Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner entered the United States on an F-1 nonimmigrant student visa on Dec. 29, 2009. Subsequently, she falsely claimed to be a U.S. citizen to gain employment, and the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear, charging her with being removable under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (providing for the removal of an alien admitted as a nonimmigrant who has failed to maintain that nonimmigrant status or to comply with the conditions of that status) and Sec. 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) (providing for the removal of an alien who has falsely represented herself to be a United States citizen for any benefits such as employment). Petitioner proceeded pro see, explicitly waiving her right to counsel and denying the district court's offer of a continuance to secure counsel. Eventually, Petitioner obtained counsel.The Immigration Judge denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied Petitioner's request for remand after she cited a change in circumstances.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Immigration Judge did not deny Petitioner her right to Due Process as the Immigration Judge did not commit a "fundamental procedural error" regarding the appointment of counsel. Additionally, the Immigration Judge did not violate Petitioner's Due Process when it refused to remand based on changed circumstances. View "Flora Holmes v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

A carrier for the United States Postal Service was involved in an automobile accident that killed another motorist. He had already completed his delivery route and returned undeliverable mail to the post office. Plaintiff, the trustee for the motorist’s heirs, sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found that the employee was not acting within the scope of employment at the time of the accident. It dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court explained that the FTCA waives federal sovereign immunity for injuries ‘caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. While Plaintiff cites cases imposing or contemplating vicarious liability where employees cause accidents while driving personal vehicles, those cases did not find that employees were acting within the scope of employment because they were driving their own vehicles. Rather, they observe that an employer is not relieved of liability because the employee was driving his or her own car.   Because the employee was not within the scope of employment at the time of the accident, the FTCA does not waive federal sovereign immunity. Thus, the district court properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Jason Blais v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to Iowa Department of Human Service (DHS) employees (collectively, “Defendants”) on Plaintiffs’ claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violation of their right to due process. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants failed to afford them an opportunity to be heard on child abuse allegations prior to issuing a founded child abuse report and placement on the Iowa Child Abuse Registry (Registry).   On appeal, Plaintiffs contended the district court erred in concluding that the right to be informed of child abuse allegations and an opportunity to respond to such allegations prior to issuing a founded child abuse report and placement on the Registry was not clearly established. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that Plaintiffs have not proven that the law was clearly established such that Defendants should reasonably have been expected to know that the interim finding of founded child abuse pending the interviews of the Plaintiffs violated their right to due process. View "Billie Hovick v. Darci Patterson" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz declared a state of “peacetime emergency” and began issuing executive orders (EOs) intended to combat the spread of the virus. The EOs limited which types of businesses could continue operations and, later, specified the capacities at which those businesses could operate. Plaintiffs, three Minnesota businesses and their respective owners, suffered financial losses during the COVID-19 pandemic while these EOs were in effect. Plaintiffs brought an Equal Protection Clause claim against Governor Walz and Minnesota’s Attorney General, in their official capacities and a Takings Clause claim against Governor Walz in his individual capacity, which the district court dismissed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The court found that in 2020, the law was not clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his issuance of the challenged EOs violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to just compensation for a government taking. The court explained that Plaintiffs have not offered anything that supports their hypothesis that Governor Walz will, first, declare a second peacetime emergency and, then, will issue additional EOs—specifically, EOs like 20-74 that, in their view, treat them differently than other, similarly situated businesses and impede them from conducting their businesses as they wish. The court further wrote that it need not parse through whether or not a taking occurred, however, because even assuming that a taking did occur, whatever its type, Plaintiffs have offered nothing to support their contention that, in 2020, the law was clearly established such that Governor Walz would have understood that his EOs constituted a taking. View "Glow In One Mini Golf, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a law enforcement officer employed by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). Martinez claims that Sasse violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment by effecting a seizure through the use of excessive force. Sasse moved for judgment on the pleadings and argued that she was entitled to qualified immunity. denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez’s allegations stated a claim for the violation of a clearly established right.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that Defendant violated a clearly established right, because it was not clearly established as of June 2018 that Defendant’s alleged push was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that although the claim here alleges the use of excessive force, the parties dispute the threshold question of whether Defendant seized Plaintiff at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant effected a seizure when she pushed Plaintiff to the ground before locking the doors to the ICE facility. Defendant maintains, however, that when an officer’s use of force is designed only to repel a person from entering a facility, there is no seizure. On that view, Plaintiff may have a tort claim against Defendant for assault or battery if the officer used unjustified force, but Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Andrea Martinez v. Ronnet Sasse" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, bank fraud, and four counts of aggravated identity theft. He entered into a non-binding Plea Agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count and two counts of aggravated identity theft. A magistrate judge found that the plea was knowing and voluntary. The district court adopted those findings, accepted the guilty plea, and sentenced him to 71 months imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 24 months imprisonment on each aggravated identity theft count, with the three sentences to be served consecutively, for a total of 119 months imprisonment.   Defendant appealed, challenging (i) the court’s compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and (ii) the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that a defendant who fails to object to the Rule 11 colloquy in the trial court “has the burden to satisfy the plain-error rule and [the] reviewing court may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights.” Here, the court held that Defendant failed to meet his burden.   Further, Defendant argued the district court gave inadequate weight to mitigating factors and did not adequately explain why it imposed a sentence that was twice the parties’ joint recommendation. However, the court explained that a district court has “wide latitude” to weigh the relevant sentencing criteria, and has no obligation to accept the recommendation of the parties in a non-binding plea agreement. View "United States v. Gregory Harrison" on Justia Law

After Petitioner pled guilty to one count of receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sections 5841 and 5861(c)-(d), the district court sentenced him to 100 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating his base offense level under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Section 2K2.1(a)(3) and in applying a two-level enhancement under USSG Section 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) for an offense involving a destructive device.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with Defendant’s second point of error and remanded for resentencing without application of the destructive-device enhancement. The court explained that it is undisputed that the shotgun involved in the offense of conviction was a .410 caliber weapon, meaning that its bore diameter was less than one-half inch, and the government concedes error, suggesting that this Court remand for resentencing. The court agreed with Defendant and the government that the application of this enhancement when the weapon involved in the offense of conviction does not meet the definition of “destructive device” was plain error that affects Defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Demetrius Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. Defendant appealed, asserting four claims of error: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it made certain evidentiary rulings; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial due to behavior by members of the gallery; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction; and (4) the district court improperly considered prior act evidence for purposes of sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court took steps to ensure the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial by considering the cumulative effect and denying the proffered testimonies of two additional women. While some amount of prejudice is to be expected when evidence is admitted under Rule 414, it did not rise to the level of unfair prejudice in this case.   Next, during cross-examination of Defendant, a member of the gallery caught the district court’s attention. The district court addressed the behavior swiftly and succinctly. Defense counsel raised no questions or objections during trial and Defendant’s testimony continued without incident. The weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and there is no indication that any further problems or concerns occurred. No jurors complained or had questions about the incident. Without some indication that Defendant’s substantial rights were affected, the jury was influenced by the behavior, Defendant has failed to show plain error. Further, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the district court to find that Defendant committed a prior act of molestation. Thus, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. View "United States v. Robert Dowty, Sr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff tripped and fell in the parking lot of a Walgreen Co. d/b/a Walgreens store in Republic, Missouri. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens.  The court concluded that Plaintiff did not establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the “lip” formed at the junction of the parking lot’s pavement and the brick sidewalk was a dangerous condition. Consequently, Plainitff failed to establish an element of premises liability under Missouri law. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred by granting summary judgment because the record shows that there was a genuine fact dispute regarding the dangerousness of the sidewalk.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff is correct that he was not required to produce expert testimony and that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. But the circumstantial evidence presented fails to provide a sufficient basis for a jury to infer the presence of a dangerous condition created by Walgreens. Thus, the court held that Plaintiff did not present any evidence, direct or circumstantial, permitting the reasonable inference that a dangerous condition caused his accident. The district court, therefore, did not err by granting summary judgment to Walgreens. View "Gerry Hodge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff a former part-time employee of the City of Cedar Falls, brought an action against the City of Cedar Falls and certain city officials after her 2018 termination, alleging interference with and retaliation for the exercise of her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and claims of age discrimination, disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s claims, and she appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it need not consider the substantive elements of the claim because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she sustained any recoverable damages and it is undisputed that she did not seek any form of equitable relief.   Second, as to the retaliation claim, the court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of retaliation before the burden shifts back to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Here, Plaintiff has failed to put forth any evidence of the kind that would demonstrate pretext. She offered nothing more than disagreement with the statements contained in the disciplinary reports. In the absence of any factual record demonstrating that these documented performance deficiencies were inaccurate, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating pretext. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that the final three disciplinary reports were part of the same unlawful employment practice—harassment based on her age and disability. View "Michelle Brandt v. City of Cedar Falls" on Justia Law