Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and other death-row prisoners in Arkansas sued the governor and a corrections official, arguing that Arkansas’s three-drug execution protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. After a bench trial, the district court found that the prisoners failed to establish a violation, and denied a motion for new trial.   The prisoners argue that the district court clearly erred in finding that they failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol creates a substantial risk of severe pain. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The prisoners cite expert testimony from Dr. Craig Stevens and Dr. Gail Van Norman that midazolam has a ceiling effect that occurs at a dose between 0.2 to 0.4 mg/kg. These experts relied on two medical studies, which are known by the names of their principal authors as the Inagaki study and the Miyake study. The court wrote that with no scientific consensus and a paucity of reliable scientific evidence concerning the effect of large doses of midazolam on humans, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the prisoners failed to demonstrate that the Arkansas execution protocol is sure or very likely to cause severe pain. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the claim under the Eighth Amendment.   Further, the prisoners failed to establish that the State’s existing method was sure or very likely to cause needless suffering, so the State was not required to consider alternative methods. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "Stacey Johnson v. Asa Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced an action n against two credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”), Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) and Trans Union, LLC (“Trans Union”), for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state plausible claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint is too thin to raise a plausible entitlement to relief. The FCRA is not a strict liability statute. Here, Plaintiff’s complaint presents a bare legal conclusion that Experian and Trans Union employed unreasonable reporting procedures. There are no allegations that the CRAs knew or should have known about systemic problems. The court explained that the FCRA requires reasonable—not perfect—procedures. That Plaintiff’s credit reports may have contained inaccurate information is not in itself sufficient for the imposition of liability. View "Anders Rydholm v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

In 2020, Kansas City began restricting participation in its Minority Business Enterprises and Women’s Business Enterprises Program to those entities whose owners satisfied a personal net worth limitation. Mark One Electric Co., a woman-owned business whose owner’s personal net worth exceeds the limit, appeals the dismissal of its lawsuit challenging the Kansas City Program as unconstitutional because of the personal net worth limitation.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to survive strict scrutiny, the government must first articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling government interest, such as stopping the perpetuation of racial discrimination and remediating the effects of past discrimination in government contracting. Here, Mark One does not dispute that the City has a compelling interest in remedying the effects of race and gender discrimination on City contract opportunities for minority- and women-owned businesses. And Mark One has conceded the 2016 Disparity Study provides a strong basis in evidence for the MBE/WBE Program to further that interest.The City’s program must be narrowly tailored, which requires that “the means chosen to accomplish the government’s asserted purpose are specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose. Mark One claims that its exclusion from the Program despite its status as a woman-owned business shows that the Program is unlawful Indeed, Mark One has declared that it has suffered past discrimination, as the Program requires for certification. But the City does not have a constitutional obligation to make its Program as broad as may be legally permissible, so long as it directs its resources in a rational manner not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. View "Mark One Electric Company v. City of Kansas City, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a police officer in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, for use of excessive force, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendant moved for summary judgment, raising the defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and Defendant appealed. The Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case.At this stage, the court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff did attempt to flee, but Defendant had grabbed him by the time he reached the closed door. The officers knew Plaintiff was unarmed, and the offense they were there to arrest him for was nonviolent. The reasonableness of the use of force is a fact-intensive inquiry. The court held that it affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the disputed facts are material to the question of whether Defendant used excessive force and that, viewing those facts in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendant’s use of force was excessive. However, the court found, that even if his use of force was excessive, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless the excessiveness of the force was clearly established on the date of the incident, August 13, 2017. Thus, the court found that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the court could not identify a case or body of case law that clearly established as of August 13, 2017, that Defendant’s use of force was excessive, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. View "Randy McDaniel v. Markeith Neal" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. On appeal, Defendant challenges several rulings of the district court* and the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the convictions.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements from the interviews on November 8 and 21, 2018. He contends that investigators subjected him to custodial interrogations without advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The court concluded that there was no custodial interrogation of Defendant on November 8. Defendant responded to the FBI agent’s request for a conversation and agreed to let the agent come to his house for the meeting. The agent did not display a weapon or restrain Defendant in any way. The agent was dressed in plain clothes and allowed Defendant’s wife to sit nearby for the interview. Further, the court held that there is no indication that Defendant is particularly susceptible to undue influence: he is an adult of average intelligence who has earned an associate’s degree and is familiar with the protections afforded by the legal system due to an extensive criminal history.Moreover, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Further, the court concluded that there was no error in declining to instruct the jury that the government must prove that Defendant knew in advance that death would result from the kidnapping. View "United States v. Ramon Simpson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transportation of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1). At sentencing, the district court determined an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 108 to 135 months in prison, considered the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) sentencing factors, and imposed a sentence of 96 months imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. The court imposed seven special conditions of supervised release.Defendant appealed his sentence, presenting as the issue for review whether the district court abused its discretion in requiring Defendant to submit to periodic polygraph testing at the discretion of the U.S. Probation Office.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the district court did not procedurally err. It conducted a thorough individualized analysis of the sentence it was imposing. The seven special conditions of supervised release require that Defendant (5) “participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program,” and (6) “submit to periodic polygraph testing . . . to ensure that he is in compliance with the requirements of his supervision or treatment program.” In response to Defendant’s timely objection, the court carefully explained why the sentence would include this polygraph testing special condition. Moreover, the court held that Defendant has not met his burden to establish that a special condition is unreasonable. View "United States v. Reynaldo Sanchez" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his application for relief from removal to Iraq. The Eighth Circuit concluded that there is no basis to set aside the decision of the Board, and denied the petition for review.Petitioner first challenges the Board’s conclusion that he is removable under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as an alien convicted of a crime of child abuse. Congress did not define “crime of child abuse,” but the Board has defined the term in a series of precedential decisions, and Petitioner does not challenge the agency’s definition. The court explained that under the categorical approach the court considers whether the elements of the offense necessarily fit within the Board’s generic definition. The court wrote that it does not examine the specific facts of Petitioner’s case, but instead presumes that his conviction rested on the least of the acts criminalized by the Nebraska statute. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013).Further, the court held that the Board reasonably concluded that the lesser charge did not diminish the gravity of the crime to the point where an offense involving serious bodily injury to a six-month-old was not particularly serious. The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner was convicted of a particularly serious crime. Moreover, the court wrote that to the extent that Petitioner also challenges the Board’s weighing of the evidence in affirming the IJ’s decision, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary determination. View "Raad Al-Masaudi v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant appealed, arguing that evidence from his iPhone should have been suppressed because the government delayed unreasonably before seeking a search warrant, and that prior firearm convictions were improperly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He also appealed his sentence, arguing that neither his Iowa willful injury conviction nor his two Illinois armed robbery convictions qualifies as “violent felonies” under Section 924(e). He further argued the Illinois robbery convictions were not “committed on occasions different from one another,” Section 924(e)(1), and thus constitute only one prior violent felony conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although significantly longer delays have been upheld as not unreasonable, without question the twenty-four-day delay at issue is of concern. The court reasoned that because smartphones “retain data for long periods of time,” delay between the time a cell phone is seized and when it is searched is not likely to cause stored personal data to be lost, or data of potential evidentiary relevance to become stale. More important to the private interests at stake, Defendant was in police custody for the entire twenty-four-day period, and there is no evidence that either Defendant or anyone acting on his behalf made a request or demand for its return, or even inquired about it. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the court held that the district court properly determined that Defendant’s Section 708.4(1) willful injury conviction is an ACCA predicate violent felony. View "United States v. Darvill Bragg" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. She reserved her right to appeal an order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence that police seized after conducting a protective sweep of a hotel room in which she was staying. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the officers permissibly entered and searched the hotel room. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the police lacked specific and articulable facts suggesting that a person posing a danger to the officers was located inside the hotel room. She maintains that the officers violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by entering the hotel room without a warrant and that all evidence seized as a result of the entry should be suppressed.The court explained that a protective sweep of the hotel room was justified here as an inspection of spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. It is undisputed that officers were positioned in the doorway to effect the arrest, and that police crossed the threshold into the room under the authority of the warrant. Accordingly, the court held that the officers observed evidence of unlawful drug activity in plain view while conducting the protective sweep did not violate Defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Angela Garges" on Justia Law

Facing five child-pornography counts and one for enticing a minor, Defendant decided to enter into a plea agreement with the government. Of the six counts, he pleaded guilty to three of them: two for receiving child pornography, each from a separate victim. When the presentence investigation report said he was responsible for receiving pornographic images from two others, Minor Victim 3 and H.P., he filed a written objection. At sentencing, the fact dispute never came up. Defendant did not renew his objection, the government did not present evidence that he had received sexually explicit material from Minor Victim 3 or H.P., and the district court never made any findings. Without ever resolving the factual dispute that the presentence investigation report had flagged, the court sentenced him to 210 months in prison.The Eighth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court explained that agrees that Defendant specifically objected to receiving sexually explicit images from Minor Victim 3 and H.P., meaning that the district court could not rely on those facts unless the government proved them by a preponderance of the evidence. The government never did so, yet the district court sentenced Defendant as if it had. The government does not dispute that the error here was “clear or obvious.” Instead, the focus is on the next step in the plain-error analysis: whether the procedural error affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court vacated the sentence explaining that a failure to correct the error will also seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Lamark Combs, Jr." on Justia Law