Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, having preserved the right to do so pursuant to his conditional plea of guilty. He also appeals his sentence, challenging his classification as an armed career criminal pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and in the alternative, the calculation of his Guidelines range on other grounds.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The court vacated his sentence and remand for resentencing, however, because Defendant does not have three prior qualifying convictions under the ACCA. The court explained that was reasonable for the officers to rely on our then-applicable precedent that dog sniffs at an interior apartment door are permissible.   Moreover, the court wrote that to be subject to higher statutory penalties under the ACCA, an individual who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g) must have three or more prior convictions for offenses -6- that are “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s].” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). As relevant here, a serious drug offense is defined as: “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. Accordingly, the court found that Defendant’s prior offenses are not serious drug offenses under the ACCA, and the district court erred by sentencing Defendant as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Christopher Perez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff resigned from his employment as a surgeon with Mayo Clinic (“Mayo”) after an internal committee recommended his termination following an investigation into allegations of his misconduct. Plaintiff sued Mayo and his supervisor, alleging discrimination and reprisal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo and the supervisor.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff argues Mayo’s recommendation to terminate his employment was based on his race, religion, and national origin. Because Said does not offer direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must create a sufficient inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive summary judgment.   Here, Plaintiff claims another similarly situated former employee, who also received complaints, from Mayo received preferential treatment. The court concluded that even if Plaintiff was similarly situated to the other employee, the court concluded that Plaintiff does not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude he received disparate treatment from the other employee. The court further explained that the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that Mayo believed Plaintiff was guilty of making unwelcomed advances toward female coworkers and of other misconduct. Said fails to “create a real issue as to the genuineness of” Mayo’s perceptions. Finally, regarding Mayo’s reporting of Plaintiff’s resignation to the State Board, as already discussed, the record demonstrates Mayo believed it was required to report Plaintiff’s termination to the State Board because Plaintiff resigned during an open investigation into his misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence showing this was a pretext for retaliatory intent. View "Sameh Said v. Mayo Clinic" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(9), and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(k). The district court sentenced him to 125 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant makes several arguments: first, that the district court erred in denying his request for an entrapment instruction; second, he raises a Brady claim; and third, he argues ineffective assistance of counsel.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that factual record establishes law enforcement and its informant merely provided Defendant an opportunity to make a sale, which revealed Defendant’s unlawful possession of the firearm that he sold to the agent.  As there is no evidence of inducement, the court was not required to give entrapment instruction.   Further, Defendant’s assertions are too speculative to support a Brady claim. The jury heard the relevant testimony and was thus aware of the conflicting recollections of the agent and the confidential informant about the events leading to the sale. Furthermore, considering the weight of evidence against Defendant on the two counts of conviction, the failure to disclose the identity of the informant’s brother did not prejudice him. Finally, the court declined to hear Defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim. The court held that it only reviews such claims on direct appeal in “exceptional cases”, and this case is not such an instance. View "United States v. Brandon Hayes" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court convicted Defendant on one count each of receipt and possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (5)(B) and sentenced him to 97 months imprisonment. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. According to Defendant, a rational jury could not have found that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly received or possessed the child pornography found on his devices. The court explained that first, the thumbnails in Exhibits 1 to 4 support the district court’s finding that Defendant knowingly received and possessed those images or their originals. The examiner testified that a thumbnail indicates that the original of that image was in the phone’s gallery application at some point. Second, circumstantial evidence surrounding Exhibits 5, 6, and 8 to 13 supports the district court’s finding that Defendant knowingly possessed and received at least one of the images in these exhibits. Third, other evidence supports these inferences. Defendant’s devices contained thirteen child-pornography files, several suspected child-pornography files, and hundreds of other images of children—many erotic and some watermarked with child-pornography-related terms. Further, because the district court would have imposed the same sentence under Section 3553(a) factors as it did under the guidelines, any error in its application of the guidelines was harmless. View "United States v. Christopher Golden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued, now retired, police officer, after an encounter that led to Klein’s arrest and a truncated prosecution. The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims alleging unlawful seizure, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the seizure and arrest claims were untimely and that the malicious prosecution claim fails on the merits. The court explained that Plaintiff’s false arrest claim accrued when he was bound over for trial on June 20, 2017, and his unlawful seizure claim accrued at the time of the seizure, on June 19, 2017. The action filed on November 6, 2019, was therefore untimely as to these claims as well. The district court properly granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims alleging false arrest and unlawful seizure under both federal law and Iowa law.Moreover, the court concluded that Defendant had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or possession with intent to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine, and failure to possess a tax stamp for seven grams of methamphetamine. Plaintiff argues that Defendant lacked probable cause because his search for the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa Constitution. The existence of probable cause in a civil action, however, is measured based on all evidence known to the arresting officer, whether or not it would have been admissible at trial. View "Michael Klein v. Warren Steinkamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated action against Experian Information Solutions (“Experian”), alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681 (“FCRA”). The district court found that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a jury question on damages.   Plaintiff contends that a genuine dispute of material fact exists on damages because she provided evidence of financial and emotional harm. The court explained that to maintain a claim for negligent violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must offer proof of “actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure. Further, Plaintiff argues that she sustained financial injury based on the denial of her application for a Chase Bank credit card after a hard inquiry on her Experian report. However, her deposition testimony refutes this claim. The record bolsters the conclusion that the bankruptcy drove Chase’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s credit card application. Thus, Plaintiff’s assertion of financial harm is insufficient to create a jury question on damages. Finally, the court wrote that like in other decisions where the court has denied damages for emotional distress, the record reveals that Plaintiff “suffered no physical injury, she was not medically treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated any outward manifestation of emotional distress. View "Christa Peterson v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and other death-row prisoners in Arkansas sued the governor and a corrections official, arguing that Arkansas’s three-drug execution protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. After a bench trial, the district court found that the prisoners failed to establish a violation, and denied a motion for new trial.   The prisoners argue that the district court clearly erred in finding that they failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The prisoners cite expert testimony from Dr. Craig Stevens and Dr. Gail Van Norman that midazolam has a ceiling effect that occurs at a dose between 0.2 to 0.4 mg/kg. These experts relied on two medical studies, which are known by the names of their principal authors as the Inagaki study and the Miyake study. The court wrote that with no scientific consensus and a paucity of reliable scientific evidence concerning the effect of large doses of midazolam on humans, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the prisoners failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause severe pain. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim under the Eighth Amendment.   Further, the prisoners failed to establish that the State’s existing method was sure or very likely to cause needless suffering, so the State was not required to consider alternative methods. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "Stacey Johnson v. Asa Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action n against two credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”), Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) and Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”), for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state plausible claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint is too thin to raise a plausible entitlement to relief. The FCRA is not a strict liability statute. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint presents a bare legal conclusion that Experian and Trans Union employed unreasonable reporting procedures. There are no allegations that the CRAs knew or should have known about systemic problems. The court explained that the FCRA requires reasonable—not perfect—procedures. That Plaintiff’s credit reports may have contained inaccurate information is not in itself sufficient for the imposition of liability. View "Anders Rydholm v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2020, Kansas City began restricting participation in its Minority Business Enterprises and Women’s Business Enterprises Program to those entities whose owners satisfied a personal net worth limitation. Mark One Electric Co., a woman-owned business whose owner’s personal net worth exceeds the limit, appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit challenging the Kansas City Program as unconstitutional because of the personal net worth limitation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must first articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling government interest, such as stopping the perpetuation of racial discrimination and remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting. Here, Mark One does not dispute that the City has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of race and gender discrimination on City contract opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses. And Mark One has conceded the 2016 Disparity Study provides a strong basis in evidence for the MBE/WBE Program to further that interest.The City’s program must be narrowly tailored, which requires that “the means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Mark One claims that its exclusion from the Program despite its status as a woman-owned business shows that the Program is unlawful Indeed, Mark One has declared that it has suffered past discrimination, as the Program requires for certification. But the City does not have a constitutional obligation to make its Program as broad as may be legally permissible, so long as it directs its resources in a rational manner not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "Mark One Electric Company v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a police officer in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, for use of excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendant moved for summary judgment, raising the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and Defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.At this stage, the court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff did attempt to flee, but Defendant had grabbed him by the time he reached the closed door. The officers knew Plaintiff was unarmed, and the offense they were there to arrest him for was nonviolent. The reasonableness of the use of force is a fact-intensive inquiry. The court held that it affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the disputed facts are material to the question of whether Defendant used excessive force and that, viewing those facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant’s use of force was excessive. However, the court found, that even if his use of force was excessive, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless the excessiveness of the force was clearly established on the date of the incident, August 13, 2017. Thus, the court found that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the court could not identify a case or body of case law that clearly established as of August 13, 2017, that Defendant’s use of force was excessive, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. View "Randy McDaniel v. Markeith Neal" on Justia Law