Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appeals his conviction on three counts of a four-count indictment for child abuse. Each count concerns a different child. On appeal defendant argues that (1) the district court plainly erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction for Count I; (2) the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance.Conducting a plain error review, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred by not giving a specific unanimity instruction to the jury regarding Count I. The government presented evidence of three separate incidents in a single count of aggravated child abuse. The court reasoned that the trial court should view “the defendant’s acts . . . in a commonsense manner, taking into account whether the acts occurred in a separate time frame or separate identifying place.” State v. White Face, 857 N.W.2d 387 (S.D. 2014).Here, no evidence suggested “a pattern of continuous abuse”; instead, it described three “discrete incidents.” The district court erred by not providing the jury with a special unanimity instruction requiring it to agree on the specific act supporting the conviction or find that defendant had committed all three acts. The plain error prejudiced defendant. The court vacated the Count I conviction and affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects. View "United States v. Tyson Keepseagle" on Justia Law

Officers conducted a traffic stop of a car in which the defendant was the passenger. The officers stated they were concerned the defendant was carrying something, so they handcuffed him. Defendant denied carrying anything but told officers they could check, at which point they found a stun gun and a lighter.A federal grand jury indicted the defendant on three counts, and he moved to suppress the evidence officers discovered during the search. He then pled guilty to the charges. Defendant presented mitigation evidence and asked the district court to impose the minimum sentence; however, they sentenced him to 211 months of imprisonment.Defendant argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, the officers placed him under de factor arrest without probable cause, and the district court gave too much weight to aggravating factors when sentencing him. First, the circuit court concluded that the totality of the circumstances justified the officer’s search. Next, the circuit court found that the officers’ reasonable belief that the defendant was carrying weapons allowed them to handcuff him without resulting in a de facto arrest. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by the sentencing defendant at the bottom of the guidelines range.. View "United States v. Tanner Halverson-Weese" on Justia Law

Under Michigan abortion law, a minor may bypass the parental-consent requirement by obtaining a court order granting the right to self-consent (for mature minors) or judicial consent (for “best interests” minors). When the plaintiff sought to apply for judicial bypass, the defendant hadn’t heard of the process and told the plaintiff to come back later. Plaintiff sued the defendant in her individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendant’s refusal to allow her to apply for a judicial bypass without parental notification violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion when the defendant moved for summary judgment, invoking quasi-judicial and qualified immunity.Before the Eighth Circuit, the defendant claimed she acted at the direction of the Associate Circuit Judge (“Judge”). The Judge testified that he did not recall telling the defendant not to accept the application without parental consent. The circuit court concluded there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Judge’s practice of giving pre-filing directions. Further, the is a clearly established right to apply for a judicial bypass. Thus the circuit court declined to address the defendant’s other arguments regarding qualified immunity. View "Jane Doe v. Michelle Chapman" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to federal drug charges. The district court determined that defendant had a category VI criminal history and applied a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. While considering the statutory sentencing factors, the district court mistakenly stated defendant shot a gun in the air during a prior offense. Defendant was sentenced with a special condition requiring him to undergo substance abuse treatment.The Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s finding regarding the reckless endangerment enhancement was not erroneous. Reasoning that the defendant's actions, such as speeding, running red lights, and unsafe lane changing, amounted to reckless endangerment. Next, the circuit court found that the district court committed a procedural error by linking an erroneous fact with another uncontested conviction. However, the defendant failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights because there was not a reasonable probability that, but for the erroneous fact, the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence. Further, the circuit court concluded the district court’s bottom-of-the-guidelines sentence of 92 months was not substantively unreasonable. Finally, while medication compliance requirements may infringe on constitutional liberty interests, whether a medical professional will prescribe medication or treatment is speculative and does not unconstitutionally infringe on the defendant's liberty interests. View "United States v. Leprese Williams" on Justia Law

Following the merger of Centene Corporation ("Centene") and Health Net, Inc. ("Health Net)," certain shareholders of Centene (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought five claims on behalf of the corporation against certain of its former and then-current directors and officers and nominal defendant Centene (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs did not make a pre-suit demand on Centene's Board of Directors (the Board). The district court dismissed their complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts demonstrating that a demand would have been futile.The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing the relevant documents contained a material misrepresentation. Further, the court did not consider the second or third claims because the plaintiffs made no argument contesting the district court's finding that a majority of the Board faces a substantial likelihood of liability. Next, the circuit court held that the plaintiffs' futility argument was patently insufficient. Finally, the circuit court found that at least half of the Board does not face a substantial likelihood of liability under the plaintiffs' insider trading claim. As such, the circuit court found the same as to plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim pertaining to alleged insider trading. The circuit court affirmed the district court's decisions. View "Carpenters' Pension Fund of IL v. Michael Neidorff" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to murdering his cousin and her husband. At sentencing, the defendant was represented by two attorneys with experience handling capital cases. The jury returned a sentence of death for each murder, finding seven aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant then petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254, raising twenty-eight claims, including a claim that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of his adjustment to incarceration.The Eighth Circuit reviewed whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Martinez requires a defendant to show that his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel has “some merit.” The circuit court agreed with the defendant that the district court erred by treating the substantiality standard as different from the certificate-of-appealability standard. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim was insubstantial even under the correct standard. The circuit court found that no reasonable jurist could believe that or find it debatable whether either prong of the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim is met. Thus, the defendant cannot show cause for his failure to raise the claim in state postconviction proceedings. View "Brian Dorsey v. David Vandergriff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Minnesota Governor Walz (“Walz”) signed an executive order mandating a statewide residential eviction moratorium. Heights Apartments, LLC (“Heights”), a property owner of residential units, challenged the executive orders, raising First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims under Section 1983.The court found that the plaintiffs met the two-prong test to determine whether a state has impermissibly interfered with a contract. However, the court held that Heights has failed to allege a cognizable Petition Clause claim because the only potential remedy is damages; Heights has not pleaded damages that are somehow unique to its Petition Clause claim.Heights alleged it was deprived of its expected return on investment in the form of rental income. These alleged damages are sufficient to plausibly give rise to a Fifth Amendment takings claim. Finally, Heights has alleged violations of various rights that trigger protections under other constitution amendments; however, it has failed to plausibly plead a substantive due process violation. Thus, Heights has plausibly argued constitutional claims under the Contract Clause and Takings Clause. The court reversed the dismissal of those two claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Heights Apartments, LLC v. Tim Walz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when a pledge of the defendant fraternity snuck into her room and slit her throat after a night of drinking. The plaintiff filed tort claims against the fraternity and related parties (“the fraternity”). Plaintiff claimed primary and vicarious liability.Applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s primary liability claims, finding that the attack was not a foreseeable result of the fraternity’s forced hazing. The attacker’s criminal conduct was an intervening cause, severing the chain of causation. As to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that any supposed agents of the fraternity were negligent under Nebraska law.The Eighth Circuit also held that social host liability does not apply. Nebraska’s Minor Alcoholic Liquor Liability Act provides a cause of action related to the “negligence of an intoxicated minor.” Here, the attacker was convicted of second-degree assault, which requires a finding that he acted knowingly or intentionally. This precludes a finding that the attacker acted negligently. View "Teresa Spagna v. Collin Gill" on Justia Law

Frustrated with then-President Donald Trump, the defendant obtained his parents' .40 caliber pistol and headed to Washington, D.C. Defendant’s plan was to put himself in a position where he could shoot President Trump. However, the defendant had no concrete plans. On his way, the defendant began to have second thoughts. He called his father and eventually turned around.The district court deferred ruling on the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal pending the jury’s verdict. However, upon the jury finding the defendant guilty, the district court explained that, although it was a close call, the evidence was sufficient.While the Eighth Circuit found aspects of the case troubling, the court is “without authority to reverse a conviction as long as there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably” find the defendant guilty. Here, the evidence was sufficient that the defendant’s actions constituted a true threat. View "United States v. Timothy Cessor" on Justia Law