Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a black male who was 60 years old at the time his employment was terminated, brought race, sex, and age discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") after the Minnesota Guardian ad Litem Board (“GALB”) terminated his employment following internal and external investigations into allegations of his misconduct. The district court granted GALB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if he had done so, he failed to demonstrate GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.   Appellant appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant failed to point to any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. The court concluded that GALB has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Appellant in March 2018: the internal and external investigations into Appellant’s alleged misconduct uncovered evidence that Appellant had engaged in gross misconduct. As such, because Appellant failed to show that GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to GALB on his race, sex, and age discrimination claims and his retaliation claim. View "Gregory King v. MN Guardian ad Litem Board" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempting to persuade, induce, and entice an individual who had not yet attained the age of 18 years old to engage in sexual activity. The district court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. Sec 2422(b). Defendant challenged the district court's imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court explained that the facts of the case show defendant intentionally engaged in dangerous conduct that was exploitive of children, which is exactly the type of conduct contemplated and targeted by the statute. Under these facts, the court determined that there was no inference of gross disproportionality. View "United States v. Raul Rivas" on Justia Law

Appellant petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus in part on the basis that an off-the-record jury selection procedure violated his constitutional rights. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. The Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the district court prematurely dismissed Appellant’s claims that the pretrial jury selection procedure violated his right to be present, right to a public trial and right to an appeal and that his trial counsel was ineffective for participating in the procedure.The Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Appellant has not shown that “fundamental unfairness” resulted from his trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure. Appellant alleged that his was fundamentally unfair because he was unaware of the pretrial jury selection procedure and any discriminatory strikes made during this procedure.  However, the court wrote, that Appellant’s trial counsel agreed to and participated in the procedure, which effectively gave both parties an additional 15 peremptory strikes; a record was, in fact, made of these strikes, and maintained by and available for review at the Washington County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office; the written submission of strikes that occurred as part of the pretrial jury selection procedure was only a portion of voir dire; and the remainder of voir dire, along with the evidentiary and sentencing phases of the trial, remained open to the public. Thus, Appellant’s trial counsel’s participation in the pretrial jury selection procedure did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. View "Zachariah Marcyniuk v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

Monsanto Company and BASF Corporation began developing dicamba-tolerant seed and sued each other over intellectual property. When the USDA deregulated Monsanto’s dicamba-tolerant soybean seed that year, Monsanto began to sell it. BASF’s lower-volatility dicamba herbicide was approved in 2017. Bader Farms, Inc. sued Monsanto and BASF for negligent design and failure to warn, alleging its peach orchards were damaged by dicamba drift. The jury awarded compensatory damages and punitive damages based on Monsanto’s acts.   The district court denied Defendants’ motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law but reduced punitive damages to $60 million. The district court’s judgment also held Monsanto and BASF jointly and severally liable for the punitive damages.   Defendants appealed, arguing that Bader failed to prove causation, the measure of actual damages is the value of the land rather than lost profits, Bader’s lost profits estimate was speculative, and the punitive damages award was unwarranted under Missouri law and excessive under the United States Constitution.   The Eighth Circuit held that Bader established causation by showing Defendants' conduct was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of Bader's injury. Further, the district court properly refused to find intervening cause as a matter of law or to give an affirmative converse on the issue. However, the evidence established different degrees of culpability between BASF and Monsanto, and the district court should have instructed the jury to separately assess punitive damages against each of them; therefore, the court remanded with directions to hold a new trial only on the issue of punitive damages. View "Bader Farms, Inc. v. BASF Corporation" on Justia Law

After Nygard removed his driveway and was about to pour a new one, an Orono inspector told Nygard that he needed a permit. The next day, Nygard finished the driveway and applied for a permit. The new driveway was narrower than the previous one. The city responded with a form, imposing several conditions. Nygard crossed out some conditions, initialed the modified form, and returned it. After several exchanges, the city notified Nygard that he must agree to the conditions or “this matter will be turned over to the prosecuting attorney.” Nygard did not acknowledge the conditions. A police officer drafted a statement of probable cause, alleging that “work had been completed without having first obtained a permit” and listing some alleged deficiencies in its construction. According to the Nygards, the police did not inspect the property and some allegations were not true.Nygard was acquitted of violating the city code. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the code was void for vagueness and alleging First Amendment retaliation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Nygard’s prosecution was not based on falsehoods. The report did not claim that the conditions were required by the code but that Nygard had not agreed to the conditions and had replaced a driveway without a permit. Any failure to investigate did not defeat probable cause; the city already knew that he installed a driveway without a permit. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law

Cruz repeatedly brought methamphetamine from Texas to North Dakota for sale. South Dakota officers stopped and searched Cruz’s vehicle, finding drugs and cash. Cruz posted bond, returned to North Dakota, and continued using methamphetamine and selling drugs. Grafton Officers Jones and Campoverde surveilled his residence. When Cruz exited, they approached. Cruz shot Campoverde, who was wearing a marked police ballistic vest. The bullet entered Campoverde’s arm, caused nerve damage, and collapsed his lung. Jones shot Cruz before apprehending him. Where Cruz fell, officers found his gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana. A search of the residence produced additional drugs and ammunition.Cruz pleaded guilty to five counts; two carried potential life sentences, and one carried a minimum sentence of a mandatory consecutive 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government agreed to limit its sentencing recommendation to 360 months. The PSR recommended an advisory range of 235–293 months with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government did not pursue the application of a six-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1) for assaulting an officer during flight, so the resulting advisory Guidelines range was 130–162 months plus the consecutive 120 months. Cruz described his criminal history as old and as largely the product of his addiction to methamphetamine. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a 420-month sentence as not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Minneapolis police investigated Randle for selling crack cocaine while he was on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After conducting a controlled buy, Officer Hamilton applied for a warrant to search a Brooklyn Park, Minnesota home that Randle listed as his supervised release address. The warrant was executed that day. Randle arrived during the search. Police seized 308 grams of crack cocaine and related evidence from the home and from bags carried by Randle.The district court denied a motion to suppress, applying the good-faith exception while concluding the affidavit did not create a “fair probability that evidence of Randle’s alleged drug trafficking activities would be found at the Residence” because it did not include Hamilton’s statement that in his professional judgment drug traffickers typically keep narcotics in their home and did not state that Hamilton followed Randle to the residence directly after the controlled buy and failed to specify when the officers started following Randle. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence is admissible because “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing [the] search warrant to have relied in good faith on the [issuing] judge’s determination that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.” The court also upheld the denial of a “Franks” hearing; Randle failed to make the necessary “substantial preliminary showing” of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” View "United States v. Randle" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon and sentencing him to 105 months in prison, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.The presentence report in this case recommended a base offense level of 20 and an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months' incarceration. The parties subsequently determined that Defendant's base offense level should be 14. The court considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and ultimately imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive or unreasonable and that the court did not abuse its discretion by considering an improper sentencing factor. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant challenged two of the district court's evidentiary rulings. Specifically, Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting the expert of Dr. Stacy Benson, a licensed clinical psychologist with a specialization in the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders, and a video recording of the victim's forensic interview. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting either Dr. Benson's testimony or the video recording of the victim's forensic interview. View "United States v. Counts" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the order of the district court in this criminal case declaring inadmissible any communications that were "made in confidence" between Defendant and his spouse during the evening of the crimes giving rise to Defendant's charges of arson within Indian country and felony murder within Indian country, holding that an exception to the marital communications privilege applied in this case.Defendant allegedly started a cabin fire that killed an occupant of the dwelling. During his criminal trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the government from introducing incriminating statements that Defendant made to his wife after the fire. The district court granted the motion, concluding that if there were a spousal-victim exception to the marital communications privilege, it would not apply in this case. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Defendant's statements to his spouse fell within the third-person/spousal-victim exception. View "United States v. White Owl" on Justia Law