Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After USCIS denied plaintiff's I-485 application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. 1255(m), plaintiff filed suit in the District of Minnesota and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction setting aside the effective date of the denial. Plaintiff had previously submitted a U-nonimmigrant status (I-918) application and an application for waiver of inadmissibility (I-192). The district court denied the motion, concluding that 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of discretionary adjustment of status relief.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested preliminary injunction. The court agreed with the district court that, based on the plain language of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the court has no jurisdiction to review the underlying denial of plaintiff's adjustment of status under section 1255(m). In this case, the statutory substantive ground on which USCIS based its denial of plaintiff's I-485 application -- his failure to establish that adjustment of status is warranted on humanitarian grounds, to ensure family unity, or is otherwise in the public interest -- is a discretionary determination governed by section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), like determinations to deny cancellation of removal under section 1229b(b) because removal would not cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen family member. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's remaining unconstitutional deprivation claim because there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in discretionary relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "J.M.O. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring to distribute marijuana and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer a nexus between defendant's handgun and his drug trafficking offense. The court also concluded that the district court's finding regarding the drug amount was plausible in light of the record as a whole. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in refusing to give defendant credit for acceptance of responsibility after he pleaded guilty at the eleventh-hour and decided to force the government to prove its case on the firearm charge. View "United States v. Tan Fong Vang" on Justia Law

After he sent a sexually explicit text message to a customer, the other members of Synergies expelled Jeffery White as a member of the company. White and White Communications filed suit against Synergies, claiming that the expulsion was a breach of the assumption agreement and the operating agreement between the parties. At trial, the jury found in favor of White Communications on its breach of implied contract claim, but found in favor of Synergies on all other claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of White's motion for judgment as a matter of law because the jury had a legally-sufficient basis to find that Synergies terminated him for cause. In this case, it was within the purview of the jury to determine whether White's actions led to instant or deferred irreparable harm to Synergies' reputation or its economic interests. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting prior bad acts evidence of defendant's previously-sent texts of the same nature. Furthermore, there was no abuse of discretion in permitting alleged hearsay evidence to show its impact on the listener. The court further concluded that the district court did not err by denying White's motion for a new trial where there is more than sufficient evidence to support the finding in favor of Synergies on the breach of contract claim. Finally, the court upheld the jury's award of damages on plaintiff's breach of implied contract claim. View "White Communications, LLC v. Synergies3 Tec Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied petitions for review challenging the BIA's decision denying petitioner's applications for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's claim for withholding of removal based on petitioner's membership in "tattooed Guatemalan youths" and "people who promised to remove their tattoos years ago but did not," because petitioner failed to establish a nexus between his claimed fear and his social group. In this case, petitioner was no longer a member of the first proposed social group and his second social group lacks social distinction. The court also concluded that the Board did not err by adopting the IJ's conclusion that it was reasonable to expect petitioner to relocate within Guatemala to avoid a vigilante group. The court further concluded that the Board did not err in rejecting petitioner's CAT claim where petitioner could relocate to avoid the group and there was no evidence that Guatemala acquiesced in any torture performed by the group. View "Bautista-Bautista v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of a traffic ordinance in St. Louis. Plaintiff's claims arose from her attendance at an event called the Women's March in 2017 where she was arrested for failing to move to the sidewalk. An officer arrested her for violating section 17.16.275 of the Revised Code of St. Louis, which prohibits obstructing traffic. After the charges were dismissed, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The court concluded that the St. Louis ordinance does not forbid all expressive activities on streets and sidewalks. Instead, it merely forbids a person to position herself in a way that obstructs the reasonable flow of traffic. Therefore, plaintiff has not established that the ordinance unduly restricts free speech in light of the City's legitimate interest in regulating traffic. The court also concluded that the ordinance is not void for vagueness and thus is not unconstitutional on its face. The court further concluded that the ordinance is not unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff where the record does not support a conclusion that police invidiously discriminated against plaintiff based on her speech by selectively enforcing the traffic ordinance. The court remanded with directions to enter judgment for the City. View "Langford v. City of St. Louis" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's orders involving plaintiff and Union Pacific's motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in this suit under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the lack of damages or equitable relief at the district court level did not strip this court of subject matter jurisdiction. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court improperly granted plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where a reasonable jury could find Union Pacific attempted to fit plaintiff into an appropriate job within the corporation's reorganized structure upon his return from deployment, thereby leading to the conclusion Union Pacific reemployed him in accordance with the escalator position principle. The court reversed the district court's JMOL decision on the reemployment claim.In addressing the denial of its own JMOL motion, Union Pacific raised affirmative defenses for the first time on appeal. The court will not consider Union Pacific's new arguments on appeal. Nonetheless, on the record before the court and on de novo review, the court concluded that the district court should have granted Union Pacific's motion for JMOL because no reasonable jury could find in favor of plaintiff on his reemployment claim. In this case, the record does not support the conclusion that Union Pacific failed to place plaintiff in the position that he would have otherwise been in had he not been deployed. Finally, because plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his reemployment claim, he does not qualify as a prevailing party for the purpose of recovering attorney fees. View "Quiles v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Oral Surgeons submitted a claim to Cincinnati for losses it suffered as a result of the suspension of non-emergency procedures due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Oral Surgeons maintains that the COVID-19 pandemic and the related government-imposed restrictions on performing non-emergency dental procedures constituted a "direct 'loss' to property" because Oral Surgeons was unable to fully use its offices.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Cincinnati's motion to dismiss, concluding that the policy unambiguously requires direct physical loss or physical damage to trigger business interruption and extra expense coverage, which Oral Surgeons did not allege. Therefore, the policy clearly does not provide coverage for Oral Surgeons' partial loss of use of its offices, absent a showing of direct physical loss or physical damage. View "Oral Surgeons, P.C. v. The Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against Auto-Owners after their family members were killed in an auto accident, alleging that they were entitled to more under Auto-Owners' Policy. After both sides filed motions for summary judgment, the district district court granted in part and denied in part each motion and disposed of all claims.The Eighth Circuit agreed with Auto-Owners that the district court erroneously interpreted the policy to provide $3 million in total coverage. The court explained that there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy that avoids surplusage. In this case, because sections 4.a and 4.b of the policy specify at "most" how much an insured may recover, those sections are properly read as limitations to coverage, not promises to provide a certain amount of coverage. Because there is only one reasonable interpretation of the policy and because 4.a and 4.b do not conflict with each other, the policy is not ambiguous. Accordingly, the court reversed, vacated, and remanded. View "Brazil v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a 24-month sentence after revocation of defendant's term of supervised release. After defendant was involved in a fight outside of a strip club, defendant's probation officer filed a petition to revoke his supervised release.The court agreed with the district court's rejection of defendant's self-defense argument, seeing no self-defense justification that warranted defendant leaving his vehicle to attack others. Moreover, the assault on defendant at the strip club was both temporally and spatially distinct from the assault that defendant committed in the truck parking lot. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Arkansas' limits on which candidates can appear on its general-election ballot, Ark. Code 7-7-101. After the district court entered judgment upholding the challenged provisions, plaintiff appealed. While the appeal was pending, the 2020 general election came and went.The Eighth Circuit dismissed plaintiff's appeal as moot, concluding that the "capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-judicial-review" exception to mootness did not apply. The court explained that plaintiff's interest in this case was predicated on his status as an Independent candidate; without such a candidacy, the challenged provisions do not apply to him. However, plaintiff's 2020 Independent candidacy has ended and he has not indicated whether he intends to run as an Independent again. Therefore, this case is no longer "live." Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to show that he is reasonably likely to be subject to the challenged statutory provisions again. View "Whitfield v. Thurston" on Justia Law