Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2021 to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Applying circuit precedent, the district court1 determined that Larry’s Missouri offense constituted a “crime of violence” under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Pulliam, 566 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2009), and therefore increased his base offense level. Larry appeals, arguing that Pulliam is no longer good law in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), and that the district court thus committed procedural error in determining his Guidelines sentencing range. Defendant argued that Borden requires that the offender’s force be targeted at another person.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote, that when the plurality and concurring opinions are read together, then, Borden holds only that the force clause categorically excludes offenses that can be committed recklessly. Pulliam thus remains binding precedent. View "United States v. Keith Larry" on Justia Law

Appellants distribute food to homeless people in the City of St. Louis and wish to continue doing so as part of their charitable and religious practice a St. Louis police officer observed Appellants distributing bologna sandwiches and issued each a citation for violating a city ordinance requiring a permit for the distribution of “potentially dangerous food.”Appellants filed this suit, claiming that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance violated their federal and state constitutional rights and Missouri statutes. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the provisions ensure that health inspectors have an opportunity to determine whether the temporary food establishment is complying with the Ordinance. When operating a temporary food establishment, Appellants would also have to ensure: that they take steps to prevent contamination of any ice served to consumers; that tableware provided to consumers is only in single-service and single-use articles; that any equipment is located and installed in a way that avoids food contamination and to facilitate cleaning; that food-contact surfaces are protected from consumer contamination; and that they have water available for cleaning utensils and equipment and to make convenient handwashing facilities available for any employees. Without these provisions regarding the distribution of potentially hazardous food to the public, the City’s goal of preventing foodborne illness would be achieved less effectively. Moreover, the court noted that nothing about the City’s enforcement of the Ordinance against Appellants prevents them from conveying their religious message in other ways. View "Raymond Redlich v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Defendant, MidAmerican, selected a defined-contribution plan, which can rise in value over time but includes no fixed payments. Plaintiffs alleged their employer failed to properly manage and monitor the costs of the company's defined-contribution retirement plan. The district court granted MidAmerican’s motion to dismiss. Without mentioning the recordkeeping allegations, it concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to plead meaningful benchmarks for “assessing the performance of the challenged funds.”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs allege that no more than $100 per participant is reasonable for a plan with approximately $1 billion in total assets and 5,000 participants. Even if the fees here look high, the court explained it cannot infer imprudence unless similarly sized plans spend less on the same services. Rather than point to the fees paid by other specific, comparably sized plans, Plaintiffs rely on industry-wide averages. But the averages are not all-inclusive: they measure the cost of the typical “suite of administrative services,” not anything more. Finally, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice without giving Plaintiffs a chance to amend it. Here, Plaintiffs never requested leave to amend, much less “submitted an amended complaint.” View "Daniel Matousek v. MidAmerican Energy Company" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and the district court sentenced her to 42 months in prison. She maintained that her sentence is unreasonably high.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the record reflects that additional considerations drove the district court's sentence. For example, the court was concerned that the calculated Guidelines range didn't adequately account for the severity of Defendant’s offense conduct, which it characterized as a "series of serious criminal conduct . . . including the sexual abuse of a minor" that the court found "very troubling." The court also expressed concern about Defendant’s behavior during pretrial detention, where she incurred 25 separate violations of jail rules, including her possession of sharpened objects and drugs as well as a false allegation of rape against jail staff.  Thus, the court discerned no abuse of discretion in the court's treatment of the relevant sentencing criteria, and "reversal is not appropriate simply because the district court did not weigh" these considerations as Defendant prefers.   Further, the court wrote that though the court did not apply a sentencing enhancement based on this finding, it nevertheless took it into account in selecting a sentence. Finally, it is true that at one point during the sentencing hearing the district court remarked that Defendant could "get some treatment that she may need" while in prison. But the record as a whole demonstrates that the sentence was driven by her offense conduct, her criminal history, and the court's desire to protect the public. View "United States v. Keasia Morrow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against LAMMICO d/b/a Lammico Risk Retension Group, Inc. (LAMMICO); Mercy Hospital-Fort Smith (Mercy); various doctors, Mercy Clinic Fort Smith Communities; and John Does 1-10, alleging liability under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd. Plaintiff claimed that Mercy made an “inappropriate transfer”. Plaintiff alleged that the delay in receiving vascular surgery within a six-hour window after the injury caused her leg to be amputated. Plaintiff further alleged that Mercy’s statutory duty under EMTALA is strict or absolute.”   The district court granted summary judgment. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants. Further, she argued that EMTALA imposes a strict liability standard for noncompliance with its directions.    The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained EMTALA’s aim is to discourage bad-faith hospitals from dumping patients. Imposing liability upon a hospital’s good-faith effort to secure appropriate care for a patient that is beyond its capabilities is off the mark. Such liability would run contrary to EMTALA’s purpose and would undermine the express target of securing adequate care for patients who could not otherwise afford it. EMTALA’s “appropriate transfer” requirement should be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable transferring hospital at the time the hospitals agreed to the transfer and the patient departed the transferring hospital. Under this standard, Mercy effected an “appropriate transfer”: it sent Plaintiff to a hospital that, based on the information conveyed to it by the hospital, had “qualified personnel” for her treatment. View "Kimberly Ruloph v. LAMMICO" on Justia Law

The district court convicted Defendant of two controlled substance offenses, and of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The issue on appeal is the third element of this offense, whether the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly possessed ammunition. Defendant argued on appeal, as he did in the district court, that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the ammunition in question, which was found in a locked safe in a closet of what Defendant described as “my bedroom” in a Davenport, Iowa home where he was not then living.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there were gaps and inconsistencies between what Defendant told the officers and what officers found when they searched the safes in the bedroom closet at 1025 West Locust. But resolving fact discrepancies and drawing reasonable inferences are tasks reserved for the fact finder at trial, here, the district court. The errors in Defendant’s testimony can be reasonably attributed to his age, his decades of heroin and cocaine abuse, and the likely passage of time since he had accessed the safes in the bedroom closet. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s verdict the court concluded that Defendant’s statements to officers, when combined with the other evidence are sufficient for a rational factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the ammunition found in the second safe. View "United States v. Donnie Spencer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff saw Cognium, a “nutraceutical” manufactured by Natrol, on sale. Cognium, according to Natrol’s advertising, improves memory and concentration. Its packaging stated that Cognium is “powered by Cera-Q, a natural protein from silkworm cocoons,” and can improve “Memory Recall Efficiency” by 90% when taken twice daily for four weeks. The box claimed that “nine clinical studies in adults, seniors and children showed statistically significant improvements in memory and cognition in 4 weeks or less when taken as directed.”   Plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against Natrol, seeking damages for herself and establishment of a National Class and Missouri Consumer Subclass. Plaintiff alleged that, prior to her purchases of Cognium, two of the nine clinical studies noted on its packaging had been retracted, including one for “data fabrication and falsification.”   With Plaintiff’s individual claims dismissed, the court determined the sole named plaintiff could not represent the purported class and dismissed the entire action. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing her MMPA and unjust enrichment claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here Plaintiff purchased a product that expressly stated on the label it was “not intended to” do what she stated she purchased it for, serve as a substitute treatment for her prescription medication. Thus, for Plaintiff the actual value of the Cognium she purchased, and the value of Cognium without Natrol’s alleged marketing misrepresentations was “zero.” The benefit of the bargain rule does not apply in this situation, so Plaintiff cannot prove that she suffered ascertainable loss “as a result of” Natrol’s unlawful practice. View "Christine Vitello v. Natrol, LLC" on Justia Law

During proceedings to determine whether Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised release, Defendant asked the district court to allow him to appear without a lawyer. The court granted his request and, after a hearing, revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to thirteen months' imprisonment. Defendant maintains on appeal that the court erred in granting his request.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant has not demonstrated reversible error but merely buyer's remorse for his decision to proceed pro se. The court wrote that the record shows that the court did not deny Defendant his right to proceed with appointed counsel; if anything, it shows that the court encouraged Defendant to proceed with his prior attorney as counsel. The court explained that a "district court does not violate the right to counsel when it gives a defendant the choice between adequate representation and self-representation," see Ivers, 44 F.4th at 756, and Defendant does not allege that his previous counsel was inadequate. In addition, Defendant has no right to standby counsel, as that option is available at the district court's discretion. View "United States v. Orlando Preston" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reviewed a case for the second time regarding “whether a South Dakota tax on nonmember activity on the Flandreau Indian Reservation (the Reservation) in Moody County, South Dakota is preempted by federal law. On remand, and after a six-day video bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Tribe, concluding again that federal law preempts the imposition of the tax.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that in light of guideposts from the Supreme Court, even with the evidence that the district court heard at trial, the court cannot conclude that the federal regulation in IGRA regarding casino construction is extensive. The court reasoned that even with a more factually developed record than the court considered on summary judgment, the Bracker balancing test does not weigh in favor of preemption under IGRA because the extent of federal regulation over casino construction on tribal land is minimal, the impact of the excise tax on the tribal interests is minimal, and the State has a strong interest in raising revenue to provide essential government services to its citizens, including tribal members. The district court thus erroneously entered judgment in favor of the Tribe based on IGRA’s preemption of the excise tax. View "Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Michael Houdyshell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating the Travel Act by facilitating prostitution, served her fifteen-month prison sentence, and began a three-year period of supervised release in July 2020. In the following eighteen months, she violated supervised release conditions at least twenty-four times. The district court revoked supervised release and imposed an 18-month sentence, with 18 months of supervised release to follow. Defendant appealed, arguing that varying upward to a sentence greater than the 6-12 month advisory guidelines range is substantively unreasonable because a lesser sentence would have been sufficient.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the sentencing record, the contention the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the Section 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range is without merit. The court wrote it has repeatedly held that it is not unreasonable for a sentencing court to demonstrate with an upward variance that contemptuous disregard for our laws can have serious consequences.   Further, here, the district court explained it was varying upward to promote Defendant’s respect for the law and to protect the public from further crimes, not to enable treatment or promote rehabilitation. View "United States v. Paisley Michels" on Justia Law