Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Missouri Division of Family Services (DFS) hotline received a call reporting drug activity, verbal abuse of children, and weapons at the house where Alloway lived with her boyfriend and his children. A DFS social worker went to the house for a welfare check, accompanied by sheriff’s deputies. Alloway met them outside. They stated the reason for their visit. Alloway invited them into the house and told them to wait in the kitchen while she went upstairs to get the older child. While the social worker interviewed the child, a deputy saw three loaded rifles. Where those rifles were was disputed. After confirming that Alloway was a felon, he arrested her. Alloway’s boyfriend stated that he was also a felon and that there was another gun in the bedroom safe. He refused to open the safe and was also arrested. While the deputies were on the phone getting a search warrant for the safe, they spotted more guns in plain sight in the bedroom. They obtained and executed two search warrants, finding 13 guns, 125 grams of meth, and other drug evidence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Alloway consented to the search, and the deputies did not exceed the scope of that consent. View "United States v. Alloway" on Justia Law

Collins paid a minor for sex acts. While in detention, he contacted potential witnesses with instructions on what to say to law enforcement and with questions about the victim’s whereabouts and violated a no-contact order. Collins pled guilty to sex trafficking of children, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1) and (b)(2). His plea agreement stipulated that the government would abstain from recommending a guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, and would recommend that Collins receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. The government’s offense conduct statement included a summary of Collins’ post-indictment conduct but nonetheless recommended that Collins receive credit for acceptance and no obstruction enhancement.The PSIR proposed an enhancement for obstruction of justice and no credit for acceptance of responsibility. The government’s sentencing memorandum detailed Collins’ allegedly obstructive conduct, stating that “Collins’ attempts to influence witnesses throughout these proceedings are certainly relevant under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and as to his acceptance of responsibility.” The district court rejected an enhancement for obstruction. With a two-level reduction for acceptance, Collins’ guidelines range became 210-262 months. The court varied downward by an additional level, stating “the government has an obligation here to move for that third level, but I can’t force them” and sentenced Collins to 210 months’ imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit vacated. The government breached the plea agreement by relying on Collins’ pre-plea conduct to dispute acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Gallegos, a citizen of Mexico, gained Lawful Permanent Resident status through her marriage to a U.S. citizen. After Gallegos petitioned to dissolve the marriage, DHS concluded that the marriage was fraudulent. DHS filed a Notice to Appear, charging Gallegos as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A) as an alien who was inadmissible at the time she adjusted her LPR status because she procured admission through fraud (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)); under section 1227(a)(1)(A) because she did not possess valid immigration documents when she sought readmission as an LPR (1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)); and under 1227(a)(1)(G)(ii) for failing or refusing to fulfill a marital agreement which was made for the purpose of procuring admission as an immigrant.The immigration court later mailed an amended Notice, informing Gallegos her hearing was rescheduled. Gallegos failed to appear at the rescheduled hearing. The IJ ordered Gallegos removed in absentia. Gallegos argued that exceptional circumstances prevented her from attending the hearing. Gallegos admitted to receiving the amended Notice but explained that she misplaced it and incorrectly remembered the hearing date because of mental health issues, claiming she was treated for depression and anxiety and was involuntarily hospitalized. The BIA affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Gallegos did “not show that her mental condition was causally related to her failure to appear.” The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no exceptional circumstances justifying Gallegos’s failure to appear. View "Gallegos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Fisher was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and two counts of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government filed notice that Fisher was subject to an enhanced sentence based on his prior conviction for first-degree burglary under Minnesota law, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Fisher pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine but objected to the enhanced sentence and requested sentencing credit for the time he served in tribal jail for a tribal court conviction based on the same conduct.The district court overruled Fisher’s objection to the sentence enhancement and denied Fisher’s request to credit his time served in tribal jail, reasoning that it did not have the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Fisher to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for a defendant with a “serious violent felony” conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. While Minnesota’s statute is broader than the generic definition of burglary, it is divisible; applying the modified categorical approach, Fisher’s conviction for burglary with assault is a “serious violent felony.” Treating discharged and undischarged sentences differently does not violate the Due Process Clause. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Jones transported large amounts of methamphetamine from California to Arkansas and large amounts of money back to California. In January-February of 2019, Jones made at least seven round trips transporting drugs and money. He purchased most of the airline tickets himself. During one trip, Jones was questioned at the airport because he was carrying $21,000. In May 2019, Jones was arrested at a bus stop with 4.395 kilograms of methamphetamine duct-taped to his body.He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and requested a minor-role adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b). The district court denied his request; it considered the unchallenged facts in the PSR, explicitly compared Jones’s role to that of another courier, noted the section 3B1.2 factors, and concluded that Jones did not meet his burden to show “that he was less culpable than the average participant.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court explicitly compared Jones’s culpability only to another courier and not to the supplier and dealers and did not discuss every section 3B1.2 factor at length, it did not need to make extensive findings. Considering “the totality of the circumstances,” it was not clearly erroneous to conclude that Jones was not substantially “less culpable than the average participant.” View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

After RMC implemented new staffing grids for registered nurses at its acute-care hospital, the Union filed a grievance under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and later sought arbitration. The grievance alleged that “the hospital intends to displace bargaining unit (BU) RNs [with] supervisory RNs in the performance of BU work as expressed in the hospital’s staffing grids” that were implemented in June 2020 and that “removed RNs in the BU.” RMC refused to process the grievance, claiming that the CBA did not cover the Union’s allegations of wrongdoing. The Union filed suit, seeking to compel arbitration.The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Union. The CBA defines “grievance” as “[a]n alleged breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement,” sets forth the process for submitting grievances to RMC, and provides that if the grievance is not resolved by the parties, “the Union may advance the grievance to arbitration.” Article 38(1)(F) exempts from arbitration certain disputes. Because the grievance alleges displacement of bargaining unit nurses, which is covered by Article 3, and not issues related to nurse-to-patient staffing levels, which are covered by Article 38, Article 38(1)(F)’s arbitration exemption does not apply. View "National Nurses Organizing Committee-Missouri & Kansas v. Midwest Division-RMC, LLC" on Justia Law

Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law

Chol, a citizen of South Sudan, was born in a refugee camp in Uganda. At age five, he was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. Twelve years later, he was convicted of two counts of robbery and sentenced to seven-15 years. Charged with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Chol applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Chol appeared pro se. The IJ explained that he was ineligible for asylum due to his criminal record, but alerted him that he would be eligible for CAT relief if he could prove that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by the government (or with its acquiescence) in South Sudan and Uganda.After testimony from Chol, his mother, and a prison official, the IJ determined he was not entitled to CAT relief and ordered removal, finding that it is not more likely than not that Chol would be tortured in South Sudan because he is a member of the governing Dinka tribe, and not a politician, journalist, or humanitarian worker. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Eighth Circuit denied Choi’s petition for review, rejecting arguments that the IJ erred by failing to fully develop the record about Choi’s tribal faction, provide the State Department’s country reports for South Sudan and Uganda, and tell Choi the definition of “torture” under the CAT. View "Chol v. Garland" on Justia Law

After a fire destroyed Merechka's home, Vigilant denied his insurance claim, which sought $634,000 for the dwelling and $475,500 for its contents. During its investigation, Vigilant discovered that Merechka had filed for bankruptcy about four years earlier. According to his bankruptcy petition, he had around $9,000 in personal property, well short of the more than $600,000 (or $325,825, according to a third-party appraiser) that he reported to Vigilant. Without an explanation for the discrepancy, Vigilant suspected insurance fraud. Merechka assured Vigilant that he had acquired nearly all of his personal property after the bankruptcy using several sources of income: $700 per week he received for working for his brother, a $1,300 monthly social-security payment, and periodic payments from an investment account. The numbers did not add up, so Vigilant denied coverage under the policy’s concealment-or-fraud provision.Merechka sued. Vigilant filed a counterclaim, seeking reimbursement for the nearly $400,000 it had paid to Merechka’s mortgage lender. Applying Arkansas law, the district court determined that neither side owed anything. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and remanded Vigilant’s claim. No reasonable juror could believe that Merechka acquired so much property in such a short time on his modest income; the circumstances indicate that the falsehood was intentional. View "Merechka v. Vigilant Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2015, Powley joined RCX as a driver. RCX accommodated multiple requests for leave, specific trucks, and specific shifts based on doctors’ notes. In May 2018, Powley became a dispatcher. On August 8, Powley provided a doctor’s note stating, “Patient needs day shift work.” The note did not mention headaches. RCX rearranged schedules to accommodate her. Powley also requested she return to driving, stating that the noise in the office “gave her a headache.” On September 18, Powley submitted a doctor’s note saying: “Must have 11 hrs between shifts.” On September 28, Powley sent RCX an email stating the office noise “interferes with my ability to perform my duties,” restating her desire to return to driving, and reiterating her frustration with the arrangement of the office. She did not mention headaches or back pain. RCX treated this as a resignation.Powley sued, citing failure to accommodate her disabilities and unlawful retaliation in response to her request for an accommodation, under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Nebraska Fair Employment Practices Act. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Powley did not actually seek a reasonable accommodation for her alleged disability. Powley received many reasonable accommodations for her back pain by submitting doctor’s notes but never submitted a doctor’s note or indicated that her request to return to driving was connected to her back pain. She complained about noise, light, and office layout and did not suggest that her request was based on medical needs. View "Powley v. Rail Crew Xpress, LLC" on Justia Law