Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

James Trambly was employed by the University of Nebraska-Kearney as a help desk associate and later promoted to workstation support specialist. His job performance declined after the promotion, leading to a negative evaluation and further issues. In November 2018, Trambly accused a co-worker of interfering with his email, and in January 2019, he removed a hard drive from a university computer without authorization, violating university policy. He was terminated on February 8, 2019. Trambly filed a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act (NFEPA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, concluding that Trambly failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. The court also denied Trambly's motion to amend his complaint to include a claim under Title II of the ADA, ruling that employment-based discrimination claims could only arise under Title I.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Trambly did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he suffered from an impairment that substantially limited his major life activities. The court also found that Trambly's retaliation claims were unsupported, as the alleged adverse actions were not materially adverse or causally linked to his protected conduct. Additionally, the court upheld the denial of leave to amend the complaint, agreeing that Title II of the ADA does not apply to employment-based discrimination claims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Trambly v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska" on Justia Law

Patricia Conway, a registered nurse, was terminated from Mercy Hospital St. Louis for refusing to comply with the hospital's COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required all employees to be vaccinated unless they obtained an approved medical or religious exemption. Conway requested a religious exemption, which was denied. She was subsequently terminated and filed a lawsuit alleging religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital, finding that as a religious organization, the hospital was exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Conway appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Mercy Hospital qualifies as a "religious organization" under § 2000e-1(a) due to its structure, mission, and affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church. The court found that the hospital's religious identity and mission, supported by uncontroverted facts, met the criteria for the exemption.The court also rejected Conway's arguments that Mercy Hospital waived its exemption by complying with the CMS mandate and that it should be estopped from invoking the exemption due to its internal vaccine policy. The court concluded that compliance with federal regulations does not waive a statutory exemption and that the hospital's policy did not constitute a clear representation that would induce detrimental reliance.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mercy Hospital, upholding the exemption for religious organizations under Title VII. View "Conway v. Mercy Hospital St. Louis" on Justia Law

Officer Mason Roth shot and killed Bobby Jo Klum, who was walking through a residential neighborhood with a gun to his head, evading arrest, and ignoring officer commands to drop the weapon. Klum’s spouse and mother sued Officer Roth and the City of Davenport under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Klum’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. The district court granted qualified immunity to Officer Roth and concluded the City of Davenport was not liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment to Officer Roth and the City of Davenport on all claims. The court concluded that Klum’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure was not violated and that Klum did not possess a clearly established right against seizure by deadly force under the circumstances. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to their excessive force claim against Officer Roth and the City of Davenport.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that any right was not clearly established at the time, and therefore, Officer Roth was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the totality of the circumstances, including Klum’s non-compliance, evasion, and proximity to bystanders, justified the use of deadly force. The court also upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue as to whether the City of Davenport had a policy that directly caused the use of deadly force. View "Klum v. City of Davenport" on Justia Law

A law firm, Sutter & Gillham PLLC, and its partners were involved in a contentious wrongful-death lawsuit in Arkansas, representing the family of a teenage boy who died from a gunshot wound. The family suspected foul play, while the boy's friends claimed it was suicide. The state court dismissed the case with prejudice, citing misconduct by the family and its attorneys. Although the firm had withdrawn from the case, it felt unfairly maligned by the court's order. One partner's attempt to intervene and seek recusal of the judge was denied, and no appeal was filed. The family successfully overturned the dismissal, and the case remains pending.The firm faced related litigation, including a state court lawsuit by the wrongful-death defendants against the firm and its partners for alleged misconduct. The firm also filed a federal lawsuit alleging constitutional violations by the wrongful-death defendants and their attorneys, claiming they conspired with the state trial judge. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the federal lawsuit did not seek to overturn the state court judgment but rather targeted the actions of the defendants and their attorneys. The court emphasized that the doctrine only applies when a federal action is essentially an appeal of a state court decision. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to pursue their claims. View "Sutter & Gillham PLLC v. Henry" on Justia Law

Verlynin Buckley pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that he was an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months in prison. Buckley appealed, arguing that the court erred in deeming him an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years in prison for defendants with three or more prior convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that Buckley’s prior Arkansas convictions for possessing cocaine with the intent to deliver and for delivering cocaine were serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Buckley conceded that his prior convictions involved prohibited activity subjecting him to ten or more years in prison but contended that his prior convictions did not involve a controlled substance as defined by federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and rejected Buckley’s argument. The court held that the Arkansas statutes under which Buckley was convicted did not incorporate the state’s drug schedules but instead referred to cocaine in its ordinary sense. The court found no reason to believe that Arkansas intended to define cocaine more broadly than federal law. Consequently, Buckley’s prior cocaine convictions were deemed serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Buckley’s sentence as an armed career criminal. View "United States v. Buckley" on Justia Law

Justin Johnson, a pretrial detainee at Jefferson County Jail, was attacked by two other inmates while in protective custody. Johnson sued correctional officers Jacob Schurman and Christopher Taylor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect him and for negligence under Missouri law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding that qualified immunity barred the § 1983 claims and that official immunity and the public duty doctrine barred the negligence claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri determined that Johnson could not show a constitutional violation necessary to overcome qualified immunity. The court found no evidence that the officers were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, as the attackers were not known to be violent, and Johnson had no prior relationship with them. The court also dismissed the negligence claims, ruling that the officers were protected by official immunity because their actions were discretionary, not ministerial. Additionally, the court found that the public duty doctrine applied, as the officers owed no particular duty to Johnson beyond that owed to the general prison population.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as Johnson failed to show that they were deliberately indifferent to a known risk. The court also upheld the dismissal of the negligence claims, concluding that the officers' actions involved discretionary decisions protected by official immunity. The court did not address the public duty doctrine, as the official immunity finding was sufficient to resolve the negligence claims. View "Johnson v. Schurman" on Justia Law

Absolute Pediatric Therapy, owned by Anthony Christopher, hired LaDonna Humphrey in May 2018 but terminated her four months later. In October 2018, Absolute and Christopher sued Humphrey in Arkansas state court, alleging various tort claims and accusing her of stealing information and making false accusations. Humphrey counterclaimed under the False Claims Act, alleging her termination was for reporting illegal activities. The litigation was contentious, and in August 2019, the state court found Humphrey in contempt and liable on all counts, awarding $3.57 million in damages to the plaintiffs.Following the state court's decision, Humphrey filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in September 2019. The Trustee of her bankruptcy estate proposed selling her claims, including her counterclaim and defensive appellate rights, to Absolute for $12,500. Humphrey objected to the sale of her defensive appellate rights. The bankruptcy court approved the sale, finding it reasonable and negotiated at arm's length. Humphrey did not obtain a stay of the sale but did secure a stay of the state court appeal.Humphrey appealed the bankruptcy court's order to the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, which reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. The district court held that defensive appellate rights are not property of the estate under Arkansas law and found the sale not in the best interest of the estate. The district court also rejected the argument that the appeal was moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) because Humphrey had obtained a stay of the state court proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the absence of a stay of the sale itself rendered the appeal statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). The court vacated the district court's order and dismissed Humphrey's appeal from the bankruptcy court. View "Humphrey v. Christopher" on Justia Law

The Debtor-Appellant filed a chapter 13 voluntary petition on August 16, 2024, and was allowed to pay the filing fee in installments. The Debtor claimed to have received credit counseling within 180 days before filing, but failed to submit the required credit counseling certificate within the statutory deadline. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the Debtor to file the certificate by October 11, 2024, but the Debtor did not comply. Additionally, the Debtor failed to make the required installment payments on September 27 and October 11, 2024.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the Debtor’s case on October 15, 2024, due to the failure to pay the installment payments and the failure to submit the credit counseling certificate. The Debtor appealed the dismissal, arguing that the failure to pay the filing fee installment was due to unintentional delay and that the payment for the September 27 installment was sent but not received. The Debtor also attempted to submit two payments on October 14, which were delivered late.The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Debtor’s appeal did not comply with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8014, as the brief lacked necessary components such as citations and a proper argument. Additionally, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to file a credit counseling certificate and for failure to make required installment payments. The court emphasized that compliance with the credit counseling requirement is mandatory and that the bankruptcy court had no choice but to dismiss the case. The order of the bankruptcy court was affirmed. View "Rivett v. Carlson" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Legislature amended its statutes to impose stricter regulations on white-tailed deer farming, including prohibiting new registrations and limiting transfers to immediate family members. The Minnesota Deer Farmers Association and individual deer farmers challenged these amendments, claiming violations of their substantive due process, equal protection, and procedural due process rights.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed their complaint. The Deer Farmers appealed, arguing that the amendments deprived them of their fundamental right to pursue their chosen profession and unfairly advantaged those with immediate family members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed the standing of the plaintiffs, finding that Udovich, an unregistered former deer farmer desiring a registration, had standing to challenge the amendments. The court then considered the substantive due process claim, concluding that the right to pursue white-tailed deer farming is not a fundamental right deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions. Therefore, the amendments were subject to rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.The court also addressed the equal protection claim, determining that the classification based on having immediate family members was not suspect and thus also subject to rational basis review. The court found that the amendments were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of containing Chronic Wasting Disease.Finally, the court dismissed the procedural due process claim due to a lack of standing, as the complaint did not adequately allege that any particular plaintiff had been cited or intended to engage in noncompliant conduct.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Deer Farmers' claims. View "MN Deer Farmers Assoc. v. Strommen" on Justia Law

The case concerns Erik J. Vivier, who was accused of engaging in sexual acts with J.M., a 15-year-old girl, while she was allegedly incapacitated due to alcohol consumption. J.M. testified that she felt dizzy, nauseous, and not in control of her body after drinking, and described being invited into Vivier’s home, given more alcohol, and then sexually assaulted while in a spare bedroom. Vivier initially denied knowing J.M., then changed his account multiple times, eventually admitting to a sexual act but claiming he was not in the right state of mind. Other witnesses present at the home offered limited observations, and the government’s case relied heavily on J.M.’s testimony and Vivier’s inconsistent statements.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota presided over the trial, where a jury convicted Vivier of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim and sexual abuse of a minor. Vivier moved for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of sexual abuse of an incapacitated victim, arguing insufficient evidence of J.M.’s incapacity and his knowledge thereof. The district court denied this motion. During trial, Vivier also objected to the testimony of an FBI agent who opined on Vivier’s truthfulness, arguing it was undisclosed expert testimony. The district court denied the motion to strike but issued a curative instruction, partially adopting Vivier’s proposed language.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that J.M. was incapacitated and that Vivier knew of her incapacity. The court also found that, although the district court erred in its curative instruction regarding the agent’s opinion testimony, this did not affect Vivier’s substantial rights. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Vivier" on Justia Law