Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, individually and as special administrator of the Estate of her father (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appealed following the district court’s dismissal of her claims for legal malpractice, fraud, and deceit against attorneys (collectively, “the law firm”).   The Eighth Circuit granted Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record. However, the court affirmed, reasoning that the court predicts the South Dakota Supreme Court would prohibit the assignment of legal malpractice claims and the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims. The court explained that Plaintiff asserts the district court erred when it dismissed her fraud and deceit claims against the law firm. To the extent Plaintiff intended to state a claim for fraud or deceit claim, no such claim actually appears in the amended complaint— especially in light of South Dakota’s requirement that fraud and deceit be pled with particularity. While the original complaint contained an allegation of fraud and deceit, the failure to retain that allegation in the amended complaint is dispositive. The only remaining allegations pertain to punitive damages, but an assertion of punitive damages is not a free-standing cause of action under South Dakota law. View "Teresa Thompson v. William Harrie" on Justia Law

While in jail, Plaintiff clawed at his own eye with enough force to tear it out. Plaintiff sued nearly everyone involved, including St. Charles County, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court concluded that none of the individuals involved had violated his Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Nor, in the absence of a constitutional violation or a county-wide custom of unconstitutional conduct, was St. Charles County liable for his injuries. The question is whether qualified immunity is available to those who may have prevented the injury.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that the record is devoid of evidence that the Officer and Sergeant consciously disregarded a serious medical need. And even if the Nurse’s failure to administer Plaintiff’s medications approached criminal recklessness, the court wrote, it cannot say that the law was so “clearly established” that she was on “fair notice” she was violating it. Further, Plaintiff cannot point to any court that has held that an officer was deliberately indifferent because he placed a pepper-sprayed inmate in a new cell with a sink. View "Jamie Leonard v. Steven Harris" on Justia Law

The decedent, while detained at the Washington County Jail (“WCJ”), committed suicide by jumping from a height. Plaintiff, as trustee for the decedent’s next of kin, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Washington County and WCJ employees. The individual Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. At issue is whether the uncontroverted measures taken by WCJ were so inadequate as to be deliberately indifferent to the decedent’s risk of suicide.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that a review of the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the preventative measures taken by WCJ were not so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference. C400 was specifically designated to hold suicidal inmates for close observation. This area had cameras and large windows, allowing for constant observation of the decedent. Further, neither the history of jump attempts at WCJ nor the correctional officers’ failure to report the decedent’s earlier effort to climb the stairs raises a material fact question, given the few jump attempts that have occurred at WCJ over the course of several years and that inmates climb C400’s stairs for innocent reasons. Further, because there is no cognizable constitutional violation, there is no basis for Monell liability. View "Lisa Brabbit v. Frank Capra" on Justia Law

ResCap Liquidating Trust (“ResCap”) pursued indemnification claims against originator Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc. (“PRMI”), a Nevada corporation. ResCap asserted breach of contract and indemnification claims, seeking to recover a portion of the allowed bankruptcy claims for those holding units in the liquidating trust. The district court concluded that ResCap had established each element of its contractual indemnification claim. The district court awarded ResCap $10.6 million in attorney’s fees, $3.5 million in costs, $2 million in prejudgment interest, and $520,212 in what it termed “post-award prejudgment interest” for the period between entry of judgment and the order awarding attorney’s fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit remanded for a recalculation of postjudgment interest but otherwise affirmed. The court explained that the district court held that, as a matter of Minnesota law governed by Section 549.09, a final judgment was not “finally entered” until its Judgment in a Civil Case resolving attorney’s fees, costs, and interest was entered on April 28, 2021, and therefore Minnesota’s ten percent prejudgment rate applied in the interim period. But Section 1961(a) does not say “final judgment,” it says “money judgment.” The district court, on August 17, 2020, entered a “money judgment.” Thus, the district court erred in applying Minnesota law to calculate interest after August 17, 2020, rather than 28 U.S.C. Section 1961(a). View "ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Primary Residential Mortgage" on Justia Law

Officers in an armored police vehicle shot tear gas at three people near the scene of a protest in downtown St. Louis. The district court concluded that all three had a First Amendment retaliation claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court agreed that one Plaintiff has a valid First Amendment retaliation claim, but qualified immunity shields the officers from the claims brought by the others. Two of the Plaintiffs claimed that the First Amendment covers what they did, which was to observe and record police conduct during the St. Louis protest. The court wrote that even if it were to assume they are correct, observing and recording police-citizen interactions was not a clearly established First Amendment right in 2015. Further, in regard to Plaintiffs’ peaceful-assembly theory. The court reasoned even if the officers “unreasonably believed” that the group was refusing to comply with their earlier directions to disperse, their official orders—not retaliatory animus—caused them to use the tear gas.   However, in regard to the third Plaintiff, the court explained at this stage, there is enough evidence to establish the “personal involvement” of everyone in the armored vehicle. To be sure, Plaintiff could not see who launched the tear gas canister. But with multiple “officers present,” the jury could find that each one of them participated in the decision or that one did it “while the others failed to intervene.” Under these circumstances, the claims against the individual officers can proceed. View "Sarah Molina v. Daniel Book" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of the district court committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for medical care and treatment under 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. The court found that Defendant presently suffered from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release from custody posed a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the findings underlying the commitment were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that the district court’s finding that Defendant posed a substantial risk to persons or property was adequately supported in the record. The court relied on the unanimous recommendation of the experts. The experts observed that the most reliable predictor of future violence is past violence, and they detailed Defendant’s history of random and unpredictable violent actions. The court further found that the parties have not made a sufficient showing to justify sealing the briefs in this appeal. View "United States v. Dewayne Gray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit stemming from her son’s death while under the supervision of employees at an Arkansas jail. She alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her son’s serious medical needs. The district court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s opinion that a layperson would recognize seizure-like activity as a serious medical need that one of the Defendant’s deliberately ignored. The court reasoned that a reasonable jury could not conclude from this description of events that Defendant was aware of a serious medical need. Second, a reasonable officer would not necessarily infer that seizure-like activity in these circumstances required him to take additional action. The decedent was behaving normally at booking, though very thirsty and reportedly under the influence of methamphetamine. It isn't unreasonable to believe that whatever medical episode he experienced during transport (if he actually experienced one) had fully resolved itself by the time Defendant encountered him.   Further, the court explained that in these circumstances, Defendants can't be faulted for presuming that the medical staff best knows the quantity and quality of information needed for assessments. And even though the decedent was obviously sick, recognizing that someone is sick is not the same as knowing that he is receiving inadequate care from a trained medical professional. View "Donna Reece v. S. Williams" on Justia Law

Continental Resources, Inc. operates an input well on Timothy and Tracy Browns’ land in Harding County, South Dakota. The Browns sued Continental, seeking compensation for damage to the surface of their land and Continental’s use of their pore space. Continental removed the case to federal court and twice moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted both motions, finding that Plaintiffs: (1) released Continental from liability for surface damage; and (2) could not recover damages under South Dakota law for Continental’s pore space use.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that section 45-5A-4 clearly articulates three categories of compensable harm. Plaintiffs sought damages for lost use, which is not one of the categories. They try to infuse ambiguity into the statutory scheme by pointing to Chapter 45-5A’s purpose and legislative findings sections. While these sections may help a court interpret ambiguous statutory language, the court found none in Section 45-5A-4. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiffs have not suffered compensable harm under South Dakota law, so the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. View "Timothy Brown v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Defendant challenged an order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded there was no error. The court explained that probable cause “is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” In this case, the detective was not required to exclude all reasonable possibilities that Defendant was ignorant of the scale; he needed only a fair probability that she knew what was in the console. The combination of Defendant’s control over the vehicle, her proximity to the console, her history of an arrest for drugs, and her association with a backseat passenger who possessed drugs was sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. View "United States v. Jessica Mathes" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor, travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, and transfer of obscene material to a minor. The district court sentenced him to 144 months in prison. He appealed his conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting parts of his signed plea agreement that the court had not accepted.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that at trial, Defendant’s prior counsel testified that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily signed the plea agreement, noting that he read, discussed, and explained each paragraph to him, specifically covering the waiver. Defendant believes the district court should not have relied on his prior counsel’s testimony alone because it contradicted Defendant’s testimony. But it is the district court’s role to determine the credibility of testimony, and that determination is “virtually unassailable on appeal.” Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not err in finding Defendant waived his Rule 410 rights and admitting parts of the plea agreement.   Further, because Defendant waived his attorney-client privilege on communications about the plea agreement and because his prior counsel properly testified to refute Defendant’s testimony, the district court did not err in allowing the testimony. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to show Defendant took a substantial step toward the enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). View "United States v. Jeremy Hahn" on Justia Law