Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On remand, the Supreme Court directed the Eighth Circuit to “to employ an inquiry that clearly attends to the facts and circumstances” of the incident between Plaintiffs’ son and the officers in considering whether the officers used unconstitutionally excessive force or, if they did, whether the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free of such force in these circumstances was clearly established at the time of his death.   The court affirmed the district court’s ruling and concluded that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ son’s death and the City is not liable for a policy of deliberate indifference in the absence of a clearly established constitutional right.   The court explained that the Supreme Court has never addressed whether prone restraint generally, or a particular use of prone restraint, more specifically, is unconstitutional. And the Supreme Court has never answered the question of whether a right may be clearly established without a Supreme Court case specifically recognizing it. Thus, assuming, as the Supreme Court has, that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law, the precedent in this area is insufficient to demonstrate that the facts, in this case, show a violation of a clearly established right of a detainee to be free from prone restraint while resisting.   Thus, the Plaintiffs’ son’s right to be free from prone restraint while engaged in ongoing resistance, even where officers applied force to various parts of his body, including his back, was not clearly established in 2015 when the incident occurred. View "Jody Lombardo v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that a Sheriff of Harrison County, Missouri, forced her into a sexual relationship that included giving her drugs, directing her to sell them, and protecting her from prosecution. After Doe ended the relationship, the Sheriff pursued criminal charges against her, resulting in felony convictions. Defendant was Doe’s probation officer. According to Doe, Defendant invited the Sheriff to her probation meetings, where the Sheriff threatened  Doe not to disclose the relationship. Doe asserted a state claim against Defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress (in addition to claims against the Estate of the Sheriff, who died in 2020). Defendant moved to dismiss based on official immunity and a “statutory” immunity under Revised Statutes of Missouri section 105.711.5. For her defense of statutory immunity, Defendant asserted that subsection 105.711.5 bars individual-capacity claims against state employees, such as herself. The district court held that section 105.711 “applies to final judgments”   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that by its plain text, section 105.711 does not create a new immunity. The word “immunity” does not appear in section 105.711. Further, the 2005 amendment also amended section 105.726 to add: “Sections 105.711 to 105.726 do not waive the sovereign immunity of the State of Missouri.” Construing the additions to subsection 105.711.5 and subsection 105.726.1 together, the 2005 amendment preserves immunities already in place for the State and its employees, and it does not create a new, statutory immunity. View "Jane Doe v. Lisa Worrell" on Justia Law

Torgerson Properties, Inc. ("TPI") develops and operates hotels, restaurants, and conference centers in Minnesota and Florida. It was covered by an all-risk property insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Co. from May 1, 2019, through May 1, 2020. the policy’s Business Interruption and Civil Authority/Ingress-Egress provisions. The Business Interruption clause “covers against loss resulting from necessary interruption of business caused by direct physical loss of or damage to covered property.”   TPI filed a claim under the policy for lost business income during the COVID pandemic. After Continental denied the claim, TPI sued for breach of contract. Continental moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted Continental’s motion, and TPI appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was correct to dismiss TPI’s breach of contract action for failure to state a claim.   The court reasoned that insurance provisions covering “direct physical loss of or damage to property” are not triggered unless “there [is] some physicality to the loss or damage of property.” Oral Surgeons, P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2 F.4th 1141 (8th Cir. 2021) (relying on Minnesota law).  TPI tried to distinguish this case from Oral Surgeons by alleging that the virus was actually present on its property. However, TPI failed to show that causal link. The contamination did not cause TPI’s business interruption; the shutdown orders did. TPI would have been subject to the exact same restrictions even if its premises weren’t contaminated. And the cause of TPI’s business interruption—governmental orders alone—is not a direct physical loss. View "Torgerson Properties, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. Section 841. The district court imposed a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence of 87 months in prison. Defendant challenged his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court explained that “procedural error includes failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the Section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009).   Where, as here, the defendant fails to object at sentencing, the court reviews for plain error. Plain error is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. The court wrote that contrary to Defendant’s argument, the court found that the safety valve applied. But safety valve eligibility does not guarantee Defendant a below-statutory minimum sentence; it just gives the court the opportunity to sentence below the minimum if it believes it is appropriate. Defendant argued that the court needed to specifically explain why it decided not to impose a below-minimum sentence— beyond the usual explanation for choosing a particular sentence. But he does not cite any cases from this circuit announcing such a rule, and the out-of-circuit cases he cites do not support his argument. Further, the court found that a within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable and the court’s Section 3553(a) analysis was proper. View "United States v. Jaamil Owens" on Justia Law

Petitioner is serving a life sentence for murder in Minnesota. He brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court, alleging that the state trial court violated his right to a public trial and that the decision of the state supreme court upholding his conviction was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner challenged the state court’s disposition of his claim alleging a violation of the right to a public trial. The court wrote that it evaluates the reasonableness of the state court’s ultimate conclusion, not necessarily the reasoning used to justify the decision. The state supreme court’s decision, in this case, is not contrary to Waller and Presley. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984); Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).   The court agreed with the district court that fair-minded jurists could take the view that the substantial reasons justifying witness sequestration during the evidentiary phase of a trial extend to jury voir dire. Thus, the court cannot say it was unreasonable for the state court to treat jury voir dire as an undifferentiated whole for purposes of sequestration of a key alibi witness. Therefore, the state court’s denial of the claim based on sequestration of Petitioner’s girlfriend did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Finally, a defendant may waive his right to a public trial by consenting to the closure of a proceeding. Under any standard of review, Petitioner waived his present claim that the exclusion of Stivers from the courtroom during jury selection violated the right to a public trial. View "Tracy Alan Zornes v. William Bolin" on Justia Law

Defendant and her then-husband bought a condo for $525,000 with the intention of making it their primary residence. To finance the purchase, the couple took out a mortgage with the Plaintiff bank. Defendant did not sign the note but consented to her husband doing so. The mortgage contained a "future advances" clause, which granted Plaintiff a security interest in the Mortgage covering future funds Defendant's husband might borrow.Four years later, Defendant's husband borrowed additional funds from Plaintiff to keep his business afloat. Defendant did not sign the note. A few months later, Defendant's husband filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and the condo was sold for $650,000, approximately $250,000 of which was deposited in escrow. The couple divorced and Defendant moved out of the state.In Defendant's husband's bankruptcy case, the court held a portion of the escrowed sale proceeds must pay down his business notes pursuant to the mortgage’s future advances clause and that he could not claim a homestead exemption. Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on its claims that Defendant's proceeds were also subject to the future advances clause and that Plaintiff could apply those proceeds to Defendant's husband's business note.Defendant appealed on several grounds, including unconscionability, contract formation, and public policy, all of which the court rejected, affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment to Plaintiff. View "Sanborn Savings Bank v. Connie Freed" on Justia Law

Iowa Northern Railway Company (“Iowa Northern”) and the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (the “Union”) are both parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). In 2019, Iowa Northern offered to increase the pay of unionized Train and Engine employees to $300 to recruit additional employees. The Union members rejected the pay increase. Subsequently, Iowa Northern served a Section 6 notice on the Union, proposing changes to the CBA. When the Union failed to respond, Iowa Northern provide notice it intended to resort to self-help, and then increased the pay rate to $300 per day.The Union then filed this case, claiming that Iowa Northern violated the RLA by unlawfully resorting to self-help and seeking a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo prior to the pay-rate changes. The district court denied the Union's request, finding that it did not meet its burden of establishing the likelihood of success on the merits. The Union appealed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a Union's requested preliminary injunction, finding that the Defendant railway operator did not violate the Railway Labor Act when it resorted to self-help. The court explained the Union's "prolonged foot-dragging and refusal to respond on an issue of vital importance to Iowa Northern (and to the Union’s members) raise substantial doubt that the Union’s status quo claim will survive." View "Intl Assn of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Trans v. Iowa Northern Railway Company" on Justia Law

Arkansas Act 710 prohibits state entities from contracting with private companies unless the contract includes a certification that the company “is not currently engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not to engage in, a boycott of Israel.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 25-1-503(a)(1).  Arkansas Times, a newspaper, contracts with University of Arkansas-Pulaski Technical College sued for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the certification violates the First Amendment in two ways.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections don’t just prevent outright prohibitions on speech; they also prohibit the government from imposing unconstitutional conditions that chill or deter speech. At issue, here, is whether “boycotting Israel” only covers unexpressive commercial conduct, or whether it also prohibits protected expressive conduct. Arkansas Times points to N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which held that expressive conduct accompanying a boycott is protected by the First Amendment.  The State argues that Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) controls. There, the Supreme Court held that First Amendment protection does not extend to non-expressive conduct intended to convey a political message.   The court wrote that it believes the Arkansas Supreme Court would read Act 710 as prohibiting purely commercial, non-expressive conduct. It does not ban Arkansas Times from publicly criticizing Israel, or even protesting the statute itself. It only prohibits economic decisions that discriminate against Israel. Because those commercial decisions are invisible to observers unless explained, they are not inherently expressive and do not implicate the First Amendment. View "Arkansas Times LP v. Mark Waldrip" on Justia Law

Following a series of trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury convicted Defendant of two counts of interstate communication of a threat, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 875(c). The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months in prison.   Defendant appealed arguing that the government did not have sufficient evidence to prove he made “true threats” because his statements were ambiguous and/or political hyperbole. Further, he argued that; the jury instructions were erroneous; the indictment failed to state an essential element of his offense; and he was denied a right to a speedy trial.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court first held that a jury could have reasonably concluded that his messages constituted a true threat of present or future violence and that he intended to communicate a threat. Thus, because the statements were objectively threatening, and neither ambiguous nor political hyperbole. The evidence is sufficient to satisfy the elements required for convictions under Section 875(c).  Further, there was no reversible error, because when taken as a whole, the instructions sufficiently articulated the elements for the charges and the matters were fairly and adequately submitted to the jury.   Next, Defendant has not shown prejudice caused by the delay. While he points to a longer period of detention, repossession of his vehicle, increased pretrial anxiety, and an in-custody assault, none of these circumstances demonstrate he was deprived of an opportunity to properly defend himself at trial. Finally, Defendant’s constitutional claim fails because he has not shown that a nine-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. View "United States v. Cody Leveke" on Justia Law

The government alleges that Medicare overpaid Plaintiff and his medical practice approximately $5.31 million. While the third level of administrative review, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), was pending, Medicare began to recover the overpaid funds by withholding new reimbursements. Plaintiff argued that recovery prior to an ALJ hearing and decision violates procedural due process. He moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Medicare from recovering payments prior to the ALJ decision. The district court denied the preliminary injunction and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction finding that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction. Further, he has not shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his procedural due process claim nor that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm. The court explained that if an audit shows that a provider has been overpaid, Medicare may seek to recover the overpaid funds. Moreover, if a Medicare contractor determines a provider has been overpaid, the provider may challenge that decision through administrative and judicial review.   Here, Plaintiff’s interest in avoiding erroneous recoupment outweighs the government’s interest in prompt repayment. However, there is no evidence in the record that any delay in recovery against Plaintiff will cause long-term harm to Medicare or prevent Medicare from providing services to other beneficiaries. Further, Plaintiff’s claims of irreparable harm are undercut by his apparent failure to try to ease the burdens of recoupment. View "Gurpreet Padda v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law