Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Deshonte Antwon Dickson was charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin and methamphetamine. At his trial, witnesses testified that Dickson supplied methamphetamine and heroin from California to North Dakota. The jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute heroin and between 50 and 500 grams of methamphetamine. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calculated a base offense level of 26, resulting in an advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months imprisonment. However, the district court varied upward and sentenced Dickson to 120 months, finding him to be an essential participant in the conspiracy.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota initially sentenced Dickson to 120 months imprisonment, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing due to procedural errors. The district court had varied upward from the guidelines range without providing adequate notice. On remand, the district court gave notice of its intent to vary upward again and reimposed the 120-month sentence, citing Dickson's significant role in the conspiracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found no procedural error in the district court's resentencing, as it had provided proper notice and based its decision on the trial evidence. The court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting that the district court had considered the statutory sentencing factors and the nature of Dickson's involvement in the conspiracy. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Dickson" on Justia Law

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Devin Nunes, a former Member of Congress, along with NuStar Farms, LLC, and its owners, sued journalist Ryan Lizza and Hearst Magazine Media, Inc., for defamation. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by Esquire, which implied that Nunes and his family were hiding the fact that NuStar Farms employed undocumented labor. The plaintiffs alleged both express defamation and defamation by implication.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa initially dismissed Nunes's express defamation claim but allowed the defamation by implication claim to proceed. On remand, Nunes filed an amended complaint focusing solely on defamation by implication. NuStar Farms and its owners also filed a new lawsuit alleging both express defamation and defamation by implication. The district court consolidated the cases and ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on certain elements of their defamation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Nunes did not present sufficient evidence to prove special damages, which are required under California law for defamation claims when general and exemplary damages are not recoverable due to failure to comply with the notice and demand statute. Nunes's claims of impaired career opportunities and diminished fundraising ability were unsupported by evidence.For the NuStar plaintiffs, the court applied Iowa law and found insufficient evidence of economic harm or reputational damage. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a preexisting good reputation that could have been damaged by the article. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Nunes v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Iowa enacted Senate File 2340, which criminalizes the presence of aliens who have illegally reentered the United States within its boundaries. The Act mandates that aliens violating it must return to the country they reentered from and prohibits judges from abating state prosecutions due to pending or possible federal determinations of the alien’s immigration status. The United States sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act, which the district court granted. Iowa appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruled that the United States had standing to sue and could state a cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the United States established a likelihood of success on the merits, showing that federal immigration law preempts the Act under both conflict and field preemption. The court also found that irreparable harm would occur if the Act went into effect and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, examining factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the United States had standing and an equitable cause of action to enjoin the Act. The court found that the Act likely conflicts with federal immigration law, as it obstructs the discretion of federal officials and creates a parallel enforcement scheme. The court also agreed that the United States demonstrated irreparable harm and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act was affirmed. View "United States v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

CEZ Prior, LLC ("CEZ") entered into a purchase agreement with 755 N Prior Ave., LLC ("Prior") to buy a property for $26 million. The agreement required Prior to cooperate in obtaining tenant estoppel certificates. Errors in square footage measurements led to rent discrepancies, prompting an amendment to reduce the purchase price to $15.1 million and the cash required at closing to $3.8 million. CEZ later requested to delay closing due to financial issues, but Prior did not agree. Prior sent estoppel certificates that did not address rate increases, and CEZ proposed edits that Prior rejected. CEZ demanded satisfactory certificates on the closing date, but Prior terminated the agreement, alleging CEZ failed to tender cash.CEZ sued Prior for breach of contract in Minnesota state court and sought to enjoin the termination. Prior removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court stayed the matter and later denied CEZ's motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court found that CEZ was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim, as Prior had reasonably cooperated in obtaining the estoppel certificates. The balance of harms favored Prior, given CEZ's insufficient evidence of its ability to pay. The public interest did not favor CEZ due to its low probability of success on the merits.The court also addressed CEZ's argument under Minnesota law, finding that the district court's stay order was not an injunction and did not extend statutory deadlines. Consequently, CEZ was not entitled to additional time to close under Minnesota statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "CEZ Prior, LLC v. 755 N Prior Ave. LLC" on Justia Law

John Doe filed a putative class action against SSM Health Care Corporation in Missouri state court, alleging that SSM shared private health information with third-party marketing services without authorization, violating Missouri law. Doe claimed that SSM's MyChart patient portal transmitted personal health data to third-party websites like Facebook. The lawsuit included nine state law claims, such as violations of the Missouri Wiretap Statute and the Computer Tampering Act.SSM removed the case to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Doe moved to remand the case to state court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected SSM's arguments, ruling that SSM was not "acting under" a federal officer and that Doe's proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, thus lacking the minimal diversity required under CAFA. The district court remanded the case to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that SSM did not meet the criteria for federal officer removal because it was not acting under the direction of a federal officer. The court also held that the proposed class was limited to Missouri citizens, which destroyed the minimal diversity necessary for CAFA jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's remand order. View "Doe v. SSM Health Care Corporation" on Justia Law

Monsanto Company, Pharmacia, LLC, and Solutia, Inc. (collectively, "Monsanto") filed a lawsuit in St. Louis County Circuit Court in Missouri against Magnetek, Inc., General Electric Co. ("GE"), Paramount Global, KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation, Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc., and The Gillette Company LLC (collectively, "Defendants"). Monsanto alleged that it continues to incur substantial costs to defend against PCB lawsuits that should be borne by Defendants and sought to enforce written agreements obligating Defendants to defend, indemnify, and hold Monsanto harmless in all currently pending and future PCB lawsuits.GE removed the action to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Monsanto’s motion to remand, finding that GE's removal was untimely. GE appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the parties had waived Missouri Supreme Court Rule 54.13(c)’s personal service provision and expressly agreed that January 31, 2023, was the effective date for service of process. The court determined that the 30-day removal period began on the agreed effective date of service, not when GE signed the acknowledgment and waiver of service of process or when Monsanto filed the document. Consequently, GE's notice of removal was filed within the 30-day period, making the removal timely.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order of remand and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court declined to address whether GE satisfies the government contractor requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), as this issue was not addressed by the district court. View "Monsanto Company v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

Jason Kertz applied for social security disability benefits in October 2019, citing disabilities including PTSD, back and leg problems, and sleep apnea, with an onset date of March 16, 2018. His initial claim was denied, and an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ) also found him not disabled after a hearing. The SSA Appeals Council upheld this decision in February 2021. Kertz then hired attorney Nicholas Coleman to represent him in federal court. Coleman and Kertz agreed on a contingent-fee arrangement of 25% of any past-due benefits awarded.Coleman filed a civil action in the Eastern District of Arkansas, which resulted in the court remanding the case to the SSA for further proceedings. The district court awarded Coleman $5,426.08 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). On remand, the ALJ issued a Fully Favorable Decision in December 2022, finding Kertz disabled since the alleged onset date. The SSA notified Kertz of his entitlement to $96,349.00 in past-due benefits, withholding 25% as potential attorney fees. Coleman then sought 25% of the past-due benefits as per the contingent-fee agreement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted Coleman’s motion for attorney’s fees in part, awarding $10,667.50 instead of the requested $24,087.25. The court found that the full 25% fee was not reasonable given the circumstances, including the limited time Coleman spent on the case and the lack of substantive court review due to the unopposed remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the fee award, as it appropriately considered the reasonableness of the fee in light of the services rendered and avoided a windfall to the attorney. View "Kertz v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Jason Potter was charged with drug trafficking offenses after police seized drugs from his vehicle during a traffic stop. The stop occurred following an investigation at a motel in Lee’s Summit, Missouri, where police were conducting surveillance due to reports of drug activity and stolen vehicles. Potter and his associate, Daniel Dryden, were arrested after leaving the motel. An inventory search of Potter’s car, conducted after it was towed, revealed methamphetamine. Potter moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and Potter was convicted and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied Potter’s motion to suppress the evidence. A jury subsequently found Potter guilty on both counts of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. Dryden, who pleaded guilty, received a 36-month sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the timing of the traffic stop did not make the seizure unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as officers had probable cause based on an outstanding arrest warrant. The court also found that the inventory search of Potter’s car was reasonable and conducted according to standardized police procedures. Additionally, the court rejected Potter’s claim of vindictiveness in sentencing, noting that the district court provided valid reasons for the disparity between Potter’s and Dryden’s sentences. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Potter’s appeal. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

Larenzo Burnett pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. During sentencing, a dispute arose regarding whether Burnett’s prior conviction under Iowa Code § 708.6(2) was a "crime of violence," which would increase his base offense level. The probation office recommended the increase, but Burnett objected. The parties reached a sentencing agreement where Burnett withdrew his objection and stipulated that the prior conviction was for a crime of violence. The district court imposed a sentence of 99 months and 14 days in prison.Burnett later filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Burnett had not asked his attorney to file a notice of appeal within the 14-day period allowed by rule. Consequently, the court denied Burnett’s motion to vacate his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Burnett needed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. The court found that Burnett’s defense counsel testified credibly that Burnett never requested an appeal. The district court’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous, as it was based on the observation of witness demeanor and the consistency of the testimony. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that there was no clear error in the finding that Burnett did not ask his attorney to file a notice of appeal. View "Burnett v. United States" on Justia Law