Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police Lieutenant deployed pepper spray into Plaintiff’s face, during a protest in St. Louis, Missouri. Plaintiff sued the police lieutenant and the City of St. Louis, alleging, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for retaliatory use of force in violation of the First Amendment, as well as tort claims under Missouri law. The district court denied the lieutenant’s motion for summary judgment based on his defenses of qualified and official immunity and reserved ruling on whether the City is entitled to sovereign immunity on the state tort claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to the lieutenant, vacated, in part, the denial of summary judgment to the City, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court explained that the lieutenant contended that at the time he pepper-sprayed Plaintiff, it was “not clearly established that a use of force that does not violate the Fourth Amendment violates the First Amendment.” The lieutenant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the district court. In any event, the argument does not undermine the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s right to be free from a retaliatory use of force was clearly established at the time of the incident.  However, the court vacated the denial of summary judgment on the state tort claims and instruct the district court on remand to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue. View "Alison Dreith v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant on three counts in connection with his involvement in a methamphetamine and heroin conspiracy. The district court sentenced Defendant to 149 months imprisonment, followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion in limine and admitting certain testimony of a confidential informant (CI).   On appeal, Defendant raised the same arguments as he did before the district court: (1) that the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events is irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and constitutes a prior bad act, rendering the testimony inadmissible under Rules 402, 403, and 404(b), respectively, and (2) that the CI’s testimony identifying Defendant is inadmissible under Rule 403, given that he was unaware that the CI could identify him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, as the district court noted, the Government did not introduce the evidence to establish that Defendant was acting in accordance with his character but rather offered it as direct evidence establishing Defendant’s participation in the instant conspiracy. Moreover, the evidence was offered to lay the foundation for how the CI knew Defendant and was able to identify him at the 2019 drug transaction. Accordingly, the court wrote that because substantial evidence other than the CI’s testimony supports the jury’s verdict, any error in admitting the CI’s testimony regarding the 2017 events was harmless and does not warrant reversal. View "United States v. Armondo Heredia, Jr." on Justia Law

The North Dakota Retail Association and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, alleging that fees for merchants in debit card transactions violated the Durbin Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Merchants alleged that their facial challenge to Regulation II first accrued when Corner Post opened in 2018, rather than when Regulation II was published in 2011.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that, when plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to a final agency action, the right of action accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, upon publication of the regulation. In this case, the Merchants challenge the collection of interchange fees by third parties authorized to collect interchange fees by Regulation II. Here, The Merchants’ equitable tolling argument failed on its merits. This court reviews “a denial of equitable tolling de novo” and “underlying fact findings for clear error.” Thus, the court wrote that the Merchants failed to show that they have been pursuing their rights diligently. Because the Board published Regulation II in 2011 and the Merchants are not eligible for equitable tolling, the Merchants’ facial challenge to Regulation II remains time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. Section 2401(a). View "North Dakota Retail Assoc. v. Board of Governors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued Biomet, Inc. and associated entities (Biomet) after the wife’s M2a Magnum hip implant failed. The M2a Magnum is a large-diameter metal-on-metal hip implant produced by Biomet. The wife argued that the implant caused irreparable damage to her hip joint and surrounding tissues. A jury awarded the wife $20 million in damages. The jury awarded an additional $1 million in damages to her husband for his loss of consortium. Biomet appealed, arguing that (1) the jury’s verdict was inconsistent, (2) Plaintiffs failed to establish the required standard of care, (3) Plaintiffs failed to show a breach by Biomet, and (4) the damages award was excessive.   The Eighth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court explained that the jury could have, in its discretion, believed or discounted the expert testimony in its entirety. Further, the jury could have determined whether Biomet’s testing procedures met industry standards. If credited by the jury, this testimony was a sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Biomet failed to meet a reasonable standard of care. Thus, the court did not overturn the jury’s determination because the jury had a sufficient evidentiary basis to find a design defect. Further, the court deferred to the jury’s judgment as to whether $20 million is the correct compensation for a lifetime of hip dislocations and seven revision surgeries. View "Mary Bayes v. Biomet, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of Drake University (Drake), brought this action against Drake and her former supervisor, (collectively, Appellees), after her 2019 termination. Plaintiff alleged disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under both the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), as well as retaliation and discrimination based on the exercise of her rights under the Family Medical Leave  Act (FMLA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her retaliation claims under the FMLA, ICRA, and ADA, as well as her discrimination claim under the FMLA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellees have established a robust, well-documented set of legitimate reasons for Plaintiff’s termination—and Plaintiff does not dispute them. These reasons include a plethora of performance deficiencies, such as failing to pay staff members the appropriate amounts and missing deadlines, as well as non-FMLA tardiness and attendance problems. Here, the only evidence of pretext Plaintiff provides is: (1) a tenuous temporal connection between her harassment complaints and negative performance reviews; (2) a one-month temporal connection between her filing an NLRB complaint and her termination; and (3) Drake’s failure to follow its harassment-complaint policies. Therefore, the court held that Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail as a matter of law because she has presented insufficient evidence of pretext. View "Margaret Corkrean v. Drake University" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm but preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appealed and asked the court to reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in addition to crediting law enforcement’s testimony, the magistrate judge discredited witness testimony to the extent it varied from the officers’ description of events. The magistrate judge noted that the witness originally told the Sheriff there were only two people in the house when there were actually three. The magistrate judge also noted that the witness appeared to admit he lied when he “dropped his head” after the Sergeant confronted him about the discrepancy. Defendant insists the magistrate judge “infers too much.” But, again, the magistrate judge’s credibility determination after personally hearing and observing the witness’s testimony is virtually unassailable on appeal. And the Sergeants’ testimony was not inconsistent or implausible. View "United States v. Michael Mitchell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court1 determined that Defendant qualified for the enhanced statutory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Defendant appealed the district court’s application of the ACCA enhancement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the ACCA, a felon who possesses a firearm is subject to a minimum sentence of fifteen years if he has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from one another.” Here, The PSR notes that Defendant “admitted to selling drugs to an undercover officer on three separate occasions.” Although Defendant objected to his sentence enhancement, Defendant never objected to this separate-occasions statement in the PSR, so the district court properly accepted it as true. The court also disagreed with Defendant that the rule of lenity requires the court to construe the ACCA’s occasions clause in his favor. The rule of lenity states that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant. However, the court considers the rule of lenity only when, after employing all other tools of construction, “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute” remains. Here, Defendant committed at least three (if not four) qualifying offenses occurring on separate occasions, so there is no ambiguity in the statute as applied to Defendant. View "United States v. Damon Buford" on Justia Law

After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant’s conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court sentenced Defendant to 126 months imprisonment, varying upward six months from the mandatory minimum of 120 months, his advisory guidelines range. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, raising three Fourth Amendment issues emanating from a postal inspector’s warrantless seizure of an undeliverable Express Mail package sent to “Defendant Rm 512” at a hotel in Des Moines, Iowa. He also appealed his sentence, arguing it is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately justify the upward variance.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Here, the district court carefully explained why it imposed a six-month upward variance, stating that a mandatory minimum sentence would “ignore” Defendant’s “ridiculously problematic” and “offensive” behavior during his pre-sentence detention for this offense. The court did not abuse its discretion by varying upward to account for dozens of serious security and disciplinary violations. View "United States v. Manuel Flores" on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) required RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc. to contribute to four employee benefits Funds. The Funds sued for unpaid contributions, alleging that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions for all hours worked by covered employees, regardless of the type of work performed. RoadSafe countered that the CBA unambiguously requires contributions only for construction and highway work. The district court granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. The issue on appeal was whether the CBA obligates RoadSafe to make contributions to the Funds for all or only specified types of work   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that by its plain language, Article V of the CBA limits RoadSafe’s contribution obligations to “Building Construction” and “Highway/Heavy” categories of work. Because work coded as NON or “shop hours” is not within the definitions of either “Building Construction” or “Highway/Heavy,” the CBA does not require RoadSafe to make contributions for the coded work. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to RoadSafe. View "Cons. Laborers Welfare Fund v. RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and subsequently appealed. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was unlawfully arrested in his home, and the attenuation doctrine does not apply to render the evidence that was seized during a subsequent search admissible against him.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that under the circumstances, it cannot say the district court committed a clear error in finding that Defendant’s consent to search was voluntary. The court expressly considered the relevant factors for assessing voluntariness before reaching its conclusion, including those weighing against a finding of voluntary consent. Further, the court wrote that weighing the appropriate factors, it concluded that Defendant’s voluntary consent to the search of his residence was sufficient to purge the taint of the officers’ initial unlawful conduct. The district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the December 14, 2019, search. View "United States v. Gary Harris" on Justia Law