Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Five months after being sued in Oregon for trademark infringement, Jacob Rieger & Co., LLC provided notice to its liability insurer, Cincinnati Insurance Company. Due to Rieger’s delay, Cincinnati refused to reimburse Rieger’s legal fees for the five months that Cincinnati was unaware of the lawsuit. The Oregon case was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Instead of waiting to be sued in a court that did have jurisdiction, Rieger’s parent company, GSP Licensing LLC, filed a new suit in Missouri as the plaintiff. GSP was not named under Rieger’s insurance policy, so Cincinnati denied coverage for the Missouri case. Cincinnati then filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaration of coverage. The district court granted summary judgment to Cincinnati.   The Eighth Circuit reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Cincinnati. The court affirmed the dismissal of Rieger’s tort claims and the imposition of sanctions. The court explained that under Missouri law, a tort claim is independent of a contract claim if the tort claim can succeed without regard to the outcome of the contract claim. In other words, the tort claim could succeed regardless of the outcome of the contract claim. Here, Rieger admits that its tort claims would fail if its contract claim succeeded. By Rieger’s own admission, the court found that the district court properly dismissed Rieger’s tort claims. View "Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Jacob Rieger & Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Police officers in the St. Peters Police Department created a text messaging group to update each other about local Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. Although the text group was intended for official purposes, specifically for officers to share up-to-date information about local BLM protests, they also shared “unrelated” content. Plaintiff sent the group a video from an animated sitcom called “Paradise PD.” It showed a black police officer who accidentally shot himself with a media headline stating, “another innocent black man shot by a cop.” According to Plaintiff, the video was satire and a parody of the BLM protests. The next morning, the Police Chief berated Plaintiff, ordered him to resign, and told him that if he refused, Plaintiff would open an investigation and recommend to City Administrator that Plaintiff be fired. Plaintiff resigned and filed a lawsuit under Section 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. Defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted their motion.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court reasoned that based on the allegations in the complaint, the group text was used to send both work-related and unrelated messages, and Plaintiff’s video was such an unrelated message. The court explained that while Plaintiff has met the threshold showing required to advance his First Amendment claim, the court expressed no opinion on the merits of that claim. View "Brian Bresnahan v. City of St. Peters" on Justia Law

General Motors (“GM”) installed Generation IV 5.3 Liter V8 Vortec 5300 LC9 engines (“Gen IV engine”) in seven different GMC and Chevrolet trucks and SUVs in model years 2010 to 2014 (the “affected vehicles”). In 2016, representatives from various States filed a putative class action alleging that the affected vehicles contain a defect that causes excess oil consumption and other engine damage (the “oil consumption defect”). Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of their Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (MMPA) claim, stating that “the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the district court improperly applied the concept of puffery to  their deceptive omissions claims under the MMPA.”   The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the MMPA claims. The court concluded that advertising “puffery” does not affect an MMPA claim based on omission of a material fact, at least in this case, and the court agreed that Plaintiffs’ Class Action Complaint alleges sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state an omissions claim to relief that is plausible on its face. View "Michael Tucker v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the City of Florissant, Missouri. They allege the City is liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), because Florissant police officers, acting pursuant to an unlawful custom or policy, violated First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at five protests in June and July 2020 when they declared an unlawful assembly and ordered the dispersal of protestors who had not committed the Missouri crimes of unlawful assembly or refusal to disperse. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s Memorandum and Order dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that a municipality’s police power “to declare that an assembly is unlawful and to order individuals to disperse is not tethered to Missouri’s statutes codifying the criminal offenses of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“FAC”) improperly limited Florissant’s broad civil authority to manage protests in the public interest to situations violating the criminal offenses of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse. The court reasoned that the alleged customs of declaring unlawful assemblies and ordering protesters to disperse in “the absence of an agreement of one person acting in concert with six or more other persons to imminently violate a criminal law with force or violence” do not state a claim of constitutional injury under Monell. Thus, the FAC failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation by any city employee and therefore failed to state a claim of Monell liability. View "Khalea Edwards v. City of Florissant" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses. The district court sentenced him to 600 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and the sentence imposed. Defendant argued that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements from his interview.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment, concluding there was no reversible error. The court explained that circumstances do not establish that Defendant was in custody during the interview. Agents did not physically restrain him in the vehicle. Only two agents questioned him, and they repeatedly told Defendant that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. The agents were not deceptive or threatening, and Defendant voluntarily answered their questions. The court reasoned with the district court that a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have believed that he was free to terminate the interview if he wished. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, and that the district court properly declined to suppress incriminating statements made during the interview before agents informed Defendant that he would be arrested.   Further, the court held that the district court properly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), and elected to impose Defendant’s advisory guideline sentence. The court saw no compelling circumstances in support of a shorter sentence that demonstrate an abuse of the district court’s discretion. View "United States v. Justin Treanton" on Justia Law

Defendant admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to nine months in prison. Defendant appealed, claiming that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the district court explained the applicable Guidelines range, and that Defendant’s supervised release was being revoked because he used a controlled substance more than three times in the past year. The district court also heard Beckwith’s counsel talk about Defendant’s substance abuse, the fact that he hadn’t violated his supervised release for two years, his difficulty understanding the court’s authority over him, and more. This is enough to infer that the court considered the factors. The district court also properly considered Defendant history and characteristics in determining his sentence. View "United States v. Carl Beckwith, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine and as part of his plea agreement he agreed to waive some of his rights to appeal his conviction and sentence. He nonetheless appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines despite their harsh and disparate treatment of methamphetamine offenders, erred in treating the Guidelines as mandatory, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that the appeal waiver bars most of his appeal. As for the remainder, the court affirmed. The wrote that because the appeal waiver precludes appeal of the court's "abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence," the court dismissed this claim of error.   Further, even assuming that the district court erred in not sua sponte declaring the relevant methamphetamine Guidelines unconstitutional, the court concluded that any error was not plain. Defendant has cited scattered opinions from district courts across the country that take issue with the difference in treatment between those caught with pure methamphetamine and those with mixtures containing methamphetamine, but he hasn't shown that any of these courts held the relevant Guidelines unconstitutional. Those decisions instead appear to come from district courts that have taken these matters into consideration when selecting a sentence. Defendant has not pointed to any Supreme Court or circuit court authority to support his contention. View "United States v. Rene Lugo-Barcenas" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition found after he shot a man in a convenience store in Davenport, Iowa. The victim recovered; both were separately prosecuted. Defendant appealed his 120-month sentence, arguing the district court erred by cross-referencing to the base offense level for attempted first-degree murder.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. First, the court explained that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant’s swift but deliberate actions before the shooting demonstrate that he acted with the requisite premeditation. Next, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding “there is absolutely no evidence of self-defense.” Finally, even if the district court committed clear error in cross-referencing to the attempted first-degree murder guideline, the court would conclude the error was harmless. An incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines is harmless error when the district court “specifically identifies the contested issue and potentially erroneous ruling, sets forth an alternative holding supported by the law and the record in the case, and adequately explains its alternative holding.” Here, the district court’s careful and adequate explanation why the Section 3553(a) factors justified a 120-month sentence renders any guidelines cross-referencing error harmless. View "United States v. Jaterrius Greer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after an employee of a hospital operated by the Indian Health Service (IHS) struck Plaintiff with his vehicle. Plaintiff claimed that the hospital employee was negligent by driving despite his prior seizures; and the employee’s supervisor was negligent for not preventing the employee from driving; and the employee’s doctor was negligent for releasing the employee to drive   The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because United States’ sovereign immunity applied to Plaintiff’s claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, he must adduce evidence showing that Rosebud Health had sufficient control or supervision over the employee’s doctor’s work. He has not done so. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. View "Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a home-delivery subscriber to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch daily newspaper (the “Post-Dispatch”), filed a putative class action for damages against the owner and publisher of the Post-Dispatch in state court alleging that Defendants “double-billed” him for “overlapping days.” Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, alleging that Plaintiff is seeking aggregate class-wide damages for the applicable five-year statute of limitations period that exceed $5,000,000. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint alleging six claims for relief under Missouri law. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing all claims.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing his breach of contract and MMPA claims because there are genuine issues of material fact “whether overlaps cost subscribers money” and whether Defendants’ billing practices violate the MMPA because “overlaps are incorrect and wrong.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it might be evidence that Defendants made minor billing errors in Plaintiff’s individual subscriber account, but that claim was not pleaded. The district court did not err in granting Defendants summary judgment dismissing the claims Plaintiff asserted despite his belated raising of this unpleaded contract claim. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff failed to controvert Defendants’ evidence showing that DISCUS properly deducts from a subscriber’s payment-in-advance the applicable rate charged as each newspaper is delivered. Thus, because Plaintiff cannot establish the ascertainable loss element of an MMPA claim, the court held that it need not address his additional argument that the Post-Dispatch’s billing practices are unfair or unethical. View "Steven Goldsmith v. Lee Enterprises" on Justia Law