Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) adopted a rule eliminating processing-line-speed limits in pork plants. Unions representing pork-processing-plant workers sued to vacate the rule as arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted summary judgment for the unions and vacated the rule. Two months later, Appellants—pork-processing companies affected by the rule and vacatur—moved to intervene. The district court denied the motion as untimely, noting that Appellants had participated in the summary judgment briefing eight months earlier. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained to assess the timeliness of a motion to intervene courts consider four factors: “(1) the extent the litigation has progressed at the time of the motion to intervene; (2) the prospective intervenor’s knowledge of the litigation; (3) the reason for the delay in seeking intervention; and (4) whether the delay in seeking intervention may prejudice the existing parties.”Here, Appellants sought to intervene over a month after the court entered summary judgment and the full vacatur the unions had sought. Next, Appellants had knowledge of the case and proposed relief well before the court entered summary judgment. Appellants’ reason for delay is unpersuasive. Their proffered reason—that USDA’s interests in defending NSIS aligned with theirs—fails because USDA’s interests did not align. Appellants’ core concern is having the district court return them to the HIMP waiver system. But neither the unions nor the USDA ever pursued this. Appellants suffered little prejudice because all four of their relevant plants received line-speed permits. This factor also weighed against intervention. View "United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Quality Pork Processors, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for various child sex trafficking, firearms, and drug charges. Forty-eight hours before trial, the government disclosed certain benefits it had provided to several minor victims. Defendant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the indictment or, in the alternative, exclusion of the victim's testimony. Instead, the district court offered Defendant a continuance, instructed the jury accordingly and allowed broad cross-examination of the witnesses. Defendant was ultimately convicted and sentenced to 268 months in prison.Defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed his convictions and sentence. The court explained that even if the government's late disclosure of benefits it had provided to the victims of Defendant's offenses was a discovery violation, the district court's chosen remedy was not an abuse of discretion. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed Defendant's sentence, finding that all three sentencing enhancements used to determine Defendant's sentence were properly applied and his 268-month sentence was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Kendall Streb" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of restaurants, filed claims through their respective insurance policies seeking coverage for losses and expenses related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Insurers denied Plaintiffs' claims and, upon Plaintiff's filing suit, the district court granted the insurance companies' motion for summary judgment.On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the court held that under either Kansas or Missouri law, Plaintiffs' claims fail. Under both states' laws, there is a "physical loss or damage" which requires some form of "physical alteration" to the insured's property. Here, Plaintiffs did not prove that the presence of COVID-19 resulted in any physical alteration to their property. The court also rejected Plaintiffs' argument that their claims were covered under the "Limited Extension for Food-Borne Illness," finding that this claim also required a showing that there was a "direct physical loss of or damage to property," which Plaintiffs did not allege. View "Planet Sub Holdings, Inc. v. State Auto Property & Casualty" on Justia Law

SUNZ Insurance Company (“SUNZ”) appealed from the denial of its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration of the crossclaims filed in a complex insurance dispute. SUNZ argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the crossclaims between non-diverse parties in the underlying interpleader action and otherwise erred by denying arbitration.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of the crossclaims. The court explained arbitration agreements are generally favored under federal law. Further, a court may not rule on the potential merits of the underlying claim that is assigned by contract to an arbitrator, even if it appears to be frivolous.Here, the Program Agreement sets forth the terms and conditions of the Policy and contains the disputed statements pertaining to collateral, costs, and fees. The Policy cannot be read without the Program Agreement, which explicitly controls the administration of the Policy and only becomes binding and enforceable after its execution. While the other party’s crossclaim alleges that SUNZ breached the Policy, it is the Program Agreement that drives the question of liability. And, under the Program Agreement, both parties agreed to submit to arbitration any disagreement regarding its terms. This is a challenge to the contract’s validity that, under Buckeye, shall be considered by an arbitrator, not a court. Thus, the district court erred when it denied SUNZ’s alternative motion to compel arbitration. View "SUNZ Insurance Company v. Butler American Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC and Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC (collectively “Victoria’s Secret”) appealed an order of the district court remanding the putative class action to state court. Victoria’s Secret removed the action to the federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(d)(2). Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that Victoria’s Secret failed to show that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.   The Eighth Circuit accepted the appeal under 28 U.S.C. Section 1453(c)(1), and affirmed. The court explained that when a plaintiff contests the amount in controversy after removal, the party seeking to remove under the Class Action Fairness Act must establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, the parties debate whether the amount in controversy should be measured only from the plaintiffs’ perspective—i.e., the aggregate value of the claims to the class members—or whether a district court may determine the amount from either party’s point of view, and thus may consider the amount from the defendant’s perspective—i.e., the total potential cost to the defendant if the plaintiffs prevail. The company presented no data or other evidence to support a reasonable inference that the number of class members who would become repeat purchasers is likely to be sufficient to generate at least $1.7 million in disputed tax. Without a non-speculative basis to infer that the requested injunction would bring the amount in controversy between these parties over $5 million, the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Abraham Lizama v. Victoria's Secret Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

A driver crashed into Defendant's home, where he lived with his father. As the driver attempted to flee, Defendant and his father dragged the driver out of the car and Defendant's father beat him with a garden hoe. The driver died a few days later. Defendant was arrested for tampering with evidence after he admitted to hiding the garden hoe out of fear his father would get in trouble.At trial, the district court denied Defendant's request to add as an element of the crime that "the natural and probable effect of [the] defendant’s conduct would be the interference with the due administration of justice." Defendant was convicted and appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction, finding the provided jury instruction still covered all the required elements of the offense. The requirement that Defendant’s action was likely to affect an official proceeding is implied in the mens rea requirement of the offense, which the challenged instruction covered. View "United States v. Samuel White Horse" on Justia Law

In June 2019, Plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the IRS seeking disclosure of the terms of a third-party authentication process set forth within IRM Sec. 21.1.3.3, pertaining to the tax professional authentication process. in August 2019, the IRS denied Plaintiffs' request citing the material was properly withheld pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), and then plaintiffs filed an action in federal court.The district court granted the IRS’s motion for summary judgment, rejecting Plaintiffs' request for an in-camera review of the documents.The Eighth Circuit reversed, remanding for the district court to conduct an in-camera inspection of the documents. To meet its burden under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), the IRS must prove the withheld material was “compiled for law enforcement purposes." Here, to effectively determine whether the IRS meets the requirements of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(E), an in-camera review is necessary. Thus, the district court erred in failing to hold an in-camera review. View "T. Keith Fogg v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

Defendant was pulled over after an officer observed excessive braking. During the stop, the officer observed both driver and passenger appeared to be nervous. Upon a subsequent pat-down, the officer observed a clear glass smoking device with burnt residue inside Defendant's open pocket. After another search, an additional 20 grams of methamphetamine were recovered from Defendant.The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress. He ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 216 months in prison.On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the district court's decision, finding the officers did not unconstitutionally extend the traffic stop. The court also held that the officer was permitted to ask Defendant out of the car and that Defendant consented to the pat-down by raising his arms.The court also found that the district court did not commit any error in the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). View "United States v. William Kennedy" on Justia Law

After a construction project fell through, Plaintiff sued Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. At issue in this case is whether the party who signed the contract on behalf of Plaintiff had authority to do so. The district court concluded they did not and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.The Eighth Circuit found that the signing party neither had actual or apparent authority to sign the contract containing the arbitration agreement. Apparent authority is created by the conduct of the principal, not of the agent. View "GP3 II, LLC v. Litong Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a statutory-maximum ten-year sentence. In doing so, the district court varied upward from a guideline range of 51–63 months based on a prior felony assault conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated Sec, 5-13-204.On appeal, Defendant claimed that Sec, 5-13-204 is not a crime of violence. The statute provides, " A person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely ... Impedes or prevents the respiration of another person or the circulation of another person’s blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the other person."The Eighth Circuit found Sec, 5-13-204 qualifies as a crime of violence based on the fact that domestic abuse strangulation, which contains almost identical phrasing, was previously held to be a crime of violence. View "United States v. Jeremy Burnett" on Justia Law