Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought a variety of state and federal claims against the City of Waynesville (the City), the Waynesville Police Department (WPD), WPD Chief, WPD Officers, and Pulaski County Prosecutor (collectively, Appellees). The district court dismissed most of Appellant’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and later granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Appellant’s remaining claims. Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment. Appellant conceded that his unreasonable seizure and conspiracy-to-cause-false-arrest claims do not involve the officer. Additionally, Appellant clarified that his appeal of the unreasonable search claim is limited to “the district court’s determination about the computer and home searches.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, at minimum, it was objectively reasonable for the police Chief and Officer to believe that Appellant had committed or was committing a violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 455.085.2, Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 565.090.1 or Mo. Rev. Stat. Section 565.225.2-3. Accordingly, arguable probable cause exists, meaning that it was not clearly established that arresting Appellant on these facts would violate his right to be free from unlawful seizure. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Appellant’s unreasonable-seizure claim because Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.   Further, the court concluded that reasonable suspicion supported the search of Appellant’s house. Moreover, because there is only one minor inaccuracy in the otherwise thorough search warrant affidavit for Appellant’s computer, and the issuing judge found that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that judgment is entitled to deference on appeal. View "Dennis Ryno v. City of Waynesville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was electrocuted by a powerline owned and operated by the City of Sibley, Iowa. Plaintiff sued the City, in relevant part, for negligence and negligence per se. Plaintiff’s wife also brought a loss of consortium claim. The district court granted summary judgment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence and affirmed as to negligence per se. The court reinstated the loss of consortium claim. Plaintiff alleged that the City violated the Iowa Administrative Code, specifically (1) its adopted NESC standards and (2) Iowa Administrative Code 199- 25.4(1). The City argued that the NESC, as adopted by Iowa regulations, establishes the standard of care. But it hasn’t pointed to any authority stating that compliance with Iowa regulations is conclusive of the standard of care in ordinary negligence actions. The court reasoned that compliance with Iowa regulations is not dispositive of the standard of care for negligence. Because a jury could find that the City breached its duty, Plaintiff’s negligence claim has genuine issues of fact for trial. Further, the court held that the public-duty doctrine does not bar Plaintiff’s negligence claim because it involves City misfeasance. View "Victor Maldonado v. City of Sibley" on Justia Law

DirecTV and Dish Network (“Defendants”) provide video services in part through the Internet. The City of Creve Coeur filed this class action in Missouri state court on behalf of local government authorities, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable under the Video Services Providers Act (“VSPA”) and implementing local ordinances, plus injunctive relief, an accounting of unpaid fees, and damages. Defendants removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the state court entered an interlocutory order declaring that VSPA payments are fees, rather than taxes, DirecTV filed a second notice of removal, arguing this order established the required federal jurisdiction. The district court granted Creve Coeur’s motion to remand.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The court explained that the district court’s remand order plainly stated that the remand was based on comity principles as articulated in Levin, not on “state-tax based comity concerns.” Comity as a basis to remand was raised and fully argued in the first remand proceeding. Federal courts have long precluded two bites at this apple. Second, the Supreme Court in Levin emphatically stated that the century-old comity doctrine is not limited to the state-tax-interference concerns that later led Congress to enact the TIA. Third, the state court’s December 2020 Order addressed, preliminarily, only the VSPA fee-or-tax issue under state law. It did not address the broader considerations comity addresses. The state court order in no way overruled or undermined the basis for the district court’s first remand order. Therefore, DirecTV failed to establish the essential basis for a second removal. View "City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV LLC" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of possessing at least five kilograms of cocaine. Defendant retained new counsel and moved for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, raising numerous issues. The district court denied the motion. Defendant appealed. His principal argument, raised for the first time in the post-verdict motion, is that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment by using expired tracking warrants to locate him when he was arrested returning to the Twin Cities from a trip to Chicago with thirteen pounds of cocaine in his vehicle.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is undisputed that the Fourth Amendment argument at issue was an issue reasonably available for a pretrial motion to suppress that Defendant did not raise. However, the court agreed to review for plain error.  The court reasoned that nothing seriously affected the fairness or integrity of this prosecution. Whether the tracking warrants expired when Defendant was arrested, interviewed, and released on October 7 is an issue the court does not decide. However, it is hardly free from doubt, so any error in not reaching the issue was not plain. Moreover, Defendant fled when the police attempted to stop him on November 1, leading them on a hazardous high-speed chase that provided probable cause to arrest Defendant for resisting arrest, failing to stop after a collision, and reckless driving. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on the alleged expiration of the tracking warrants. View "United States v. John Pickens, Jr." on Justia Law

Block, Inc. appealed from an order granting in part H&R Block, Inc. and HRB Innovations, Inc.’s (collectively, “H&R Block”) motion for a preliminary injunction. H&R Block claims that the use of “Block” and a green square logo in connection with tax services: (1) is likely to cause confusion because H&R Block and Block, Inc. both offer overlapping services, including tax preparation and filing, other related financial services, and charitable services; (2) has confused consumers, the media, and investors; and (3) will cause irreparable harm, as it will undermine H&R Block’s ability to control its public image and perception and lead consumers to incorrectly believe Block, Inc’s tax service is connected to H&R Block or one of the “building blocks” in the Block, Inc. family of brands.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and vacated the preliminary injunction. The court explained that H&R Block failed to satisfy its burden because the evidence in the record is inadequate to establish substantial consumer confusion by an appreciable number of ordinary consumers, nor irreparable harm that is concrete and imminent. The court wrote that if there is, in fact, trademark infringement, H&R Block will have a full opportunity to demonstrate that infringement at a trial on the merits. View "H&R Block, Inc. v. Block, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting multiple negligent and intentional tort causes of action after being sexually assaulted by an employee of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the government’s motion. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s determination that the assault occurred outside the scope of the employee’s employment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the FTCA makes clear that the scope-of-employment test is defined by state law, not the employer. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that the provider’s duties were restricted to providing battlefield acupuncture therapy (BFA). The court explained that initially, the provider denied sexually assaulting or massaging Plaintiff. He later admitted to the sexual assault and admitted that it was inappropriate for him to massage a patient. He also failed to document anything that occurred after the BFA therapy, including the massage. This is consistent with the finding that the massage and subsequent sexual assault exceeded the scope of his treatment authority. The court explained that in light of the pleadings and undisputed evidence, the district court did not err, determining that the provider acted outside the scope of his employment. View "Jane Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 2021 conviction for various sex-trafficking offenses. He argues that the Government was prohibited from prosecuting him based on a “No Further Prosecution” clause in a prior 2018 plea agreement that resolved heroin-related charges against him.The Eighth Circuit dismissed the indictment and vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the prior plea agreement’s promise of no further prosecution encompasses the sex-trafficking convictions appealed here. The court explained that it considers three actors in considering a defendant’s demand for specific performance of a plea agreement after the defendant has pleaded guilty: (1) the possible prejudice to the defendant, (2) the conduct of the government, and (3) the public interest. Here, the prejudice is clear. Defendant pleaded guilty in 2018 to one drug offense in exchange for the Government dismissing the remaining drug offenses and promising not to bring further charges arising from or directly relating to the investigation. The Government reneged on that promise by pursuing the sex-trafficking prosecution, which relied on facts that were part of and arose out of the 2018 investigation. As a result, Defendant faced charges he would not otherwise have faced had the Government stuck to its bargain. The public also has an interest in safety from criminal behavior and in the prosecution of crimes. But that does not outweigh constitutional due-process interests, and the Government’s breach of the plea agreement violated Defendant’s due-process rights. View "United States v. Marlin Thomas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of 15 child pornography-related offenses. On appeal, Defendant argued his possession and receipt of child pornography convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and he contends his sentence violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Defendant raised an additional argument in a pro se supplemental brief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions.   The Eighth Circuit held that Apprendi requires the resentencing of Defendant for the possession of child pornography conviction. In all other respects, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that there was sufficient evidence submitted to the jury establishing the victims were minors, including (1) W.S. testified he was 11 years old; (2) K.A. testified she was 15 and she informed Defendant she was 15 years old, and (3) N.W. and A.C. informed Defendant they were 13 years old, and their birth certificates introduced at trial corroborate their ages. Also, the material depicting all victims demonstrates they were minors based on their physical characteristics. However, here the jury made no finding of a qualifying minor victim, so the statutory maximum sentence the district court can impose is 10 years. Because the district court’s sentence on the possession conviction runs afoul of Apprendi, the court vacated the sentence and remanded it for resentencing. View "United States v. Kyle Soto" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her daughter, D.A.M.I., natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision finding Petitioner removable and denying her application for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner alleged persecution on account of her membership in two particular social groups (PSG)—witnesses who cooperate with law enforcement and nuclear family members of Interiano-Erazo—and on account of an imputed political opinion. Petitioner challenged only the BIA’s determination that she failed to demonstrate that her proposed group of “witnesses who cooperate with law enforcement” is particular and socially distinct within Guatemalan society.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that even assuming that the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence does not require as a matter of law that witness-based PSGs include an element of public testimony, the BIA and the IJ committed no error because each found that the record contains insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Guatemalan society views “witnesses who cooperate with law enforcement” as a socially distinct group. Accordingly, the court found that Petitioner has failed to show that the record, in this case, compels a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s determination that Guatemalan society does not view “witnesses who cooperate with law enforcement” as a socially distinct group. View "Judith Lemus-Coronado v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

While on supervised release after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, Defendant reportedly assaulted his girlfriend and therefore violated the conditions of his release. At the ensuing revocation hearing, the government did not call Defendant’s girlfriend to testify but instead related her statements through a different witness. The district court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months. Defendant maintains that the government's introduction of this hearsay denied him his due-process right to confront adverse witnesses.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that any error the district court may have committed in allowing the government to introduce this hearsay was harmless. The court reasoned that Defendant’s admission that he participated in a physical altercation with his girlfriend, coupled with the apparent injuries that resulted and the threatening messages sent in the immediate aftermath, supports a reasonable inference that he intentionally or knowingly committed the assault. Thus, the government has offered sufficient evidence apart from the girlfriend’s statements to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant committed a grade A violation of the conditions of his supervision. View "United States v. Calvin Starr" on Justia Law