two adults present at the cabin; that the victim’s blood was found both inside and outside the cabin; that Defendant had scratch marks on his face and upper body; and that Rooney and the victim were fighting in the time leading up to her death. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant put the victim’s body in the fire, which destroyed any evidence of the cause of death. Finally, the court found that Defendant’s claim that his sentence was substantively unreasonable is unavailing. View "United States v. Jonathan Rooney" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a firearms offense. The district court imposed a sentence of thirty-two months’ imprisonment. Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error in calculating his base offense level.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the guidelines define “crime of violence” as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Commentary to the guidelines provides that “crime of violence” includes the crimes of aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit such an offense. Defendant contends that carjacking does not categorically involve the use of threatened force because the “intimidation” element in the statute does not require a communicated threat of force. The Eighth Circuit has explained, however, that “bank robbery by intimidation requires proof that the victim ‘reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm’ from the robber’s acts.” Defendant also argued that his conspiracy to commit carjacking offense does not qualify as a crime of violence because conspiracy offenses do not require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. His argument is foreclosed by the commentary to USSG Section 4B1.2 and the court’s precedent. View "United States v. Melvin Shields" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Advance Auto Parts, claiming unlawful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Advance Auto’s motion for summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that here, unlike Green v. Dillard’s Inc., there is no genuine dispute whether Advance Auto acted negligently or recklessly under Section 213. As for Section 213(a), Plaintiff does not allege that Advance Auto made improper orders or regulations. It had a written policy prohibiting discrimination based on any protected status; all employees had to read and familiarize themselves with this policy and complete annual training. The court further explained that Advance Auto is not liable under Section 1981 for discrimination based on its employee’s conduct. Plaintiff’s claims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail under respondeat superior and ratification. View "Nicolas Tashman v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 110 months in prison. He appealed his sentence. Defendant argued the district court erred in determining he had a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. Sections 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and 4B1.2(b).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no equal protection violation “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis” for the application of United States v. Henderson. Because Henderson was neither unexpected nor indefensible, its interpretation of the guidelines had a rational basis. The district court did not plainly err in not sua sponte finding that applying Henderson violated Defendant’s equal protection rights. Moreover, the court wrote that the district court considered Section 3553(a) factors and thoroughly explained its decision. It did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Christopher Evans" on Justia Law

Minnesota sued a litany of fossil fuel producers1 (together, the Energy Companies) in state court for common law fraud and violations of Minnesota’s consumer protection statutes. In doing so, it joined the growing list of states and municipalities trying to hold fossil fuel producers responsible for alleged misrepresentations about the effects fossil fuels have had on the environment. The Energy Companies removed to federal court. The district court granted Minnesota’s motion to remand, and the Energy Companies appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Congress has not acted to displace the state-law claims, and federal common law does not supply a substitute cause of action, the state-law claims are not completely preempted. The court reasoned that because the “necessarily raised” element is not satisfied, the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply to Minnesota’s claims. Further, the court wrote that the connection between the Energy Companies’ marketing activities and their OCS operations is even more attenuated. Thus, neither requirement is met, there is no federal jurisdiction under Section 1349. View "State of Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law

Plaintiff opposed a new collective-bargaining agreement that passed by a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff sued the union for breach of its duty of fair representation and a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. At their core, these claims are about whether the union hoodwinked members into ratifying the new collective-bargaining agreement by concealing what would happen to the 30-and-out benefit. The district court dismissed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act claim, denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, and granted summary judgment to the union on the fair-representation claim. On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that the union concealed key information, but only nine members said it would have made a difference.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide other evidence that the outcome of the vote would have changed. The court reasoned that the ratification vote was overwhelmingly in favor: 228 to 109, a 119-vote margin. Plaintiff offers only nine members who would have voted “no” if they had known about the elimination of the 30-and-out benefit. Even assuming each would have voted the way he thinks, the agreement still would have passed by a wide margin. The court wrote that no reasonable jury could conclude that the union’s alleged bad-faith conduct was the but-for cause of the union’s ratification of the collective-bargaining agreement. View "Matthew Nagel v. United Food and Com. Workers" on Justia Law