Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a fifteen-year mandatory-minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act after concluding that Defendant had three prior violent felonies: two for third-degree assault; and another for first-degree burglary with assault. Defendant argued that none of these convictions were violent felonies, however, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.The court explained that there are two ways for a prior conviction to count. One is through the “enumerated-offenses clause,” which lists offenses that qualify. The other is if the offense “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” otherwise known as the “force clause.” Defendant’s final conviction was for first-degree burglary, which is a “divisible” crime. The particular version he committed was first-degree burglary with assault, which as the name suggests, required him to commit an assault during the course of a burglary. This crime uses the same definition of “assault” as the others, which means it is a “violent felony” too. Defendant argues that Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) suggests that an assault can never qualify as a violent felony. However, n Minnesota, assault requires intentional conduct, and Borden only “excludes crimes that can be committed recklessly.” View "United States v. Seth Huntington" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery. The presentence investigation report (PSR) recommended applying a five-level sentencing enhancement for possessing or brandishing a firearm during the robbery. Overruling Defendant’s objection, the district court found the Government proved there was a firearm involved by a preponderance of the evidence. The five-level firearm enhancement resulted in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment. The court after considering the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) sentencing factors imposed a 100-month sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing the district court committed clear error when it imposed the five-level firearm enhancement because the government, by relying on “uncorroborated, unreliable hearsay statements,” failed to prove that Defendant possessed a firearm during the bank robbery.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the tellers’ interview testimony after concluding that the “statements, though hearsay, were made under circumstances indicating sufficient. Nor did the court clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant brandished or possessed a firearm during the robbery. The tellers’ testimony was strong but not necessarily conclusive evidence on this issue, and the security video did not eliminate uncertainty as to the presence of a firearm. View "United States v. Zachary Anderson Wailes" on Justia Law

Defendant sold capsules of heroin that contained fentanyl to a confidential source in the St. Louis metro area. A superseding indictment charged Defendant with conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl between June 2017 and May 2019, possession with intent to distribute heroin, and distribution of fentanyl in August 2019 resulting in death. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl.At sentencing, adopting the presentence investigation report (PSR) without objection, the district court1 determined an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 15-21 months’ imprisonment, granted the government’s motion for an upward departure, and sentenced Defendant to 70 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred in granting an upward departure based primarily on Defendant’s role in the August 2019 fentanyl overdose death.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the agent’s testimony, to the extent it included hearsay, bore sufficient indicia of reliability to support its use in sentencing Defendant. Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in finding that the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a death resulted from Defendant’s conduct and then granting the government’s motion for an upward departure. Departing upward, the court imposed a sentence of 70 months imprisonment. This sentence is consistent with upward departures the court has approved under Section 5K2.1 for drug distribution conduct that resulted in an overdose death. View "United States v. Jeff Harris" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of aggravated bank robbery, and the district court sentenced him to mandatory life imprisonment under the federal “three strikes” law. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that (A) the district court erroneously admitted evidence of his flight from the second traffic stop; (B) the jury’s verdict lacked sufficient evidence; and (C) the three strikes law is unconstitutional.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed.  The court held that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in concluding any danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. Here, evidence of Defendant’s flight from the second traffic stop helped establish the government’s narrative that Defendant continually evaded police for ten days following the robbery. It also helped the jury understand why the police found Defendant, as well as incriminating evidence, in another state. Further, Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that he was mistakenly identified as the robber. But overwhelming evidence indicates his identification was not a mistake. Finally, the court explained that based Defendant’s criminal history outlined earlier, he has proven he remains a danger to the public despite being given a second and third chance to show otherwise. The sentence imposed here was not grossly disproportionate to Defendant’s crime. View "United States v. Anthony Hall" on Justia Law

Three Anoka County residents sued a school district and teachers’ union about their union leave and reimbursement plan, alleging constitutional and statutory violations. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The residents appealed.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that pleading jurisdiction requires only “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” while pleading the merits requires not just “a short and plain statement of the claim,” but one that “show[s] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Here, the residents adequately alleged they are school district taxpayers and identified a “municipal action” contributing to their injury. Specifically, the school district spends tax revenues on the allegedly illegal action because the collective-bargaining agreement requires it to provide up to 100 days of paid leave, and the union does not fully reimburse that expense. Since the district court did not address the preliminary injunction factors, the common approach is to remand for the district court to conduct the full analysis in the first instance. View "Don Huizenga v. ISD No. 11" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender under Section 4B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because he had at least two prior convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant’s conviction for interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury constitutes a crime of violence. Defendant argued that interference with official acts causing bodily injury can be committed recklessly. If it can, under Borden, it no longer qualifies as a crime of violence. The court held that the offense cannot be committed recklessly. The court explained that reckless conduct is not sufficient. Because interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury cannot be committed recklessly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden has not abrogated Malloy. Interference with official acts inflicting bodily injury is a crime of violence under the force clause. Defendant, therefore, qualifies as a career offender under U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1. View "United States v. Donte Kent" on Justia Law

Defendant alleges that during the third revocation hearing, the district court violated his right to due process because it forced him to proceed either with an incompetent attorney or without any attorney at all.The Eighth Circuit reversed finding that Defendant was denied the right to counsel. The court explained that to show his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary, a defendant must show the district court forced him to choose between inadequate representation and self-representation.Here, Defendant has shown he was justifiably dissatisfied with his attorney. This is not a case where the evidence shows a defendant who disagrees with his attorney’s strategy or wants to delay the hearing. Instead, the evidence shows an attorney who was not prepared to handle a revocation of supervised release hearing. Further, the attorney’s comment regarding “the big house or the nut house” demonstrates he did not know the factual background of the case or the potential consequences that Defendant was facing. Because Defendant was forced to proceed with either this unprepared attorney or no attorney at all, Defendant’s decision to waive his right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary and his right to due process was violated. View "United States v. Robert Ivers" on Justia Law

Petitioner a citizen and native of Eritrea, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals denying relief under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge granted Petitioner deferral of removal under the Convention, but the Board reversed that finding on administrative appeal, and Petitioner was ordered removed to Eritrea.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the agency impermissibly concluded that his testimony was not credible. The court held that the credibility finding here was supported by substantial evidence, explaining that the immigration judge reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s failure to mention significant facts about alleged imprisonment and torture to the asylum officer undermined the credibility of his later claim at the immigration hearing.   Petitioner also contends that the absence of a Kunama interpreter at the hearing in immigration court denied him due process. The IJ here took a number of steps to ensure that Petitioner could participate adequately in the hearing. After the immigration court was unable to secure an interpreter in Petitioner’s preferred language, the court arranged the next best option with a Tigrinya interpreter.   Finally, the court upheld the Board’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the IJ’s finding that Petitioner likely would be tortured. The court explained that the Board adequately explained that anecdotal reports of imprisonment of returnees from Sudan, and reports of torture at the prison, are not sufficient to support a finding that Petitioner, in particular, is likely to be imprisoned and tortured if returned to Eritrea. View "Nani Keta v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the district court directing the Bureau of Prisons to turn over all funds in Defendant’s inmate trust account for payment toward an outstanding restitution obligation.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the order is not adequately supported, and therefore vacated the order and remand for further proceedings. The court reasoned that the district court cited Section 3613(a) only for the proposition that Defendant’s funds were not exempt from enforcement. The court did not assert that 3613(a) is a self-executing means to enforce a lien, and did not rely on 3613 as authority to order that the funds be turned over to the clerk of court. Rather, the court cited restitution provisions in 3664 as the basis for turnover and collection. The court, therefore, declined to affirm the order based on 3613 alone and does not address on the record what authority is available to a district court under that section. View "United States v. Anthony Robinson" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered the United States as a refugee in New York City, New York when he was 16 years old. His status was subsequently adjusted to lawful permanent resident on June 26, 1999. Petitioner’s parents became naturalized citizens in 2003 and 2006 but Petitioner’s application was denied due to a returned check for the processing fees. The IJ issued her decision denying Petitioner’s application for asylum on the grounds that he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution based on religion or clan membership. The IJ reasoned that while Petitioner had expressed a subjectively genuine fear of persecution based on the posting of the music video, he had failed to demonstrate his fear was objectively reasonable. Petitioner petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal.The Eighth Circuit denied his petition. The court explained that when considering Petitioner’s claims, “we lack jurisdiction to review factual findings and may only review constitutional claims or questions of law.” Petitioner has presented no cognizable basis that would prohibit the BIA from remanding for the development of the record on an issue that the record shows was not plainly argued or developed. While Petitioner asserted generally that he was threatened by al-Shabaab and Muslim families because of the music video, he never explicitly claimed that he was being threatened because he was Muslim. Collateral estoppel is inapplicable because all decisions at issue were made at different stages of the same action. View "Omar Osman Mohamed v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law