Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jacqueline Mills was convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, money laundering, and bribery. These charges were related to a years-long scheme to defraud the United States of monies intended to feed low-income children. The jury found that fourteen properties and monies were traceable to the proceeds of Mills's fraud. Rosie and John Farr, Mills's mother and stepfather, filed third party petitions asserting interests in various properties to be forfeited, including monies from a Southern Bancorp account number. The forfeiture order became final as to Mills when she was sentenced, but it remained preliminary as to the Farrs until the ancillary proceeding concluded. In the two years between the Farrs filing their third party petitions and the government moving for summary judgment, the Farrs failed to present evidence supporting their claims of a superior ownership interest in the Southern Bancorp account.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, on this record, the Farrs failed to prove a prior interest in the property under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6)(A) because the proceeds of an offense do not exist before the offense is committed, and when they come into existence, the government's interest under the relation-back doctrine immediately vests. Furthermore, the Farrs failed to present evidence that they qualify as bona fide purchasers for value under section 853(n)(6)(B). The court also concluded that excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) does not include ignorance or carelessness on the part of an attorney, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying that general rule in this case. Finally, as in United States v. Waits, it is clear that the Farrs as third parties had adequate notice the government intended to seek forfeiture, as their timely third party petitions confirmed. View "United States v. Farr" on Justia Law

PCMA filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of several North Dakota statutory provisions, claiming that they were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (Medicare Part D). The district court concluded that ERISA preempted none of the challenged provisions and that Medicare Part D preempted only one; the Eighth Circuit reversed on the issue of ERISA preemption; and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded in light of Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, 592 U.S. ---, 141 S. Ct. 474 (2020).On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Sections 16.1(11) and 16.2(4), as well as Sections 16.1(10) and 16.2(2), do not meet the connection-with standard. The court explained that none of the challenged provisions has an impermissible connection with ERISA plans and are therefore not preempted. The court also concluded that state laws are preempted as applied to Medicare Part D plans if and only if they either (1) regulate the same subject matter as a federal Medicare Part D standard (in which case they are expressly preempted), or (2) otherwise frustrate the purpose of a federal Medicare Part D standard (in which case they are impliedly preempted). In this case, a provision requiring plans to disclose certain information to patients or prohibiting plans from prohibiting pharmacies from disclosing certain information are preempted, as well as provisions regarding collection of retroactive fees from pharmacies. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. Wehbi" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of over $3 million in attorney fees and expenses to plaintiffs in a settlement involving Missouri's foster-care system. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of a group of foster children, alleging that Missouri did not have adequate procedures in place to guard against the overuse of psychotropic drugs. The court concluded that the district court properly placed the burden on plaintiffs to support the hours claimed. The district court then evaluated the billing records, attorney-by-attorney, and disregarded any entries that were excessive or vague, leaving no doubt that plaintiffs had failed to prove their entitlement to all the fees and expenses they had requested. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the fee award and rejected defendants' contentions to reduce the award. View "M.B. v. Tidball" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendant, a police officer, on a motion to dismiss an unlawful seizure claim based on his shooting two dogs during a residential security check. Accepting the complaint's allegations as true, the court concluded that the officer did not act reasonably in shooting the dogs. In this case, defendant shot both dogs when they presented no imminent danger and were not acting aggressively. Furthermore, it was clearly established that an officer cannot shoot a dog in the absence of an objectively legitimate and imminent threat of harm to himself or others. The court rejected defendant's contention that the court should consider other materials because the materials defendant wishes the court to consider, when properly viewed, do not settle whether the shootings were objectively reasonable. View "LeMay v. Mays" on Justia Law

Porter received a 104-month prison sentence for illegally possessing a firearm. Shortly before he was scheduled for supervised release, the probation office realized that he did not have a release plan and asked the district court to order Porter to spend 120 days at a residential reentry center, to find work and a place to live. The district court approved the request, but Porter checked out to go to work one day and never returned, violating both his conditions of supervised release and the reentry center’s rules. Porter remained at large until he was captured several weeks later. The district court imposed a 14-month prison sentence for violating the conditions of supervised release. The government filed a separate charge for escaping from custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Porter argued that he was not in the reentry center “by virtue of” a “conviction,” as the statute requires, but rather because he did not have a place to live.The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction and concurrent 12-month sentence. Porter was in “custody” at the reentry center and his “unauthorized departure” was an “escape.” A conviction must only be a cause of the custody or confinement, whether “immediate” or not. Porter never would have been at a reentry center had he not first been convicted of a crime. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

The Hospitals filed suit to enjoin the OPTN's new policy, which significantly changes the method for allocating donated kidneys to kidney transplant patients, as unlawful under the Transplant Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the Hospitals' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Examining the district court's balancing of the Dataphase factors, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the Hospitals failed to show that their procedural APA claim is likely to succeed on the merits. The court also agreed with the district court that the Hospitals failed to demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that adoption of the Fixed Circle Policy was arbitrary and capricious agency action. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Hospitals' one-year delay refuted their allegations of irreparable harm, and the balance of the equities and public interest weigh in favor of denying the requested preliminary injunction. View "Adventist Health System v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court imposed an illegal sentence because he overserved the maximum time permitted by statute for his felon-in-possession charge (10 years). Rather, the court concluded that defendant's sentence does not violate the maximum term set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). The court explained that the maximum term of imprisonment is governed by the law of the offense. The court also concluded that the revocation of defendant's supervised release did not violate his Constitutional right to a jury trial. Finally, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court carefully considered and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Childs" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant Campbell-Martin and Leiva's motion to suppress. Defendants conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Considering all the relevant circumstances, the court concluded that the officer's initial encounter with Campbell-Martin and Leiva was not a Fourth Amendment seizure because it was a consensual encounter. Furthermore, even if it became nonconsensual, the officer had reasonable suspicion to question them and ask for identification. In this case, the officer's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he could not leave. Nor does requesting identification or asking questions effect a seizure as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.The court also concluded that the search of the car and the backpack without a warrant was a valid inventory search. The court rejected Campbell-Martin's claims that the district court erred in denying her request for a two-level reduction for a minor role in the offense under USSG 3B1.2(b), concluding that the evidence was more than sufficient to support the district court's decision. Because Leiva stipulated in his plea agreement that he knowingly and intentionally possessed the methamphetamine and was within 1,000 feet of a school, the district court properly applied the two-level enhancement under USSG 2D1.2(a)(1). Finally, the district court did not err in determining that Leiva's 2018 drug-possession offense was not relevant conduct to the instant offense and could be assessed three-criminal history points. Therefore, the court affirmed defendants' sentences. View "United States v. Campbell-Martin" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 300-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of a mixture or substance containing heroin. The court concluded that the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts in making its sentencing decision and, even assuming the district court did procedurally err, any such error was harmless. In this case, the government explained that the district court found a 300-month sentence appropriate not because it believed fentanyl was present but because heroin distributed by defendant led to someone's death and defendant has an extensive criminal history, with approximately 1 conviction per year since he turned 21 years old. Furthermore, the district court court engaged in a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Wise" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that BNSF violated the Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) when it discharged him for reporting, in good faith, a hazardous safety condition. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded back pay. The district court denied plaintiff's request for reinstatement and instead awarded three years of front pay, thereafter granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Eighth Circuit concluded that BNSF's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was timely and therefore fell within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)'s 28-day time period; there existed a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support the jury's finding that plaintiff's report regarding the danger of wearing a seatbelt while hy-railing is a report of a hazardous safety condition; and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that BNSF intentionally retaliated against plaintiff. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in granting BNSF's conditional motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of BNSF, reversed the order granting BNSF's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and remanded for the reinstatement of the jury verdict and for the entry of such further relief. View "Monohon v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law