Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted by an Arkansas jury on two counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. After the district court denied his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal of two claims and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court denied Defendant's petition with respect to his conviction but granted relief with respect to his sentence of death, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. Both sides appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order affirming Defendant's conviction; however, the court reversed the district court's grant of relief. The Eighth Circuit explained that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision concerning the scope of cross-examination of a government witness did not contravene or unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent by concluding that the balance struck by the trial court was permissible under the Sixth Amendment, and his Confrontation Clause claim did not merit relief. Defendant's other claims were procedurally barred and Defendant did not show cause of prejudice to overcome the default. View "Ray Dansby v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and adverse grant of summary judgment in this diversity action arising out of a slip-and-fall on Ameristar Casino Kansas City, LLC’s property.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court found that the district court properly applied the Massachusetts Rule and granted Ameristar’s motion for summary judgment. There is no dispute that the patch of ice on which Plaintiff slipped and fell had accumulated naturally on the walkway outside the casino’s entrance. There was no dispute that the accumulation was attributable to weather conditions general to the community. Plaintiffs point to no evidence, for example, that the ice on the walkway was an isolated condition unique to Ameristar’s property, rather than the result of weather affecting the entire Kansas City area. Thus, because Ameristar took no steps to remove or treat the ice that accumulated where Plaintiff fell, the district court properly found that Ameristar assumed no duty of care.   Further, Plaintiffs point to no Missouri case where a property owner has been found to have assumed a duty by agreement under similar circumstances. The court wrote that in essence, the Plaintiffs’ implied-agreement theory is an attempt to hold Ameristar liable based on the alleged existence of a company snow-and-ice-removal policy, but Missouri courts do not recognize such an exception to the Massachusetts Rule. View "James Cleek v. Ameristar Casino KC, LLC" on Justia Law

This product liability case arises out of the multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) proceedings regarding Biomet’s M2a Magnum hip-replacement device. After experiencing complications from a hip replacement surgery using the M2a Magnum, Plaintiff sued Biomet, Inc., Biomet Orthopedics, LLC, Biomet Manufacturing LLC, and Biomet U.S. Reconstruction, LLC (collectively, “Biomet”), alleging multiple claims, including defective design. A jury ultimately found in Plaintiff’s favor, concluding the M2a Magnum was defectively designed. The jury also awarded Plaintiff punitive damages. Biomet moved for a new trial and renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law, but the district court denied these motions.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s summary judgment ruling concluded the M2a Magnum’s warnings and instructions were legally sufficient in the context of Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim. This ruling has no bearing on whether the M2a Magnum’s warnings and instructions prove an alternative design was unreasonable or would not have prevented the foreseeable risks it posed. Further, at trial, Plaintiff introduced evidence suggesting Biomet should have tested the M2a Magnum device before introducing it to the market but failed to do so. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the district court did not err in denying Biomet’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages View "Lori Nicholson v. Biomet, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base. The district court sentenced Defendant to life in prison on this count. Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court found Defendant eligible for a reduction and reduced his sentence to 480 months, his new statutory maximum penalty under Section 841(b)(1)(B) as modified by section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Defendant appealed, arguing the court procedurally erred in recalculating his amended advisory guidelines range and abused its discretion by imposing a statutory maximum term of imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court applied the 292–365-month guidelines range from the PSR addendum, based on the retroactive guidelines change in Amendment 782 but not on the nonretroactive change in Amendment 742. This was not a procedural error. Further, the court explained, the district court proceeded in a logical, careful manner to resolve multiple interlocking issues and then confirmed the amended guidelines range in its final order granting First Step Act relief. Thus, there was no procedural error.   Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its substantial First Step Act discretion. The district court did not overstate the seriousness of Defendant’s offense. His three-year evasion of authorities after skipping bond, his misconduct at his sentencing hearing, and his serious conduct violations while incarcerated show a lack of acceptance of responsibility and a failure to adjust his behavior. View "United States v. Donald Shephard" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and two counts of possession of unregistered firearms. Defendant preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and appealed.   Defendant first argued that the warrant application did not establish probable cause to justify the search of his residence because it relied on the confidential Bulletin, which in Defendant’s view represents an attempt by the ATF to improperly change the law by defining all fuel filters and solvent traps as silencers regardless of how a person intends to use them. He further asserted that hat the good faith exception does not apply because the search warrant application misstated the law regarding firearm silencers and unmodified fuel filters and omitted the intent element, misleading the judge considering the warrant as to both law and facts. Here, the court explained, that the warrant application was thin, but officers were not “entirely unreasonable” in their belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause, nor was the warrant so deficient that they “could not reasonably presume its validity.” The court agreed with the district court that, regardless of whether the warrant was supported by probable cause, the good faith exception applies. View "United States v. Christopher Hay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims against several parties after a family-help ranch was sold to a corporate entity against his knowledge.In 1961, Plaintiff’s father and grandfather formed the Healy Ranch Partnership (“HRP”). In 1986, Plaintiff’s grandmother transferred her partnership interest to Plaintiff in exchange for him assuming the partnership’s debt and making certain payments to her. In 1994, Plaintiff’s mother formed a South Dakota corporation, Healy Ranch, Inc. (“HRI”). She filed articles of incorporation authorizing HRI to issue 1,000,000 shares of common stock with a par value of one dollar per share. The articles of incorporation stated that the “corporation will not commence business until consideration of the value of at least Five Thousand Dollars has been received for the issuance of shares.” That same year, Plaintiff’s mother and her lawyer caused HRI to issue nearly 300,000 shares without consideration. In 1995, Plaintiff’s mother conveyed all of the partnership’s real-property interest in the ranch to HRI, including both her 50 percent share as well as Plaintiff’s 50 percent share. In 2000, Plaintiff’s mother sold one-third of her shares of HRI to Plaintiff and one-third to each of his two brothers. In Healy I, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s actions.Plaintiff then filed this RICO action; which the court dismissed because it ran afoul of res judicata and the four-year statute of limitations for RICO claims. View "Bret Healy v. Albert Fox" on Justia Law

Northshore Mining Company filed a petition for review of a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) order stating that Northshore had failed to maintain the walkway in good condition after an employee was injured in 2016. The order attributed the violation to Northshore’s reckless disregard of and unwarrantable failure to comply with the walkway-maintenance mandatory standard. In addition, MSHA designated the violation as “flagrant.” Commission’s conclusions on reckless.The Secretary cross-petitioned for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. The Eighth Circuit denied Northshore’s petition on the issue of the company's reckless disregard and unwarrantable failure and granted the Secretary’s cross-petition for review of the Commission’s conclusions on the flagrant designation and individual liability. View "Northshore Mining Company v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two counts of distributing heroin. Before trial Defendant filed multiple motions in limine seeking to prevent the government from introducing certain evidence. Defendant now appeals the district court’s denial of two of those motions in limine. Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of both offenses and that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 10-year sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.   Defendant argues the contested evidence cannot be considered “intrinsic” evidence—that is, “evidence of wrongful conduct other than the conduct at issue offered for the purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime occurred.” Here, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the overdose of a person that received Defendant’s heroin. The person’s overdose was relevant to prove the substance Defendant distributed was heroin. The district court’s instructions properly outlined the elements of distribution of heroin—that is, they did not instruct the jury to convict Defendant for the victim’s injuries—thus mitigating the risk of prejudice.   Defendant further argued a reasonable jury would not have credited the witness’s testimony since the witness was a heroin addict, failed to accuse Defendant when initially questioned about the incident in 2018, identified Defendant from a single photograph, and testified in exchange for immunity. The court concluded that credibility determinations, however, are best left to the jury.Finally, after reviewing the record, the court held  the district court’s findings supporting Defendant’s sentence were not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Michael Watley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s judgment upholding the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for social security disability insurance benefits. She argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) believed that she lacked the ability to follow detailed instructions, but failed to include that limitation in the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert or in the residual functional capacity finding. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately explain why only partial weight was given to the opinions of her treating mental health providers.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court considered the fact that the ALJ had found earlier in the decision that Plaintiff had only a moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying information. The sentence could thus be read as finding the opinion “not necessarily pertinent,” because the ALJ was not giving controlling weight to the providers’ opinion and because Plaintiff’s moderate limitations were accounted for in the hypothetical question and the residual functional capacity determination.Further, the court found to be unpersuasive Plaintiff’s alternative argument that the ALJ failed to adequately explain why she gave only partial weight to the testimony of Plaintiff’s mental health providers- a licensed independent social worker and an advanced registered nurse practitioner. Under the regulations, neither mental health provider is considered an acceptable medical source whose opinion may be afforded controlling weight. Moreover, their opinion was “entitled to relatively little evidentiary value” because it was “rendered on a check-box and fill-in-the-blank form.” Thus, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s denial of benefits. View "Melissa Galloway v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant challenged the admission of his prior felony firearm conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He also appealed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant first challenged the admission of his 2008 conviction as improper propensity evidence. The court explained that even assuming for the sake of argument that evidence of the prior crime was inadmissible, any error was harmless. The Government asked the witness only two vague questions about the prior conviction and mentioned it in passing during the closing argument. The district court gave a limiting instruction when the evidence was introduced, telling the jury that it could only be used to show knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake, and not as evidence of guilt. The prosecutor repeated the limiting guidance in her closing argument. And the jury had ample evidence to support its verdict even without the evidence—including a recording from the post-arrest interview in which Defendant admitted that he handled the guns.   Defendant further argued that hat the district court did not give enough consideration to Section 3553(a) factors when deciding his sentence. The court explained that based on the record as a whole, particularly the court’s engagement with each side’s arguments at sentencing, the court is satisfied that the district court was aware of and adequately considered the Section 3553(a) factors. Finally, in considering that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable, the court held that Defendant failed to overcome this presumption of reasonableness. View "United States v. Kenneth Barbee, Jr." on Justia Law