Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, civil detainees in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”), sued the state defendants arguing that they failed to pay Plaintiffs minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling finding that sexually dangerous civil detainees are not state employees. The court reasoned that “there is no bargained-for exchange of labor for mutual economic gain” like that which “occurs in a true employer-employee relationship.” Further detainees are under the control and supervision of the detention facility, which is not comparable to the free labor situation of true employment. Moreover, the detainees have their basic needs met by the state, which means that the FLSA’s purpose to maintain a “standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers” does not apply. View "David Gamble v. Minnesota State-Operated Svcs" on Justia Law

Appellant, an asphalt-paving company incorporated under Iowa law, had not paid dividends since the 1970s but has paid its shareholders “management fees” for at least twenty years. There were no written agreements between Appellant and its shareholders regarding fees paid for management services, nor was there an employment contract between Appellant and its president. Appellant claimed deductions on its tax returns for management fees for tax years 2012 through 2014. The Commissioner denied these deductions on the ground that Appellant failed to establish that it had incurred or paid the management fees for ordinary and necessary business purposes. At the tax-court proceeding, each party proffered expert witnesses. The tax court excluded the testimony of Appellant’s experts and sustained the Commissioner’s decision on the ground that the fees were not paid as compensation for services but were instead disguised distributions of corporate earnings.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the tax court, affirming the Commissioner’s denial of the Appellant’s claimed tax deductions and management fees paid to its shareholders. The court reviewed the tax court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion and held that the expert witness would not help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. Further, the court concluded that the tax court did not err in finding that Appellant failed to meet its burden to show that any of the management fees paid were reasonable. View "Aspro, Inc. v. CIR" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person, and the district court sentenced him to 71 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, an evidentiary ruling at trial, and the four-level increase at sentencing.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction finding that the record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant constructively possessed the firearm. Further, the record supports that Defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm. The court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendant possessed methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, and was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Moreover, there is no plain error warranting relief, because the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant knew of his status as a convicted felon.   Next, in regards to Defendant’s challenge of the admission of the Facebook photograph that shows him pointing a gun at the camera, the court held that the absence of conclusive evidence that the items were real did not create a risk of unfair prejudice. The court also noted the photograph was relevant.   Finally, although the four-level increase sentencing guideline does not allow an automatic increase simply because a defendant possesses drugs and a gun in the same proximity, the court did not err because it properly applied the “facilitate” standard. View "United States v. Darrell Two Hearts" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ sought coverage for losses and expenses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court granted the insurers’ motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting Defendant summary judgment. The court held that the primary rule for contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the parties' intent. In cases where the insurance policy language is unambiguous, the court will enforce the contract as written and will give each term its ordinary meaning. Here, the contract at issue provides coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to property.” Neither business alleges COVID-19 was physically present on its premises or that anything physical happened to its properties. The parties’ dispute regarding whether the policies’ Virus Exclusion applies is irrelevant because the Plaintiffs’ failed to show any direct physical loss of or damage to their property. View "Monday Restaurants v. Intrepid Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) entered an order that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. Sections 158(a)(1) and (5), including failure to bargain in good faith for a successor CBA, withholding relevant bargaining information, unlawfully declaring an impasse and unilaterally implementing altered terms and conditions of employment. With one dissenting member, the Board also concluded that Defendant unlawfully threatened and terminated ten workers who engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage. In opposition to the order, Defendant made several arguments including that the dissenting board member correctly concluded that the ten employees terminated for an unauthorized work stoppage were not engaged in collective activity protected by Section 7 and therefore the terminations did not violate Section 8(a)(1).   The Eighth Circuit granted enforcement of the Board’s Order finding that Defendant committed multiple unfair labor practice violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court agreed with the Board that Defendant failed to establish that the Union’s Section 9(a) right to be the ten employees’ exclusive bargaining representative made their spontaneous work stoppage -- a concerted attempt to question their terms and conditions of employment -- unprotected activity under Emporium Capwell.  Further, the court found that Defendant failed to preserve certain issues by challenging the special remedies before the Board, either in its objections to the ALJ’s recommended remedies or by a motion for reconsideration when the Board added the reimbursement remedy. View "NLRB v. Noah's Ark Processors, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellees were the sole owners of an electrical company. Appellant is a general contractor and hired Appellee’s company to do electrical work on various projects. Appellee’s company contracted with suppliers and submitted periodic pay applications to Appellant requesting payment for work completed and supplies purchased. When Appellee’s company went out of business its suppliers filed construction liens against the properties relating to the projects for amounts the company owed them and brought lawsuits against the owners of the projects to foreclose upon their liens. Appellant was required to defend the lawsuits and indemnify the project owners and alleges that these lawsuits resulted in damages due to misrepresentations Appellee’s company made about whether its suppliers were being paid. Appellant obtained a default judgment against the company, however, the bankruptcy court granted the Appellee's motion to dismiss concluding that Appellant did not have a valid claim for a debt owed by the Appellee’s personally.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellees. The court found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the ground that Appellant has not shown that it has a claim against the Appellees personally because it cannot pierce the corporate veil. Because Appellees do not argue that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether Appellant can prove that Appellees committed a Nebraska tort, such as fraudulent misrepresentation, the bankruptcy court improperly granted summary judgment. View "Lund-Ross Constructors, Inc. v. Jay Buchanan" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. Defendant argued that the district court erred in overruling his Batson objection, abused its discretion in admitting parts of the government’s expert witness’s testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction. Defendant’s failure to lodge an objection at trial resulted in the waiver of his Batson claim. Regarding the government’s witness, the court held that any error in admitting the testimony was harmless. Finally, the court found that the government’s evidence against Defendant was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Robert Hill" on Justia Law

The president of the Christian Action League of Minnesota (“CAL”), an antipornography advocacy group, frequently contacts those who advertise in a local newspaper. CAL believes that, since the paper runs advertisements for sexually oriented businesses, those who advertise in the paper are endorsing those businesses.CAL’s president continually contacted an attorney who advertised in the paper. The attorney filed a petition for a harassment restraining order ("HRO") under Minnesota Statute Sec. 609.748(2). The statute allows victims to obtain restraining orders against their harassers. CAL brought a pre-enforcement challenge against the Hennepin County Attorney, arguing that the Sec. 609.748(2) violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss.The Eighth Circuit held that CAL’s complaint does not allege an intention to engage in conduct proscribed by a statute, thus CAL lacks standing. The court reasoned that the Minnesota Supreme Court would not interpret Sec. 609.748(2)'s definition of “harassment” to cover CAL’s speech. As such, nothing CAL wants to do is criminalized by the Statute. Further, because there is no allegation that the County Attorney has enforced the Statute against CAL’s protected speech or has any plans to do so, the Plaintiff lacks standing. View "Christian Action League of MN v. Mike Freeman" on Justia Law

Appellant, as a Trustee of the PCI Liquidating Trust, filed a proceeding against Appellee, Safe Harbor Managed Account 101, Ltd. (“Safe Harbor”) to recover nearly $6.9 million transferred to Safe Harbor as a subsequent transferee of an entity that Appellant had previously obtained a default judgment against for transfers made to it by a PCI subsidiary. The district court held that 11 U.S.C. Sec. 546(e) shielded Safe Harbor from Appellant’s avoiding powers.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consideration. The court found that the district court did not err in determining that a financial institution’s customer may qualify as a financial institution if the intermediary bank acted as an agent for the customer during the transaction. The court did not consider Appellant’s argument that the district court failed to determine whether Wells Fargo was a custodian.     Finally, although the district court erred in confusing two entities in determining who was a party to the Notes Purchase Agreement, that error is not dispositive. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to analyze the facts and determine whether transfers from MGC finance were in connection with the Note Purchase agreement. View "Douglas Kelley v. Safe Harbor Managed Acct. 101" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a third-party slander-of-title claim against various defendants under Missouri law. Plaintiffs purchased a property in Putnam County, Missouri. Under Missouri law, a plaintiff must prove four elements for a slander of title claim: (1) an interest in the property, (2) that the words published were false, (3) “that the words were maliciously published,” and (4) that the plaintiff “suffered pecuniary loss” “as a result of the false statement.” The district court found the first two elements were met, but Plaintiff’s claim fails because it did not establish a dispute of material fact on the malice elementHere, the court found that the undisputed facts reflect only an “innocently or ignorantly made” mistake. They show that Defendants made an error in their normal course of duties, that Defendant told Plaintiff the error would be corrected as necessary, and that Defendant eventually corrected that error with its 2019 Affidavit. The court held that Plaintiff has produced no evidence that undermines the Defendants’ credibility, nor identified anything that suggests malice, or a reason for Defendants to harbor ill-will. Therefore, Plaintiff has not produced even a “scintilla” of contravening evidence. Thus, the court found that because Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on a required element for its claim, the court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for the Defendants. View "Erickson Cabin, LLC v. Busey Bank" on Justia Law