Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of threatening to assault and murder a federal official and two counts of mailing threatening communications. The allegations were based on Defendant's several repeated promises, verbal and written, to kill two FBI agents. The pre-sentence report ("PSR") proposed an advisory range of 140 to 175 months of imprisonment. Neither party objected to the PSR, but the government sought a sentence of at least 20 years. The court sentenced Defendant to 480 months, based on Defendant's lack of remorse, the need to protect the public, and to deter Defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct, among other things.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence. A district court is not prohibited from "determining that the weight the Guidelines assigned to a particular factor was insufficient." Additionally, the sentencing court can take uncharged conduct into account. Here, the district court provided an explanation as to why the guideline calculation was insufficient to address the court's concerns. View "United States v. Clayton Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants claiming they violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act. The district court entered an order granting summary judgment to Defendants. After the court entered its order, but before the clerk had entered a separate judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff filed a notice stating that he had accepted an offer of judgment that Defendants had extended in which they agreed to pay him four thousand dollars plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.   Plaintiff maintained that, under Rule 68(a), he could accept the offer anytime up to fourteen days after Defendants had served him with it, and therefore it had survived the court's grant of summary judgment. The clerk nevertheless entered judgment consistent with the summary-judgment order. Plaintiff moved the court to amend the judgment to reflect the terms in the offer of judgment. The district court, relying on Perkins, granted Plaintiff’s motion, and the clerk entered a new judgment. Defendants appealed, maintaining that the judgment should have reflected the court's summary judgment ruling rather than the offer of judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and denied Defendants' requested relief and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and from the court’s order granting Plaintiff only one dollar in attorneys' fees. The court reasoned that only its’ en banc court may overrule a prior panel's decision. Further, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only one dollar in fees. View "Stetson Skender v. Eden Isle Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced a class action, alleging SC Data Center, Inc. (“SC Data”) committed three violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. Sections 1681-1681x. In May 2016, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement. Four days later, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016), which led SC Data to move to dismiss this action for lack of standing. On remand, the district court determined that Plaintiff had standing as to all three claims.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s orders and held that Plaintiff lacked Article III standing and remanded the matter to the district court with directions to remand the case to state court. The court held that the text of the FCRA nor the legislative history provide support for Plaintiff’s claim that she has a right under the FCRA to not only receive a copy of her consumer report but also discuss directly with the employer accurate but negative information within the report prior to the employer taking adverse action. Further, the court concluded that Plaintiff has not established that she suffered a concrete injury due to the improper disclosure, thus she lacks standing to pursue her improper disclosure or failure to authorize claims. View "Ria Schumacher v. SC Data Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs did not purchase flood insurance for their house after the sellers told them that the property was not in a FEMA flood zone. Within weeks the area flooded, the home was destroyed and Plaintiffs sued the property sellers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and private contractors.   Plaintiffs alleged that either FEMA or the Strategic Alliance for Risk Reduction (“STARR”) made the 2010 Change to the 100-year flood-line estimate and SFHA designation. They alleged that STARR is a joint venture by Defendants Stantec Consulting Services, Inc., Dewberry Engineers, Inc., and Atkins North America, Inc., but do not name STARR itself as a defendant. Atkins and Stantec filed a Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), extending the federal-contractor defense. The district court granted the motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because their complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter to show they are entitled to relief from Defendants. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s complaint does not state how Atkins, Stantec and Dewberry work within STARR or which entity was responsible for any acts through STARR. Further, the complaint fails to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation against Atkins, Dewberry, and Stantec because the Plaintiffs provide “only naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” for three elements. Finally, the complaint similarly failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because it does not plead which defendant made what representation. View "Derek Christopherson v. Robert Bushner" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, Defendant consented to a video sentencing hearing. After reviewing the pre-sentence report, Defendant's evidence of mitigation and the relevant sentencing factors, the court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum term of incarceration.On appeal, Defendant claimed that the district court violated his right to counsel and his right to meaningful allocation by muting the audio portion of the recording two times during the sentencing hearing. The Eighth Circuit rejected Defendant's argument, finding that the muting did not implicate Due Process concerns. Defendant's attorney was able to argue on his behalf while the audio was muted and Defendant had subsequent opportunity to allocate.The court also determined that Defendant's sentence was not procedurally flawed or substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Joshua Braman" on Justia Law

Progressive Technologies, Inc. sued Defendant for breaching a non-compete agreement, tortious interference with business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction entered against them.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that granted Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction on its claim that Defendant was in breach of the non-compete provisions of their contract. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction based on Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim.   The court held that the non-compete agreement is properly characterized and analyzed as one in an employment contract and the claim is reviewed under the strict scrutiny associated with non-compete agreements in employment contracts. The court reasoned that the noncompete agreement's competition and customer-solicitation restrictions both likely fail under strict scrutiny, and it is unlikely Plaintiff will prevail on the merits on those claims, as they are too long, too broad in defining protected business activity, or go well beyond what is required to protect Plaintiff's vital interests. Further, the balance of other preliminary injunction factors does not overcome the fact that Plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on the merits; likewise, Plaintiff's tortious interference with business expectancy cannot support the injunction as Plaintiff failed to show any irreparable harm resulting from it. View "Progressive Technologies Inc. v. Chaffin Holdings Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. He appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its ruling to limit the cross-examination of a law enforcement witness at trial. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and the judgment of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in its credibility finding.Defendant argued that the arresting Trooper lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle Defendant was involved in any criminal activity and, thus, the traffic stop was unlawful. He asserted that the district court clearly erred in its credibility finding and that the trooper’s testimony was “plainly contradicted” by the squad car videos. The court held that Defendant is correct that the video footage does not confirm the Trooper’s testimony concerning each of the three traffic violations, however, nothing in the video footage undermined that testimony.Next, Defendant argued the district court improperly limited his cross-examination of the Trooper at trial. At trial court sustained the government’s objection to the defense’s line of questioning regarding the Trooper and his DRE training, specifically about allegations that officers participating in the training program supplied drugs to young people in Minneapolis. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion to curtail the inquiry. View "United States v. Pierre Stewart" on Justia Law

Petitioner a citizen of Somalia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA’s order reversed the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) granting Petitioner’s application for deferral of removal to Somalia under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Eighth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review in part, granted the petition in part, and remanded it to the BIA for further proceedings.   Petitioner challenged the BIA’s reversal of the IJ’s grant of deferral of removal under CAT, asserting that the BIA failed to provide sufficient justification for its determination. The court held that it will not disturb the BIA’s findings as to the unlikelihood of Petitioner’s institutionalization because the BIA identified reasons grounded in the record sufficient to satisfy a reasonable mind.   Next, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s conclusion that the IJ clearly erred in finding that Petitioner would more likely than not be tortured as an IDP forcibly evicted from an IDP camp. The court found that the BIA gave sufficient justification for its determination that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not be forcibly evicted from an IDP camp.   Finally, the court held that further proceedings are required for the BIA to address in the first instance the IJ’s findings regarding Petitioner’s likely treatment in an IDP camp and what part of the IDP camp experience would constitute torture. The court found that the BIA erred by resolving DHS’s appeal without addressing the IJ’s findings regarding treatment in IDP camps. View "Musla Salat v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder money for a drug trafficking ring, and the district court, in calculating Defendant’s recommended sentencing range, found that Defendant was responsible for more than five hundred grams of drugs. On appeal, Defendant challenged that determination and argued that his recommended sentencing range was too high as a result of the court's error. Defendant objected to the presentence report (“PSR”) calculation. He claimed that "the facts contained in the PSR are insufficient to demonstrate that the amount alleged even existed” let alone that he engaged in any actions related to the amount. He also challenged the price of methamphetamine that the PSR recommended.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and found that the court erred in calculating Defendant’s sentencing range. The court left it to the district court to decide whether resentencing should take place on the existing record and to resolve Defendant’s objection concerning the price of methamphetamine.   The court found that the timing of events supports the conclusion that some of the drugs may have been counted twice. Therefore, Defendant’s sentence cannot stand on this record because it was the government’s burden to demonstrate drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the court held that it does not believe that Defendant forfeited his double-counting argument by raising it for the first time at the sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Dakota Siller" on Justia Law

Defendant, while working as a priest, stole from the cash-offering collections of several parishes. After a jury trial, he was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, transporting stolen money, and making and subscribing false tax returns. The district court sentenced him to 93 months’ imprisonment.   The Eighth Circuit reversed three of Defendant’s convictions and affirmed his remaining convictions, the forfeiture order, and the restitution award. The court also affirmed his sentence, except it directed the district court to vacate the $100 special assessments associated with Counts 39, 41, and 44.   The court held that the district court did not plainly err in failing to disturb the jury’s finding that Defendant’s cash deposits furthered his fraudulent scheme. Assuming the deposited money comprised stolen cash, a reasonable jury could believe that the cash deposits, were designed to “postpone inquiries,” and to keep the scheme from coming under scrutiny.   However, the court held that the district court did plainly err in upholding the wire fraud convictions which involved transfers of funds rather than cash deposits. The court reasoned that no reasonable jury could find that these actions furthered a fraudulent scheme. Once the cash was securely in the credit union account, the danger that it would expose Defendant’s scheme to fellow priests was eliminated. Finally, although the court reversed Defendant’s convictions for Counts 39, 41, and 44, it did not remand for resentencing because the sentences for those counts ran concurrently with the sentences for the first sixty counts. View "United States v. Marcin Garbacz" on Justia Law