Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiff, a campus police officer, initiated a retaliation action after he was terminated following an incident where he responded to a call for an intoxicated man who had lost consciousness. Employer's reason for Plaintiff's discharge was that he did not properly handle the situation, and it warranted termination. The trial court accepted Employer's reason as non-pretextual and granted Employer's motion for summary judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding there are no genuine disputes of material fact that would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of Plaintiff. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation, Employer's proffered reason for Plaintiff's termination was legitimate and non-pretextual. View "Christopher Thompson v. University of Arkansas Brd of Trustees" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a civil suit against an insurer based on allegations that the insurer negligently advised them that they did not need to purchase a builder's risk policy for a hotel project. The district court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, finding that the insurer had no duty to give advice about different coverages or to ensure that adequate coverage existed and that plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a special relationship between the agent and the insureds that would give rise to additional duties on the agent's part to ensure the insured had adequate coverage.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its resolution of the motion for summary judgment. View "I Square Management, LLC v. McGriff Insurance Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Arkansas Video Service Act of 2013 (VSA) establishes a statewide franchising scheme for authorizing video service providers to provide services in political subdivisions within the state. Netflix and Hulu were already providing online video streaming services prior to the passage of the VSA; they have not applied for certificates of franchise authority. The City of Ashdown, Arkansas, filed a putative class action against Netflix and Hulu in 2020, seeking both a declaration that they must comply with the VSA and damages for their failure to pay the required fee. The district court granted Netflix and Hulu’s motions to dismiss, concluding, among other things, that the VSA does not give Ashdown a right of action to bring this suit. Ashdown appealed, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the VSA.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the fact that the VSA does not “prevent” a party from exercising a right does not, itself, confer a right. This provision is more logically read to preserve existing rights of action. The reference to “other laws” in the section title supports this conclusion. Further, the court wrote that the VSA does not establish such a “high duty of care” for video service providers, nor does it signal a strong public policy of protecting municipalities. Thus, the court concluded that recognizing a right of action would circumvent the intent of the VSA. View "City of Ashdown, Arkansas v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant worked as a salesman at a retail flooring store. The company gave Defendant a cell phone, which he was allowed to take home and use as a personal phone. After a co-worker alleged in 2020 that Defendant had used the phone to record her, the company’s co-owner asked Defendant for the phone and its passcode. After Defendant unlocked the phone and provided the passcode, the co-owner discovered images that he believed were child pornography. He thereafter gave the phone and passcode to law enforcement officers,   Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of child pornography that the officers had discovered on the phone. Following the district court’s denial of the motion, Defendant pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography and was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that because it found that the co-owner had apparent authority to consent to the search, the court need not reach Defendant’s argument that the warrantless search constituted an unlawful trespass. The co-owners apparent authority also defeats Defendant’s argument that the later search of his residence should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. View "United States v. Matthew Langenberg" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant repeatedly assaulted his victim, beating her with a pistol, restraining her in a car, and threatening to kill her. This was not his first such offense. He pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison. Defendant appeals, claiming that the district court erroneously calculated his advisory guideline range because it applied the kidnapping cross-reference under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Defendant’s conduct constituted kidnapping under Iowa law. Wielding a gun, he refused to let his victim exit the vehicle by physically grabbing her and threatening to kill her. Forcing his victim to stay in the car for hours—longer than the duration of a typical assault—substantially increased the risk of harm by providing Defendant easy opportunity to assault her again and again. Thus, the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range. View "United States v. Damarcus Perkins" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A jury found Defendant guilty of sex trafficking of a minor. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation by denying his requests to proceed pro se. Second, he contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Third, he argues that the district court admitted unfairly prejudicial evidence. Finally, he submits that two of the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court are impermissibly vague and overbroad.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed but remand for clarification of the two special conditions. In regards to the special conditions the court explained that although a sentencing judge has “broad discretion” when imposing terms of supervised release, we have said that a special condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague when it “fails to convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct . . . when measured by common understanding and practices.” The court held that Defendant is correct that the two special conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, respectively. The court remanded for the narrow purpose of amending the written judgment as it relates to Special Conditions 2 and 3. View "United States v. Anthony Atkins" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court’s1 order upholding the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (Commissioner) denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits, arguing that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff challenged two aspects of the Commissioner’s decision. First, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly evaluating the medical evidence. Second, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ’s RFC assessment was unsupported by substantial evidence. 
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to “perform light work . . . ; except, she should avoid extreme cold and wetness, avoid work in direct sunlight, and avoid loud noises.” Central to this finding was the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s surgically implanted neurostimulator resulted in “on-going symptom control without a consistent description of debilitating pain or the inability to function.” A lack of evidence of treatment in the months prior to the hearing undermines Plaintiff’s claim of disabling headaches. The court ultimately concluded that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is within the “available zone of choice” provided by the whole record. View "Lisa Austin v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff attended protests in downtown St. Louis. While she was leaving, an armored St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (“SLMPD”) vehicle fired tear gas in her direction. Plaintiff sued the City of St. Louis, 12 police officers who were members of the SWAT team on duty that night, and several SLMPD officials for constitutional and state law violations. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity for four Defendant officers specifically alleged to have been in the armored vehicle at the time of the incident. As to eight Defendant officers not specifically alleged to have been in the vehicle, the district court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that additional discovery was needed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity as to the eight Defendant officers for whom specific allegations were not made. The court affirmed as to the four defendant officers for whom specific allegations were made. The court explained that Plaintiff’s allegation, and the district court’s finding, that Plaintiff was not committing a crime when she was tear-gassed is enough to plausibly allege the tear-gassing was in retaliation for the First Amendment activity.  Further, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the eight officers were personally involved in the violation of clearly established constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s denial of the Officers’ motion to dismiss. View "Megan Green v. Cliff Sommer" on Justia Law

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Defendant began supervision in November 2020. He struggled reacclimating to society. Although he started a business and, for a time, underwent substance-abuse and mental-health treatment, he never stopped using meth. In ten months, he violated his probation no less than 15 times, never lasting more than a month without testing positive for meth. He was arrested on October 13, 2021 for driving without a license. While in custody, he threatened to kill two United States Marshals if they did not release him to care for his sick mother. The district court revoked his probation on January 20, 2022.   The government urged a top-of-the-guidelines sentence. The court imposed a bottom-of-the-guidelines 21-month sentence. Defendant appealed, claiming the court both committed procedural error by failing to consider the letter he sent before his original sentencing and also imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the revocation court did not commit plain error by failing to read Defendant’s letter. Defendant did not ask the revocation court to consider it. He did not provide the information contained in the letter. He did not even mention its existence. He now argues that the district court erred by not learning of and hunting down the letter sua sponte. This court disagrees. The district court did not plainly err by failing to discover and consider the letter. Further, here, the district court did not fail to consider a relevant factor. Moreover, the court’s within-guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable. View "United States v. Jeffrey Dixon" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Petitioners natives and citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of Petitioners’ motion to reconsider the BIA’s prior order, which upheld the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision finding the Petitioners removable and denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that here, in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider, the BIA reaffirmed its previous finding that Petitioners have not persuasively shown any error of law or fact in our prior decision to establish that the Salvadoran government would be unable or unwilling to control the individuals they fear. In their petition for review, Petitioners do not meaningfully argue that the BIA erred in reaching this conclusion and have accordingly waived any challenge to such a finding. Thus, Petitioners cannot show that they suffered persecution and their claims for relief necessarily fail. View "Fatima Coreas-Chavez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law