Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, a public utility company, challenged an order by the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) regarding the allocation of costs from a refund mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Entergy Arkansas made short-term opportunity sales to third-party wholesale customers, which led to a complaint by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. FERC ruled that Entergy Arkansas violated the System operating agreement, resulting in a net refund of approximately $135 million to other System members. Entergy Arkansas sought to recover these costs from its retail customers, but the APSC denied the request and ordered Entergy Arkansas to refund a portion to its retail customers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the APSC's order after a bench trial, finding that it did not violate Arkansas law, the filed rate doctrine, or the dormant Commerce Clause. Entergy Arkansas appealed, arguing that the APSC's order violated the filed rate doctrine by trapping costs and improperly allocating the bandwidth adjustment. They also contended that the order violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and imposing excessive burdens.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because FERC did not preemptively decide the cost allocation of the refund. FERC explicitly left the allocation of costs to state commissions. Additionally, the court found that the APSC's order did not discriminate against interstate commerce or impose excessive burdens, as it was not driven by economic protectionism and any negative effects were speculative.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the APSC's order. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb" on Justia Law

After the death of George Floyd, large-scale protests occurred in Kansas City, Missouri. On May 30, 2020, the Kansas City Police Department requested assistance from the Missouri State Highway Patrol to manage the protests, which turned violent. Law enforcement used tear gas and other munitions to disperse the crowd. Sergeant Jeffrey Spire deployed various crowd control measures, including smoke grenades and projectiles. Around 11:47 p.m., Spire fired projectiles indiscriminately into the crowd, one of which allegedly struck Sean Stearns, causing him to lose vision in his left eye.Stearns sued Sergeant Spire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brought claims under Missouri law and a Monell claim against the Board of Police Commissioners. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity and that Stearns could not establish a Monell claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim because Stearns failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his injury and retaliatory animus. The court also found that Stearns waived his Fourth Amendment claim by not providing a meaningful argument. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court concluded that Spire's actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not constitute a substantive due process violation. Consequently, the Monell claim failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stearns v. Dean" on Justia Law

Derrick A. Davis sued the City of Little Rock, the chief of police, and three detectives for Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a no-knock warrant was executed on his residence. The warrant was based on an email about drug activity, a controlled buy using a confidential informant (CI), and Detective Bell's affidavit. The SWAT team executed the warrant, finding marijuana inside Davis's home.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Davis appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the detectives' responsibility for the SWAT team's actions, the veracity of statements in the warrant affidavit, and the existence of a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. He also challenged the district court's handling of evidence and the imposition of sanctions for his failure to attend a deposition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Detectives Bell and Ison were entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of the warrant's execution. The court also found no Franks violation, as Davis failed to show that any false statements in the affidavit were made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, the court ruled that Davis's § 1983 conspiracy claim failed because the underlying Fourth Amendment claims were properly dismissed.The court also determined that the district court did not err in considering Detective Bell's affidavit or in disregarding Davis's expert opinions. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sanctions award because the district court had not yet fixed the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "Davis v. City of Little Rock" on Justia Law

Jerell Wilson was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The charge stemmed from an investigation into the shooting death of Dolorean Wade, during which law enforcement found a Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun at Wilson's residence. Wilson was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 96 months in prison. He appealed his conviction, sentence, and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa handled Wilson's case. Wilson had several disputes with his counsel and requested to represent himself, leading to delays and a competency evaluation. The court found Wilson competent to stand trial and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act. Wilson was ultimately convicted and sentenced, with the court granting an upward variance based on aggravating factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Wilson's appeal. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, sufficient evidence to support Wilson's conviction, and no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The appellate court also upheld the substantive reasonableness of Wilson's 96-month sentence, noting the district court's consideration of aggravating conduct and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Jerell Wilson" on Justia Law

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law

Anthony Lemicy was convicted by a jury on four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). The district court sentenced him to consecutive 30-year terms for each count, totaling 120 years. Lemicy appealed, raising several claims including improper waiver of his right to counsel, violation of his right to a fair trial due to appearing in an orange jumpsuit and restraints, improper jury instructions, insufficient evidence, incorrect calculation of criminal history points, and an unreasonable sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially appointed a federal public defender for Lemicy, but after conflicts, he chose to represent himself with standby counsel. The court repeatedly informed him of the risks and limitations of self-representation, which he acknowledged. During the trial, Lemicy appeared in jail-issued clothing by choice, despite the court offering him the opportunity to change. The jury was instructed to disregard his appearance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It found that Lemicy knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and the district court did not err in its handling of standby counsel. The court also determined that Lemicy was not compelled to wear the orange jumpsuit and any error was invited by him. The jury instructions were deemed appropriate, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. The court upheld the calculation of criminal history points and found the sentence reasonable, given the severity of the offenses and the involvement of multiple victims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there were no violations of Lemicy’s constitutional rights and that the sentence imposed was within the court’s discretion. View "United States v. Lemicy" on Justia Law

Lester Brown was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit cyberstalking, cyberstalking resulting in death, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Brown, who dealt marijuana in Kansas City, had a history of conflict with his associates, including the disappearance and murder of Ryan Cobbins. In 2018, Brown sent threatening messages to Christopher Harris and Antwon Tolefree, including demands for money and threats of violence. Brown used tracking devices to monitor Harris's movements, ultimately leading to Harris's murder in front of his daughter.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri sentenced Brown to life plus 180 months in prison. Brown appealed, challenging several evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence for two of his convictions. He argued that certain hearsay statements were improperly admitted and that evidence of his prior wrongful conduct should have been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the contested hearsay statements, as they either fell under exceptions or were not hearsay. The court also determined that evidence of Brown's prior wrongful conduct was intrinsic to the charged crimes and highly probative, thus not subject to exclusion under Rule 404(b) or Rule 403. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support Brown's convictions for conspiracy to commit cyberstalking and cyberstalking resulting in death, given the threats, use of tracking devices, and the fatal shooting of Harris.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Brown's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Mar Maluoth was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a machinegun in violation of federal law. During a police surveillance operation, officers observed suspicious behavior involving Maluoth, leading to a traffic stop. During the stop, officers found a loaded Glock handgun modified to be a machinegun under the front passenger seat where Maluoth was sitting. Maluoth denied placing the gun there and claimed his movements were due to searching for his lighter and cigarettes. However, the jury found him guilty based on the evidence presented.The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska sentenced Maluoth to 70 months in prison, which was an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The court considered factors such as the obliterated serial number on the firearm and Maluoth's history of obstructing justice. Maluoth appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Maluoth guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that Maluoth's furtive movements and the location of the firearm supported the jury's verdict. Regarding the sentence, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors, including the obliterated serial number and Maluoth's criminal history. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Maluoth" on Justia Law

Robert J. Hall, an inmate in the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), filed a lawsuit against MDOC and Corrections Officer Paul Woodruff, in his individual capacity, for injuries he sustained from an attack by a fellow inmate, Ahmad Townsend. Hall had previously submitted an "Enemy Listing/Protective Custody Declaration" form indicating he felt threatened by Townsend. Despite this, Woodruff placed Townsend in Hall's cell while Hall was asleep, leading to the attack and resulting in mental and physical injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Woodruff’s motion to dismiss based on official immunity. Woodruff appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, accepting all factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Hall. The court examined whether Woodruff was entitled to official immunity under Missouri state law, which protects public officials from liability for discretionary acts performed during their official duties. The court found that the MDOC policies cited by Hall did not create a ministerial duty because they allowed for discretion in how and when enemy declarations were checked and safeguards implemented.The Eighth Circuit concluded that Woodruff's actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and thus he was entitled to official immunity. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hall v. Woodruff" on Justia Law

Eric Virrueta pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in a warrantless search of his vehicle after a traffic stop. The evidence included methamphetamine and marijuana. Virrueta challenged the validity of the traffic stop, the extension of the stop, and the search of the vehicle, arguing that the search was not supported by probable cause and that the consent given by his parole agent was invalid.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied Virrueta's motion to suppress. The court found that the initial traffic stop was valid based on reasonable suspicion and probable cause, as Corporal Fischer had identified Virrueta driving without a valid license. The court also concluded that the extension of the stop was justified by the strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle, which provided probable cause for the search. Additionally, the court upheld the search based on the consent given by Virrueta's parole agent, who had been informed of multiple parole violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court's rulings, agreeing that the traffic stop was valid, the extension of the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, and the search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause. The court also held that the parole agent's consent provided an independent basis for the search. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Virrueta" on Justia Law