Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff bought a laptop with a manufacturer’s warranty from Target. He filed a class action on behalf of “all citizens of Arkansas who purchased one or more products from Target that cost over $15 and that were subject to a written warranty.” His theory was that Target violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act’s Pre-Sale Availability Rule by refusing to make the written warranties reasonably available, either by posting them in “close proximity to” products or placing signs nearby informing customers that they could access them upon request. Target filed a notice of removal based on the jurisdictional thresholds in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The district court the class action against Target Corporation to Arkansas state court.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the remand order and return the case to the district court for further consideration. The court explained that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. The district court refused to acknowledge the possibility that Target’s sales figures for laptops, televisions and other accessories might have been enough to “plausibly allege” that the case is worth more than $5 million. The district court then compounded its error by focusing exclusively on the two declarations that accompanied Target’s notice of removal. The court wrote that the district court’s failure to consider Target’s lead compliance consultant’s declaration, Target’s central piece of evidence in opposing remand, “effectively denied” the company “the opportunity . . . to establish [its] claim of federal jurisdiction.” View "Robert Leflar v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress. D2 also challenged the court's withholding of the juror questionnaires that were completed during voir dire.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of D2's motion to suppress, finding that officers arrested him after he fled from them, at which point they had probable cause to arrest him for fleeing with intent to avoid arrest. However, the court remanded D2's case to the district court for the limited purpose of disclosing the completed questionnaires to defendant D2. Based on the record, the court could not conclude that the district court's questioning was adequate to determine if juror bias contributed to D2's conviction. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants (D1 and D2) were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) after the district court denied their motions to suppress. On appeal, Defendants challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of both Defendants' motions to suppress. Pertaining to D1, the court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that a reasonable police officer would have found that D1 was fleeing with the intent to avoid arrest. The interaction occurred during the day in a public area, and police officers were wearing tactical vests emblazoned "Police" and displayed badges. The officers also made repeated commands that were consistent with their intent to arrest him. View "United States v. Ronald Finley, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff argued with a police officer during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Defendant- Lieutenant saw the confrontation and, fearing for the other officer’s safety, pepper-sprayed him. Plaintiff alleged that the force used was both excessive and retaliatory the district court granted qualified immunity. Plaintiff brought excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims against the Lieutenant and a municipal liability claim against the City of St. Louis.   The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims at summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s arguments are just general complaints about the Lieutenant’s “true motivations, intentions, and testimonial fabrications.” None of these arguments make any difference because “evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force.” Further, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, causation is missing. As Plaintiff acknowledged, the Lieutenant “was not even in the area” when he criticized the Bicycle Response Team. Nor did Plaintiff “have any interaction with him” during the mere seconds between the beginning of the incident and the use of pepper spray. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that the Lieutenant did not violate Plaintiff’s First or Fourth Amendment rights also forecloses his constitutional claims against the City of St. Louis. View "Derek Laney v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested pursuant to an absconder warrant for failing to report to his supervising parole officer. Law enforcement received a tip that Defendant was staying at a certain residence and arrested him in the vicinity of the residence. Law enforcement then executed a warrantless search of that nearby residence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the motion to suppress, finding that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant lived at the residence. The government appealed the order granting the motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement had probable cause or at least reasonable suspicion that Defendant resided at the place searched.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress because law enforcement needed probable cause that Defendant was residing at the home in order to execute the warrantless search. The court explained that the informant’s tip had far fewer indicia of reliability to support probable cause without corroboration. True, the CI had given reliable information at least once before, but the record contains no details as to the basis of the tip about Defendant. View "United States v. Justin Thabit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant both work for the State of Iowa. Plaintiff is a urologist at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Defendant is a professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. After Defendant criticized Plaintiff’s expert testimony in a case unrelated to this one, Plaintiff sued Defendant under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant retaliated against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on multiple grounds, including that Plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that Linder’s conduct was under color of state law.  Plaintiff argues that his complaint contains ample facts that together plausibly allege that Defendant acted under color of state law. These include that Defendant (1) identified himself as a state employee when he criticized Plaintiff in the newspaper articles, (2) relied on “the prestige of his official position with [UI] to gain credibility with his audience,” and (3) “used the instrumentalities and resources of the State of Iowa to facilitate his retaliatory conduct.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to plead adequately that Defendant’s retaliatory actions were under color of state law. Contrary to Plaintiff’s insistence, our case law is clear that a state employee, merely by publicly identifying himself as such, does not act under color of state law. Further, even assuming that a public university professor acts in his official capacity or within the scope of his employment when he comments on public affairs, it would not necessarily follow that he acts under color of state law. View "James Brown v. Marc Linder" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. One defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Defendants’ appealed and raise several issues.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that there was no error in the court’s challenged evidentiary rulings or jury instruction, and that sufficient evidence supported the carjacking convictions, but that the convictions for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence must be reduced to convictions for simply using a firearm during the carjacking. Accordingly, the court vacated the convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and order them reduced to convictions under Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the firearms convictions affected the terms of imprisonment imposed, the court vacated the sentences on all counts and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of committing a carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury. Under a separate count, they were convicted of using and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the carjacking. Defendants appealed certain evidentiary and jury instruction issues, and also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the discharging a firearm conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, finding no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. However, the court concluded that Defendant's discharging a firearm conviction must be reduced to using a firearm. The court explained that the carjacking offense was complete at the moment of the taking, so the fact that the firearm was used after that point could not be used to support the discharging a firearm offenses. View "United States v. Ranson Long Pumpkin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. According to the presentence report, Defendant was subject to the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence because he had two prior convictions for violent felonies and one prior conviction for a serious drug offense. Defendant objected, arguing that his 2003 conviction for the sale of cocaine under Missouri Revised Statute Section 195.211 (2000) does not qualify as a serious drug offense under the ACCA because that Missouri statute criminalized conduct that does not violate federal law. The district court sustained Defendant’s objection. The government appealed the district court’s ruling.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction involved cocaine. The court compared the definition of cocaine under Missouri law at the time of Defendant’s Missouri conviction with the definition of cocaine under federal law at the time of Defendant’s instant federal offense. The Missouri schedule did not define isomer. The federal definition, however, criminalizes only optical and geometric isomers—but not positional isomers. Given the unambiguous breadth of Missouri’s definition of cocaine, the court agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior Missouri conviction for the sale of cocaine was not a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA. View "United States v. Anthony Myers" on Justia Law

Petitioner a citizen of El Salvador, petitions the court for review of the denial of his application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and reversal of withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner has serious cognitive impairments, and while living in El Salvador he was recruited by gang members who attacked and threatened him when he refused to join.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and granted in part. The court explained that it would have had jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s argument that the IJ applied an incorrect legal standard for determining the nexus between past persecution and any protected characteristics. But Petitioner waived this argument by raising it for the first time in his petition for review, not on appeal to the BIA.   However, the court held that the BIA did not provide sufficient justification for reversal, failing to identify reasons grounded in the record that are sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind that the IJ clearly erred in its factual findings. The government urges affirmance, pointing to the thoroughness of the BIA’s decision and its extensive citations to the administrative record. But these features of the BIA’s decision do not establish that substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA’s decision here. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review with respect to Petitioner’s application for withholding under the CAT. View "Gustavo Alvarez-Gomez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law