Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, as well as his request for leave to file a second suppression motion out of time. He also argued that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the relevant search was legal, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s leave to file a second, untimely suppression motion. The court explained that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was armed and dangerous, and he never exceeded the lawful scope of his Terry frisk of Defendant’s truck. Accordingly, the district court was correct to deny Defendant’s first suppression motion.   Further, even if the district court had erred, any error would have been harmless. The evidence from Defendant’s second traffic stop related to Counts 3–5 of the second superseding indictment—counts that were dropped as part of Defendant’s plea deal. So the evidence didn’t affect Defendant’s conviction. And since the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply at sentencing, United States v. Tauil-Hernandez, 88 F.3d 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1996), the district court was free to consider this evidence when imposing Defendant’s 360-month sentence. View "United States v. Randy Dabney" on Justia Law

This class action arises out of claims by commercial truck drivers who assert that they were not paid proper amounts while working for Werner Enterprises, Inc., and Drivers Management, LLC, (collectively Defendants) as part of Defendants’ Student Driver Program. In a previous appeal, we considered Defendants’ challenge to a jury verdict in favor of Philip Petrone and others (collectively, Plaintiffs) on some of Plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the district court erred in amending the scheduling order to allow Plaintiffs to submit an expert report past the disclosure deadline without good cause.   Because the expert evidence was integral to the jury’s verdict, the Eighth Circuit determined that this error was not harmless, and vacated the judgment. The case returned to the court after the district court, on remand, entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The court then vacated the judgment. The court explained that read in its entirety, the decision left the door open for the district court to consider how to proceed in light of the Circuit Court’s ruling that the district court should not have granted the motion to amend the scheduling order. The court explained that its mandate thus did not direct the district court to affirmatively find in Defendants’ favor, and their suggestion to the contrary is without merit.   Finally, while the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs could not present evidence of damages through summary evidence pursuant to Rule 1006, it failed to conduct an analysis pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) and failed to address Plaintiffs’ request for appointment of an expert pursuant to Rule 706. View "Philip Petrone v. Werner Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation took full custody of a young girl, A.A.R., from her parents and placed her at the Dakota Boys & Girls Ranch, a private psychiatric facility. After only a few months there, A.A.R. committed suicide. Her parents sued the Ranch and its employees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed the Complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim that the Defendants were state actors under Section 1983.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that when North Dakota took custody of A.A.R., it had a constitutional duty to provide adequate medical care to her. The court explained that Plaintiffs were legally required to comply with DJS’s choices and could not remove her from the Ranch The district court violated the motion-to-dismiss standard when it concluded that the Complaint, read in conjunction with the May 2018 Order, contains “no factual allegations that the only medical care A.A.R. could have received was that provided by the State of North Dakota.” Further, assuming North Dakota’s constitutional obligation to provide A.A.R.’s medical treatment, the Ranch became a state actor. Thus Plaintiffs state a plausible claim against it under Section 1983. The court further explained that Plaintiffs also state a plausible claim against the Ranch’s employees. Defendants do not contest that a finding of state action by the Ranch establishes state action by its employees. Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege the Ranch was a state actor, its employees were too. View "Manda Roberson v. The Dakota Boys & Girls Ranch" on Justia Law

The district court had strong views about what charges fit Defendant’s crimes. It rejected both her plea agreement and a motion by the government to dismiss four of the five counts in the indictment. The Eighth Circuit held that the latter ruling went too far, and reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the government’s motion.   The court explained that here, the district court merely “disagreed with the prosecutor’s assessment of what penalty the defendant ought to face.” Rather than addressing whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith, the court just listed the reasons it thought Defendant was getting off too easy: she was “very dangerous” and “by far the most culpable”; the victim suffered life-threatening injuries; and a “conviction for robbery alone strip[ped] the [c]ourt of any ability to sentence [her] to a just punishment.” These may be important factors to consider at sentencing, but they are not reasons to interfere with the government’s charging decisions, no matter how much the court may disagree with them. View "United States v. Tiffany Bernard" on Justia Law

While working his construction job, Plaintiff was severely injured when a crane cable snapped and dropped its payload onto him. Plaintiff sued Viant Crane Service, LLC and Viant Crane, LLC (together “Viant”), arguing that their crane was defective. The district court granted summary judgment to Viant.   On appeal, Plaintiff argues that an A2B doesn’t simply fall off a crane without some sort of defect. Viant, on the other hand, argues that there are alternative explanations for the A2B falling off—chiefly, employees mishandling the crane.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court explained that because Plaintiff doesn’t have any direct evidence that the crane was defective, he relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “the thing speaks for itself.” The court wrote that applying that rule, the district court held that res ipsa loquitur doesn’t apply to Plaintiff’s claim because the crane was outside of Viant’s control for several days, creating a possibility of mishandling by employees. Plaintiff argues that the district court’s evidentiary burden was too strict and that the court should follow Daleiden v. Carborundum Co., 438 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1971). The court wrote that, in contrast to Daleiden, Plaintiff’s evidence fails to reasonably eliminate other plausible causes of the A2B malfunctioning, such as mismanagement by those handling the tank. View "Shane Boda v. Viant Crane Service, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury trial before the district court, Defendant was convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he knowingly possessed a firearm.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm in question. The court explained the government presented security camera footage showing a man retrieving a firearm from Apartment H6, running down the exterior staircase of the H building with the firearm and taking a firing stance, returning to Apartment H6 and depositing the firearm, and running to Apartment P4. Security camera footage showed that Defendant was the only person, besides the resident of the apartment, who entered Apartment P4 between the time of the shooting and the time officers were posted outside of the apartment, and it is inconsequential whether Defendant left Apartment P4 before the shooting. Thus, based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm found in Apartment H6 on August 30th. View "United States v. Earl McKee" on Justia Law

Defendant drove drunk through the White Earth Indian Reservation. Local residents tried to stop him, but he struck and pinned one of them, N.V., under his car. A jury convicted Defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The district court varied upward from the Guidelines and sentenced Defendant to 80 months on each count, to run consecutively.   Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) he was too drunk to have the specific intent to assault N.V.; (2) he ran over N.V. in self-defense; (3) his convictions violate the Double Jeopardy clause; and (4) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Because those arguments are meritless.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that there was enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant intended to assault N.V. The jury’s verdict was supported by evidence that: Defendant aimed his car at local residents; he attempted to jump the curb three times; he stomped on N.V.’s head after hitting him with his car, and police described his responses afterward as logical. Further, the court wrote that the jury had significant evidence that Defedenadnt was not acting in self-defense. Moreover, the court explained that Defendant’s Double Jeopardy clause argument is foreclosed by both Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. Finally, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentence. View "United States v. Kevin Doerr" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, asserting that his 2000 Illinois state conviction could not qualify as a prior felony drug offense under 21 U.S.C. Section 851. The district court denied Appellant the requested post-conviction relief because of his untimely filing, but it granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate the diligence required for equitable tolling. The court concluded that Appellant’s Section 2255 motion is time-barred and equitable tolling is not appropriate because Appellant failed to allege facts showing that circumstances beyond his control at the prison prevented him from timely seeking relief. The court explained it need not address whether the motion is procedurally defaulted. The court also rejected Appellant’s argument that finding his motion time-barred under Section 2255(f) poses a problem under the Suspension Clause. View "Clifton Odie v. United States" on Justia Law

Brothers and Sisters in Christ, LLC (BASIC) allege that Zazzle, Inc. sold a t-shirt that infringed on BASIC’s federal trademark. The district court granted Zazzle’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that BASIC bears the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Further, where the applicable federal statute, here the Lanham Act, does not authorize nationwide personal jurisdiction the existence of personal jurisdiction depends on the long-arm statute of the forum state and the federal Due Process Clause.   Here, the court looked to Zazzle’s contacts with Missouri related to BASIC’s claims. Aside from the single t-shirt sale, BASIC fails to allege a connection between Zazzle’s other contacts with Missouri and the underlying suit. BASIC does not allege that Zazzle’s other activities in Missouri involved trademark infringement or that Zazzle sold additional trademark-infringing goods into the state. Further, BASIC has not alleged that Zazzle took such purposeful, targeted action toward Missouri or Missouri consumers. Although Missouri has an interest in this litigation because the allegedly injured plaintiff is a Missouri company, the convenience of the parties is neutral, as Zazzle would be inconvenienced by litigation in Missouri and BASIC would likely be inconvenienced in an alternate forum. In sum, BASIC has failed to allege that Zazzle could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Missouri. View "Brothers and Sisters in Christ v. Zazzle, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was severely injured when his motorcycle crashed into a police SUV while he was fleeing from police. Plaintiff sued the City of Plumerville, Arkansas (the “City”), and its police officer for use of excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and the officer.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that claims against local police for excessive force during a seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. The court wrote it consistently held deadly force is not unreasonable where an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others. The court held that the undisputed evidence reveals that the police officer had probable cause to believe Plaintiff’s flight threatened the lives of innocent bystanders as well as police. Accordingly, the court held that the officer’s actions were reasonable. Moreover, the court found that the severity of the officer’s use of force was mitigated by the opportunity the officer gave Plaintiff to avoid the collision.   Finally, the court explained that it assesses the reasonableness of deadly force for Fourth Amendment purposes from the seizing officer’s perspective at the time of the incident. The court found that based on the police officer’s knowledge at the time when he was forced to make a quick judgment, the court concluded the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard gave the officer more leeway than would have the Morrilton police officers. View "Christopher Lankford v. City of Plumerville, Arkansas" on Justia Law