Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was pulled over for speeding. Defendant and her passenger consented to a vehicle search, which revealed 28.4 pounds of heroin. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied, at which point Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute. Seeking safety valve relief, Defendant gave a proffer interview to law enforcement, explaining how she became involved in drug trafficking, including who recruited her and the methods used to transport the drugs, as well as how she supported herself since coming to the United States. However, at sentencing, the district court determined Defendant was not entirely truthful about the source of funds in her bank account and denied relief. The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. The district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The district court was entitled to make a credibility determination regarding whether Defendant was speeding. Additionally, the officer did not exceed his authority when asking Defendant out of the car and did not unreasonably delay the traffic stop. Finally, the officer's testimony that Defendant verbally consented was sufficient to establish consent, even without a signed consent form.The Eighth Circuit also held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant safety valve relief or calculating her sentencing guidelines. View "United States v. Veronica Gonzalez-Carmona" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a guilty plea to the destruction of an energy facility, use of fire to commit a felony, and possession of a firearm/ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Defendant was sentenced to 180 months in prison and over $4.8 million in restitution. Defendant's sentence included a requirement that he pay "50 percent per month of earned income available to him." However, the judgment did not define what constitutes earned income.When Defendant received a COVID-19 stimulus payment in 2021, the government moved to authorize a $1,000.87 payment from Defendant's inmate trust account. Defendant objected, claiming the money was not "earned income." Without explanation, the district court granted the government's motion and Defendant appealed.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's order granting the government's request to authorize the payment from Defendant's inmate trust account. The district court failed to place any findings of fact regarding the source of the money in Defendant's inmate trust account. The question is if the money in Defendant's account constitutes "substantial resources" from outside sources that would be subject to § 3664(n). The court remanded the case to the district court for further fact-finding. View "United States v. Jason Woodring" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed by the district court after he admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release. Defendant argued that the district court improperly considered his need for rehabilitation in crafting the sentence, in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). He further argued that the district court abused its discretion by failing to account for his significant physical and mental health challenges in determining his sentence. Finally, he challenged the district court’s decision to impose an additional term of supervised release following the term of imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court reasoned that Defendant did not ask the district court not to impose any more supervised release. In fact, Defendant asked to remain on supervised release and pursue treatment. Further, Defendant had repeatedly violated the terms of his supervised release, continued to use illegal substances, and did not put any effort into his own rehabilitation. Thus, given the circumstances, the court discerned no abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Dewey Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment of the district court upholding an agency decision to deny her application for social security disability insurance benefits. Plaintiff argued that the administrative law judge (ALJ) who denied her claim erred by giving “little weight” to the opinion of one of her treating physicians.  The Eighth Circuit concluded that the ALJ permissibly weighed the evidence and affirmed the decision. The court held that the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. On the record as a whole, the ALJ was justified in declining to give controlling weight to the conclusory opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician.   The court reasoned that the doctor’s opinion was entitled to relatively little evidentiary value on its face because it was rendered on a check-box and fill-in-the-blank form. Further, the doctor’s opinion is also in tension with her own treatment notes. The treatment notes refer only to “evidence of elevated blood pressure levels and occasional skin abnormalities,” while observing “otherwise normal heart, lungs, and extremities.” Additionally, some of Plaintiff’s daily activities also undermined her doctor’s opinion of severe limitations. View "Deborah Swarthout v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Five defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, conspiracy to transport persons to engage in prostitution, conspiracy to engage in money laundering, and conspiracy to use a communication facility to promote prostitution. The jury also found one of the five, guilty of a substantive count of sex trafficking. Defendants appealed various aspects of their convictions and sentences.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding that there was no reversible error. Defendants 1 and 2 argued that their convictions must be reversed because there was a variance between the conspiracy charged in the indictment and the conspiracy proved at trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that they joined a single ongoing conspiracy to commit sex trafficking.   Defendant 3 challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. The court held that based on the evidence a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant 3 knowingly agreed to engage in sex trafficking and did so with the knowledge that women working in her houses were subject to coercive debt.   Defendant 4 challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on a substantive count of sex trafficking. The court reasoned that the offense of benefiting from participation in a venture to “maintain” a victim of sex trafficking is a continuing offense that may occur in more than one district. The court found no clear error in the district court’s orders of restitution and forfeiture to Defendant 5. View "United States v. Pawinee Unpradit" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer, the University of Minnesota, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), for discrimination based on her disability, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court first addressed whether Plaintiff met her burden to show that the University failed to provide a reasonable accommodation; specifically, whether Plaintiff qualified for any alternative positions. The court held that Plaintiff did not meet her burden, reasoning that she did not submit the job posting, the job title, or any evidence of the duties or requirements of any position.Further, the court addressed whether the University failed to engage in the interactive process. The court concluded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether the University acted in good faith to make reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff. The University offered to help Plaintiff find a new job many times and considered adopting technologies to help Plaintiff perform her job duties. Once the University realized Plaintiff could not be accommodated in her current position, an employee from the job center reached out to Plaintiff to schedule a meeting about vacant positions. But Plaintiff cancelled it, and the rescheduled meeting could not take place because Plaintiff went on full-time medical leave. Moreover, even if the University did not use good-faith efforts, Plaintiff needed to show that she “could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” View "Jessica Ehlers v. University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

MNDKK, LLC’s insurer, Great Lakes Insurance, sent subrogation demands through an assignee to Dingmann Brothers Construction (“Dingmann”) due to alleged dust-related property damage. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company (“Grinnell”), Dingmann’s insurer, commenced a declaratory-judgment action to determine coverage under the insurance policy issued to Dingmann. The district court granted Grinnell’s motion for summary judgment, holding that two policy exclusions unambiguously apply due to the presence of silica in the dust and that coverage is foreclosed. Defendants argued that the two exclusions do not apply, meaning Grinnell is responsible for covering the cost of the property damage caused by the dust.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether the dust contained silica. Further, Defendants argued that the cleanup provision does not apply because the damage was due to silica or silica-related dust itself, not its effects. Defendants claimed that there is a misplaced comma between “effects of” and “silica.” The court held that the comma before “silica” indicates that the phrase “the effects of” belongs with the phrase immediately preceding it, rather than with “‘silica’ or ‘silica-related dust.’” So, the last verb phrase in the series is “or in any way responding to or assessing the effects of,” and the comma separates the series from the noun phrase that is its direct object. Finally, the court held overlapping provisions can exist in an insurance policy and that both the cleanup and property-damage provisions apply. View "Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co v. Great Lakes Insurance SE" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of attempted commercial sex trafficking of a minor, 18 U.S.C. Sections 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and 1594(a), and attempted enticement of a minor for sexual activity using a facility of interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress and his conviction on numerous grounds.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied Defendant's motion to suppress and affirmed his conviction.  Defendant argued that law enforcement’s warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures.  The court held that a reasonable person could believe Defendant committed or was committing a crime and the facts sufficiently establish probable cause to believe that Defendant was attempting to commit sex trafficking crimes. Defendant further argued that his indictment was insufficient because he contends his crimes cannot be based on a non-existent victim. The court held that caselaw states a defendant may commit both attempted commercial sex trafficking of a minor and attempted enticement of a minor for sexual activity using a facility of interstate commerce.  Next, Defendant argued insufficient evidence supported either conviction. Here, the evidence sufficiently showed Defendant’s subjective intent to engage in a commercial sex act with someone he believed to be a minor. Moreover, the evidence showed Defendant knowingly used two facilities of interstate commerce, to try to entice a fictitious minor female to engage in illegal sexual activity and then took a substantial step toward committing the offense by driving to the meeting spot. View "United States v. Carlocito Slim" on Justia Law

Defendants Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, and Ann Lebo, Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa’s facial covering statute, Code Section 280.31. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa Code Section 280.31 as moot.   The court reasoned that the issue surrounding the preliminary injunction is moot because the current conditions differ vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed it. The court reasoned that COVID-19 vaccines are now available to children and adolescents over the age of four, greatly decreasing Plaintiffs’ children’s risk of serious bodily injury or death from contracting COVID-19 at school. Further, when Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, delta was the dominant variant, producing high transmission rates and caseloads throughout the country. Now, omicron has become dominant and subsided, leaving markedly lower transmission rates and caseloads throughout Iowa and the country. The court noted that to the extent that the case continues, the Court emphasized that the parties and district court should pay particular attention to Section 280.31’s exception for “any other provision of law.” Iowa Code Section 280.31. This exception unambiguously states that Section 280.31 does not apply where “any other provision of law” requires masks. The word "any” makes the term “provision of law” a broad category that does not distinguish between state or federal law. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Kimberly Reynolds" on Justia Law

The parties entered into a contract related to the construction of a bridge. Plaintiff filed a claim against Defendant including those of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and negligent misrepresentation. Based on an arbitration agreement, the parties presented their cases to an arbitrator, which found in Defendant's favor. The arbitrator awarded attorney's fees to Defendant.The district court reversed the arbitrator's award of attorney's fees, finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding the fees.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order reducing Defendant's arbitration award to exclude attorney's fees. The arbitration agreement at issue was not entirely clear on the attorney's fees issues, but Plaintiff cannot show that “the arbitrator based his decision on some body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract." View "Ind. Steel Construction, Inc. v. Lunda Construction Company" on Justia Law