Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to carjacking and brandishing-a-firearm charges and received a 179-month sentence. He now argued that the district court committed procedural and substantive errors in determining his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. He first argued that the district court procedurally erred by referring to the JSIN statistics. He claimed that he had a right under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to have notice of, and therefore time to review, all material information relied on by the district court at sentencing.  The court explained that it found that any error made by the district court in interpreting the JSIN statistics “did not substantially influence the outcome of the sentencing proceeding” because the district court focused on Defendant, not the data. If the district court erred in this case, its error was harmless.   Further, Defendant’s 179-month, within-guidelines sentence reflects the district court’s careful weighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. As the district court did not fail to consider or properly weigh any relevant factor or otherwise commit a clear error of judgment, the court concluded that Defendant’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Ryan McDaniel" on Justia Law

Several homeowners hired contractors to repair damage to their homes. The homeowners assigned to the contractors their rights under their insurance policies with State Farm & Casualty Co. State Farm refused to pay. The contractors sued. State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing the assignments were invalid under Nebraska law. The district court granted the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties disagree on whether the terms are sufficient to create a valid assignment of rights. The court held that without a description of the services to be provided and a definite price, these terms are left “to be determined in the future,” and thus, there is no mutuality of obligation. Although the written language is insufficient to create an enforceable assignment, this conclusion, by itself, does not resolve this case. The contractors argued that their oral arrangements cure any deficiencies that may exist in the written agreements. The court concluded that it cannot conclude that the assignments here are invalid as a matter of law simply because the written “vital terms” were not as definite as they could have been. View "R.A.D. Services LLC v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

After conceding that he was removable from the United States for entering the country without being admitted or paroled, Petitioner applied for asylum on the ground that gangs in his native Honduras had persecuted him in the past and that he feared persecution from them should he return there. An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals determined, as relevant, that any harm Petitioner had suffered bore no connection to his political opinions and denied his application. Petitioner for review of the agency's decision and his motion to reconsider that decision.   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petitions. The court explained that the record here does not contain much evidence, if any, that Petitioner’s refusal to assist the gang, even one as powerful and politically influential as MS-13, was meant to reflect a political opinion or that the gang thought his refusal was due to a political opinion. Further, the court wrote that Petitioner’s contention that the IJ and BIA failed to examine the record adequately in reaching their conclusions is untenable. The IJ recounted the gang's interactions with Petitioner and concluded that he never expressed any political opinion or anti-corruption sentiment or that the gang imputed those things to him—conclusions that find ample support in the record. View "Hugo Aguilar Montecinos v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”) issued Professional Liability policies to Dr. Bradley DeWall and Wound Management Consultants, P.C. (collectively, “WMC”). Coverage Paragraph A insured WMC against “claim[s] for damages . . . based on professional services rendered or which should have been rendered . . . by the insured . . . in the practice of the insured’s profession.” In this coverage action, the parties dispute whether Paragraph A covers a third party’s claim to recover Medicare reimbursements it had to repay because of deficiencies in WMC’s documentation of the professional services it provided. Applying Iowa law, the district court1 ruled, consistent with other courts that have considered the issue, that the third party’s “Medicare recoupment” claim is not “based upon professional services” and, therefore coverage is limited to the $50,000 of defense costs provided in the policies’ separate Medicare Endorsement. WMC appealed this summary judgment ruling, raising numerous issues.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that MedPro had no duty to defend WMC from Genesis’s Medicare recoupment claim under the policies’ Paragraph A coverage. The court also agreed with the district court that there is no duty to defend the other claims Genesis asserted in its arbitration complaint because those claims are not “based upon professional services rendered . . . in the practice of [WMC’s] profession.” View "Bradley DeWall v. Medical Protective Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Cash Advance Centers, Inc., alleging a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227. Counsel purporting to represent Cash Advance Centers, Inc., moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration provisions contained in loan agreements between Plaintiff and non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc. The district court denied the motion to compel. Counsel also moved to substitute Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., for Cash Advance Centers, Inc., as the party defendant, but the district court denied that motion as well.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse judgment. Because Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., is not a party to the lawsuit, its notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court. The non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., made no appearance in connection with the motion, and the court’s order addressed only a motion advanced by the party Defendant. The notice of appeal also names Cash Advance Centers, Inc., the party Defendant, as an appellant. But while attorneys purporting to represent Cash Advance Centers, Inc., filed a notice of appeal, counsel acknowledged at oral argument that she represented only non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., and not Cash Advance Centers, Inc. View "Kamisha Stanton v. Cash Advance Centers, Inc" on Justia Law

Ahern Rentals, Inc. (Ahern), alleges that two competitors— EquipmentShare.com, Inc. (EquipmentShare) and EZ Equipment Zone, LLC (EZ)— misappropriated its trade secrets to gain an unfair advantage in the construction equipment rental industry. The district court first dismissed EZ from the lawsuit, ruling that Ahern failed to state a plausible claim for relief against it. Later, the district court dismissed the case altogether, ruling that Ahern’s remaining claims against EquipmentShare were duplicative of claims against EquipmentShare in several other ongoing lawsuits brought by Ahern. Ahern appealed both rulings, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing its claims.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that, according to Ahern, EquipmentShare developed programs by exploiting Ahern’s trade secrets. Ahern also alleged that the market information used by EZ to develop profitable utilization and rental rates is based on Ahern’s trade secrets illegally obtained by EquipmentShare. Taking all factual allegations as true, Ahern pled enough facts to make it entirely plausible that EZ is at least using systems developed by EquipmentShare through the exploitation of Ahern’s trade secrets. Further, the court found that Ahern has pled sufficient facts to state a claim against EZ for unjust enrichment. It is not disputed that Ahern’s trade secrets are a benefit with real economic value. And, as alleged in the complaint, EquipmentShare and EZ have used the benefit to their advantage. Finally, Ahern plausibly alleges malfeasance in the acquisition of these confidential trade secrets. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Ahern’s claims against EZ for civil conspiracy and unjust enrichment. View "Ahern Rentals, Inc. v. EquipmentShare.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reconsider the denial of an administrative closure of his removal proceedings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing an intervening BIA decision -- Matter of Cruz-Valdez -- granted administrative closure authority the BIA previously found lacking and instructed the Board to apply the administrative closure standard set out in Avetisyan. The BIA agreed   The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion to deny motions to reconsider. As in Gonzalez-Vega, the court concluded it is “clear from the record that the [BIA] had the appropriate [Avetisyan] considerations in mind and committed no clear error of judgment in weighing them.” Petitioner argued the BIA did not analyze all the Avetisyan factors. But the court wrote it does not require the Board “to recite the considerations mechanically when applying them to the facts.” The BIA announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable us to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its broad discretion in denying the motion to reconsider View "Alejandro Islas-Saldana v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

WinRed, a “conduit” political action committee (PAC), centralizes donations to Republican-affiliated candidates and committees. WinRed helps them set up a WinRed.com webpage where donors contribute. WinRed collects and distributes the earmarked contributions. WinRed.com’s technical and maintenance services are at least partly performed by a separate entity, WinRed Technical Services, LLC (WRTS). The relationship between WinRed and WRTS is not clear, but the Eighth Circuit accepts WinRed’s affidavit that it operates exclusively in the domain of federal elections. The district court dismissed WinRed, Inc.’s request for a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction preventing the Attorneys General from (1) investigating WinRed’s activities with respect to contributions; and (2) bringing a deceptive-practice action against it for those activities.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that WinRed gives two reasons to look beyond the statutory text. Neither succeeds. The court held that WinRed errs from the start by attacking a disclaimer mandate where none exists. Minnesota’s consumer-protection law prohibits deceptive practices, and federal law does not preempt Minnesota’s enforcing it against WinRed. Because an enforceable state law underlies General Ellison’s investigation, the investigation may proceed. View "WinRed, Inc. v. Keith Ellison" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender. His term of supervised release began on September 2, 2020. At a revocation hearing, Defendant admitted to several substance- abuse violations of his supervised release. The district court revoked his supervision and imposed a ten-month sentence of imprisonment to be followed by a one-year term of supervised release. Defendant married a woman with three minor children from a previous relationship, and he asked the district court to add “stepchildren” to “biological and legally adopted children” for purposes of setting up supervised visits. The district court denied his request. Defendant appealed, challenging the special conditions of his post-revocation supervision.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that contrary to Defendant’s characterization, the Court does not interpret Special Condition 2 as an outright prohibition on visits with his stepchildren. As Defendant points out, the condition does not include “stepchildren” in the category of minors with whom supervised visits may be arranged with the help of the probation office. But, more generally, the condition’s first sentence prohibits “contact” with minors “without the prior written consent of the United States Probation Office.” A fair reading of this restriction would permit Defendant to visit his stepchildren so long as he obtained the requisite permission from the proper source. The court read Special Condition 2 as barring Defendant from visiting his stepchildren only when the probation office does not give him permission to do so beforehand. View "United States v. Shawn Hutson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on separate counts of producing, receiving, and possessing child pornography. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the warrantless seizure of his cell phone, including the images found on the phone, the evidence seized at his house, and the images found on the hard drive. Defendant also moved to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement. The district court denied Defendant’s motion in its entirety. Shrum entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of producing child pornography and one count of receiving child pornography and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argued that his cell phone was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Sergeant had probable cause to believe Defendant’s phone contained contraband or evidence of a crime. The Sergeant had seen photos of text messages between A.B. and Defendant that indicated they had engaged in sexual activity, perhaps as recently as on the camping trip the night before. Further, there was a fair probability that those text messages, or related evidence of unlawful conduct, would be found on Defendant’s phone. Exigent circumstances were also present. When the Sergeant did find the victim, it appeared that she had just showered, suggesting to the Sergeant that she may have washed away physical evidence of sexual contact. Given the totality of the circumstances, the court agreed with the district court that the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Keith Shrum" on Justia Law