Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's involuntary medication order under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), to maintain defendant's competency for trial. Given that the purpose of involuntary medication under Sell is to ensure the defendant is competent enough to participate in trial, the court concluded that adopting a rule that categorically prohibits the involuntary medication of a defendant who has regained competency for some period of time, but who is unable to maintain it, would frustrate that purpose where an important governmental interest is at stake. In this case, the district court did not err in concluding that it had the authority to order the involuntary medication of defendant for the purpose of rendering and maintaining his competency for trial. Furthermore, the district court's finding that involuntary medication is necessary to achieve the government's interests was not clearly erroneous. The court explained that the district court's order is narrowly and carefully tailored to minimize the intrusion on defendant's protected liberty interests. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release and imposition of a 24 month sentence. To the extent the district court considered a deputy marshal's hearsay statements in deciding an appropriate sentence, there was no error. The court explained that the confrontation right recognized in United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986), is limited to the question whether release should be revoked; this question was answered by defendant's possession of a controlled substance; and due process generally does not require confrontation during sentencing following a conviction and due process does not require any greater protection in the sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding. In this case, other admissible evidence supported the findings that defendant violated the provisions of his supervised release. View "United States v. Busey" on Justia Law

Rodenburg purchased a Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy from Cincinnati. In the underlying action, a plaintiff filed suit against Rodenburg, asserting several theories including wrongful garnishment, tort-based claims, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Rodenburg filed a claim under the policy for coverage of the underlying lawsuit, but Cincinnati denied coverage.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Cincinnati, concluding that the policy did not provide coverage for the underlying lawsuit and Cincinnati had no duty to defend Rodenburg under the policy. In this case, the underlying complaint alleged "personal and advertising injury" that was not "caused by an 'occurrence.'" The court explained that any potential liability arose either directly or indirectly from conduct that was alleged to violate the FDCPA, however, and was thus excluded from coverage by the Violation of Statutes Exclusion. Therefore, Cincinnati did not breach its contractual duty to defend Rodenburg. View "Rodenburg LLP v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment declaring that the United States has a duty to provide "competent physician-led healthcare" to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and its members. In light of the promises the United States made to the Tribe more than 150 years ago in the Fort Laramie Treaty, and relevant legislation since that time, such as the Snyder Act and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, the district court correctly articulated the existence and scope of the duty and declaratory judgment was proper. View "Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 420-month sentence, following two remands for resentencing, for multiple drug and firearm counts. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in determining that defendant was responsible for a drug equivalency of 1,000 to 3,000 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level of 30 pursuant to USSG 2D1.1(c)(5); in finding that defendant maintained a premises for manufacturing and distributing a controlled substance ("stash house") under USSG 2D1.1(b)(12); and in finding that defendant committed the offenses as part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood under USSG 2D1.1(b)(14)(E) (2014). View "United States v. McArthur" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of methamphetamine. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop where the record supports the district court's conclusion that defendant consented to the search within the average time for a routine traffic stop and that police obtained consent to search within the time reasonably required to complete the mission of the traffic stop. Furthermore, once police lawfully secured consent to search, any delay occasioned by the search did not constitute an unlawful extension of the seizure. The court is not convinced that the constitutional requirement of reasonableness mandates that police use only computer-generated warning tickets, and there is no showing in any event that using a computer would have produced the warning within thirty-seven seconds before defendant consented to the search. The court explained that, once defendant gave consent to search, it did not matter what method was used to generate the warning ticket, because defendant necessarily consented to an extension of the traffic stop while the search was conducted.The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6) where it did not amount to impermissible double counting. In any event, the court concluded that the district court varied downward to offset the increase, leaving defendant no basis to complain. View "United States v. Salkil" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought modification of existing desegregation consent decrees to allow their exemption from Arkansas's Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code. Ann. 6–18–1906, the district court granted the motions and modified the consent decrees to explicitly limit the transfer of students between school districts. The Department appealed, alleging that the modification imposed an impermissible interdistrict remedy.After a panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's modifications, the Department moved for rehearing, at which point the United States—for the first time—involved itself in the case and asked the court to reconsider its opinion. The court accepted the invitation, received supplemental briefing from the parties, and reversed the judgment of the district court.The court agreed with the Department that the district court abused its discretion by modifying the consent decrees because the 2017 amendments were not a significant change in circumstances supporting modification of the decrees and—even if they were—the district court did not impose a suitably tailored modification. Because no vestige of discrimination traces to interdistrict school transfers, the district court abused its discretion in expanding the consent decrees to prohibit such transfers. View "United States v. Arkansas Department of Education" on Justia Law

After plaintiff left her employment at HKFS, she filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants in her various employment contracts were unenforceable. HFKS brought counterclaims against plaintiff and a third-party complaint against plaintiff's new employer, Mariner.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining plaintiff from breaching the non-compete and nonsolicitation provisions in her employment contracts. The court agreed with plaintiff and Mariner that the non-compete provision did not survive her termination of the Employment Agreement. Because HKFS is not likely to prevail on the merits of its breach of contract claim with respect to the non-compete provision, the district court erred in enjoining plaintiff from violating that provision. In regard to the non-solicitation provision in plaintiff's contract, the court concluded that South Dakota law applies under the agreement's choice-of-law provision, and such provisions cannot prevent a former employee from accepting unsolicited business. Therefore, the non-solicitation agreement, in part, violates South Dakota law and public policy and it is at least in part unenforceable. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Honkamp Krueger Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against North Homes, a private entity, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after it confined her when she was 15 years old in a residential correctional unit where an employee sexually assaulted her for three days. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's section 1983 claims. Construing the complaint in her favor, the court concluded that plaintiff plausibly alleged that North Homes's exercise of a public function (the state's authority to detain her) caused her involuntary detainment in a corrections unit. View "Doe v. North Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NPPD's wind-farm affiliates. NPPD contends that these affiliates breached their power purchase agreements (PPAs) by transferring control of their parent companys' ownership interests without NPPD's written consent.The court concluded that the Project Entities did not transfer their direct ownership interests to NRG or GIP and did not violate the change-of-control provision of the PPAs. The court also concluded that the transfer of the Project Entities' parent companies, from Edison to NRG to GIP, did not transfer the "direct ownership interests" of each of the Project Entities. Therefore, the Project Entities did not need to obtain NPPD's written consent for each of the transactions involving its upstream parent companies, and the transfer of the ownership interests at the parent company level did not trigger a change of control under the PPAs. The court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Project Entities did not violate the anti-assignment provisions by delegating performance of certain duties, because the Project Entities remain ultimately responsible for their obligations. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a permanent injunction to prevent defendant from terminating the PPAs. View "Laredo Ridge Wind, LLC v. Nebraska Public Power District" on Justia Law