Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. (“CSI”) brought this action against Cardio Flow, Inc. (“Cardio Flow”), alleging the breach of a settlement agreement that resolved ownership of intellectual property rights related to atherectomy devices. Cardio Flow was not a named party to the settlement, however, and moved for summary judgment on that basis. In response, CSI asserted that principles of equitable estoppel and agency bound Cardio Flow to abide by the agreement.   The district court rejected CSI’s arguments and dismissed its claims and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that equitable estoppel provides no basis to enforce the settlement agreement against Cardio Flow. The court reasoned that the doctrine of equitable estoppel generally involves some type of misrepresentation. Given the Minnesota Supreme Court’s unequivocal holdings elsewhere that a representation or concealment is essential, the court declined to supplant the usual equitable estoppel elements.   Further, the party who signed the agreement with Plaintiff was not acting as Defendant's agent when she signed the settlement; there was no joint venture between the signer and Defendant, and Defendant did not control the signer's lawsuit against Plaintiff which led to the settlement agreement. View "Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Cardio Flow, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri inmate currently in custody at the Northeast Correctional Center (“NECC”), filed a pro se Section 1983 action against multiple defendants, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and retaliation for filing grievances. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on his individual capacity claims against Defendant, an employee of the Missouri Department of Corrections serving as food service manager at NECC during the time in question. After discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. As noted, Defendant argued that summary judgment was warranted because undisputed facts show that Defendant was not responsible for discontinuing Plaintiff’s Renal Diet.   The Eighth Circuit vacated a portion of the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The court explained that Defendant asserted exhaustion as an affirmative defense in his separate answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. In granting summary judgment, the district court did not consider exhaustion because it did not address Plaintiff’s 2015-2018 interference and retaliation claims. Thus, that issue remains open on remand. View "Kenneth Charron v. Larry Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. In calculating an advisory guideline range at sentencing, the district court found based on the evidence of drug trafficking that Defendant possessed the firearm “cited in the offense of conviction in connection with the commission . . . of another offense.” USSG Section 2K2.1(c)(1). Therefore, the court applied a cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and applied Section 2X1.1 in respect to the offense of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. As a result, the base offense level under Section 2X1.1(a) was 32 based on USSG Section 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(5), and (b)(1), and Defendant’s guideline sentence was the statutory maximum term of 120 months’ imprisonment.   Defendant argues that the district court erred by applying the cross-reference and that the error increased his advisory guideline sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Defendant’s sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court properly applied the cross-reference under Section 2K2.1(c)(1). The court explained that by its plain terms the guideline extends beyond “use” to “possession,” as long as the possession is “in connection with the commission” of another offense. The guideline commentary specifies that the cross-reference applies “in the case of a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia.” USSG Section  2K2.1, comment. (n.14(B)). According to the plain meaning of Section 2K2.1(c), as explained more specifically by the commentary. View "United States v. Gregory Sewalson" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant, an officer, guilty of willfully depriving a man of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 242, and the district court sentenced Defendant to 72 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court committed both procedural and substantive errors.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence imposed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding that the district court’s explanation of Defendant’s sentence was adequate. “In determining whether a district court has adequately explained its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, the context for the appellate court’s review is the entire sentencing record, not merely the district court’s statements at the hearing.”   Next, Defendant contended that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. Upon careful review of the record, the court concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence, as it properly considered both the mitigating and aggravating factors listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553.   Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not give significant weight to any improper or irrelevant factor in fashioning Defendant’s sentence. The district court properly considered the victim's innocence and injuries. View "United States v. Brett Palkowitsch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five offenses related to trafficking methamphetamine. He filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial, alleging a violation of the court’s trial procedure order and a Brady violation. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to 295 months in prison. He appealed, challenging the denial of his motion and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is nothing in the record reflecting what one of the government’s witnesses learned or whether it affected his testimony, another witness’s testimony, or Defendant’s rights. As a result, Defendant’s argument that he was prejudiced by the still-undefined discussion is baseless, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.   Next, Defendant argued that the DEA affidavit is favorable evidence because it provides a basis for impeaching Defendant’s cellmate and because it suggests that someone else, was responsible for trafficking drugs. The court held that because the evidence is immaterial to the outcome of the case, the Government’s failure to disclose the DEA affidavit was not a Brady violation. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.   The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a downward variance. The court addressed Defendant’s arguments, considered all relevant factors, and concluded that a downward variance was not justified. View "United States v. Jason Corey" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of civil disorder. The parties agreed that U.S.S.G. Section  2B1.1(a)(2), which deals with property damage or destruction, applied. The Presentence Report, however, recommended applying the higher base level in U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a) for obstructing or impeding officers. Over objections from Defendant and the Government, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Section 2A2.4(a) was the most analogous guideline to Defendant’s conduct.   Defendant appealed arguing that the court incorrectly calculated his Guidelines range by applying U.S.S.G. Section 2A2.4(a), obstructing or impeding officers.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the shared prohibition on obstructing, impeding, or interfering with law enforcement establishes that Section 2A2.4(a) is sufficiently analogous to 18 U.S.C. Section.  231(a)(3). View "United States v. Jonathan Montanez" on Justia Law

Co-Defendants each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. On appeal, both claimed the district court erred at their respective sentencings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in both cases.   Defendant 1 disputed the quantity and type of methamphetamine attributed to him in the calculation of his base offense level. He argued that he should only be held. He also objected to his classification as a career offender. He contended his Iowa convictions for delivery of a controlled substance under Iowa Code Section 124.401(1) do not count as predicate convictions for the career offender enhancement because Section 124.401(1) is overbroad. Here, the methamphetamine seized from the controlled buy was tested and shown to be ice, and the dealers and users in this case, including Defendant 1 referred to the drugs being sold as “ice.” This evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that the methamphetamine Defendant 1 distributed was ice.   Defendant 2 sought to renew his argument that his 2011 cocaine conviction should have been classified as relevant conduct and therefore excluded from his criminal history calculation. However, where a defendant abandons and withdraws an objection to the PSR at the time of sentencing in exchange for a benefit, he has waived the objection and is not entitled to appellate review of that issue. By asserting this objection and then affirmatively withdrawing it as part of his deal with the government, Defendant 2 “demonstrated the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of his right to argue the point,” and the court may not consider it in on review. View "United States v. Lavelle Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, filed suit against Arkansas, patrolman in his individual capacity.  Plaintiffs pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that the patrolman had violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also sued the Wynne police chief, and the mayor, in their individual capacities, for failing to supervise the patrolman.   Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless their actions violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not set forth evidence showing that the patrolman is responsible for the alleged Fourth Amendment violations.   Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Police Chief and Mayor are liable for the patrolman’s alleged unconstitutional acts because they had received notice of his behavior and failed to stop it. A supervising officer may be liable for the actions of his subordinates when “he (1) had ‘notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates’; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take ‘sufficient remedial action’; (4) proximately causing injury to” the plaintiffs. Here, no evidence in the record supports a finding that either the Chief or Mayor subjectively knew of and deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of unconstitutional harms posed by the patrolman. View "Dana Harrison v. Brodie Faughn" on Justia Law

City Union Mission is a Kansas City, Missouri nonprofit organization located near Margaret Kemp Park that provides food, shelter, employment, and a Christian discipleship program to poor and homeless individuals. A Missouri law prohibits persons convicted of certain sex offenses (Affected Persons) from being present in or loitering within 500 feet of any public park containing playground equipment. After the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office informed City Union Mission that the statute prohibited some of its guests from being present within 500 feet of the park, even when receiving City Union Mission’s charitable services, City Union Mission filed suit, bringing 12 claims against the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office, Jackson County, and the Sheriff in his official capacity (collectively, the County), as well as one claim against the Sheriff in his individual capacity. The State of Missouri (the State) intervened, and the district court dismissed City Union Mission’s 12 claims against the County and granted summary judgment on City Union Mission’s claim against Sheriff Sharp in his individual capacity, finding that Sheriff Sharp was entitled to qualified immunity.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that City Union Mission’s claims seeking broad injunctive relief prohibiting Sheriff Sharp and Jackson County from “enforcing or threatening to enforce” Section 566.150 against City Union Mission or Affected Persons are moot. Further, City Union Mission did not direct the court to any case that clearly establishes its constitutional right to provide services to Affected Persons within 500 feet of a park with playground equipment. View "City Union Mission, Inc. v. Mike Sharp" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress items found during a warrantless search of the apartment he shared with his girlfriend. The district court granted the motion as to the narcotics found in a black bag, concluding the search that led to the discovery of the narcotics exceeded the scope of his girlfriend’s consent to search the apartment. As to the other evidence, the court denied the motion.   The government filed an interlocutory appeal, asserting the district court erred when it focused on ownership of the bag rather than his girlfriend’s authority to give consent for the search and the Eighth Circuit reversed.   The question before the court was whether Defendant’s girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. The court held that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement, which may be given by a third party with common authority or apparent authority over the premises or effects. Here, at the time of consent, law enforcement officers knew: (1) Defendant had directed his girlfriend to move the gun owned by and registered to her to a specific place within the apartment; (2) she voluntarily led the officers to the location of the gun; and (3) she had access to the bag and never indicated it was Defendant’s bag or that her ability to use or access the bag was limited. As the sole lessee, Defendant had actual and common authority over the apartment and consented to the search of the entire apartment for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "United States v. Mosley Williams" on Justia Law