Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Derek Mims, Elmer Mims, David Belton, and Anton Whitney for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Whitney was also charged with possession of a firearm by a drug user, and Belton with possession of a firearm by a felon and drug user. Derek, Belton, and Whitney entered conditional guilty pleas, while a jury found Elmer guilty. The defendants appealed the district court's denial of motions to suppress evidence from wiretaps and a vehicle search, and the denial of a motion to recuse. Elmer also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence, while Derek and Whitney challenged their sentences.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the motions to suppress evidence obtained from wiretaps, finding that the necessity and probable cause requirements were met. The court also denied Belton's motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search, applying the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court found probable cause based on the suspicious circumstances and modifications to the vehicle. The motion to recuse was denied, as the judge's authorization of wiretaps did not require recusal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motions to suppress, finding no clear error in the necessity and probable cause determinations. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to recuse, citing precedent that a judge's authorization of wiretaps does not necessitate recusal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Elmer's conviction and upheld the sentences of Derek, Whitney, and Elmer, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing decisions. The judgments of the district court were affirmed. View "United States v. Mims" on Justia Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law. View "Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland" on Justia Law

Kathan Daniel Wiley was convicted of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury. On October 30, 2021, Wiley's 18-month-old child ingested fentanyl pills, leading to severe health issues but ultimately surviving. Wiley had been distributing fentanyl pills for months, and evidence showed he obtained the pills shortly before the incident. The jury found him guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 240 months for the conspiracy charge and 324 months for possession with intent to distribute, to be served concurrently.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Wiley's motion for judgment of acquittal. Wiley appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the conspiracy charge, claiming his possession was to support his addiction rather than for distribution. He also contended that the evidence did not support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute resulting in serious bodily injury, asserting the fentanyl ingested by his child was intended for personal use.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that the evidence, including Facebook messages and testimony, supported the jury's finding of a conspiracy and intent to distribute. The court also upheld the district court's application of a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(13) for misrepresenting the substance as another drug. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, affirming the 324-month sentence as substantively reasonable. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Wiley" on Justia Law

Wayne Lozier, Jr., a licensed bounty hunter in Louisiana, traveled to Missouri to detain a fugitive, R.C., who had failed to appear for her court date in Louisiana. Lozier entered a residence in Missouri, handcuffed R.C., and transported her towards Mississippi. During this time, the residence owner alerted law enforcement, leading to an investigation by Officer Jeffrey Atkins. Lozier was found to have violated Missouri laws by not being licensed in Missouri and failing to notify local law enforcement before apprehending R.C.A federal grand jury indicted Lozier for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. Lozier moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing his actions were lawful as an agent of a bail bondsman. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied these motions, stating Lozier's arguments were factual challenges. At trial, Lozier admitted to the Missouri law violations but contended his actions were standard fugitive apprehension. He objected to a jury instruction that he claimed deprived the jury of deciding whether his actions were unlawful. The jury found Lozier guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 120 months on each count, to run concurrently.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the jury instruction (Instruction 16) created a conclusive presumption that Lozier acted unlawfully by violating Missouri law, thus removing the jury's ability to consider justification or excuse. This violated Lozier's due process rights. The court held that this error was not harmless and vacated Lozier's convictions, remanding the case for a new trial. View "United States v. Lozier" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs BSI Group LLC and International Business Solutions Group, LLC, financial service companies, contracted with EZBanc Corp for financial services. EZBanc collaborated with Solid Financial Technologies, Inc. and Evolve Bank & Trust to provide these services. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants mishandled funds, withdrawing nearly $9 million from their accounts and failing to process approximately $300,000 in third-party payments. Defendants sought to compel arbitration, arguing that although EZBanc’s contracts with Plaintiffs lacked an arbitration clause, the contracts referred to other terms that included such a clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Defendants' motions to compel arbitration. The court found that the language in the contracts was too vague to incorporate the Evolve Agreement by reference and that there was a factual dispute regarding whether the terms of the Evolve Agreement were known or easily available to Plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the contract and its denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The appellate court found that there were material disputes of fact regarding whether the Evolve Agreement was effectively communicated to Plaintiffs, which necessitated a trial. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for trial to determine if Plaintiffs agreed to be bound by the terms in the Evolve Agreement through the “pop-up” or other aspects of EZBanc’s website. View "BSI Group LLC v. Solid Financial Technologies Inc." on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, a public utility company, challenged an order by the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) regarding the allocation of costs from a refund mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Entergy Arkansas made short-term opportunity sales to third-party wholesale customers, which led to a complaint by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. FERC ruled that Entergy Arkansas violated the System operating agreement, resulting in a net refund of approximately $135 million to other System members. Entergy Arkansas sought to recover these costs from its retail customers, but the APSC denied the request and ordered Entergy Arkansas to refund a portion to its retail customers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the APSC's order after a bench trial, finding that it did not violate Arkansas law, the filed rate doctrine, or the dormant Commerce Clause. Entergy Arkansas appealed, arguing that the APSC's order violated the filed rate doctrine by trapping costs and improperly allocating the bandwidth adjustment. They also contended that the order violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and imposing excessive burdens.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because FERC did not preemptively decide the cost allocation of the refund. FERC explicitly left the allocation of costs to state commissions. Additionally, the court found that the APSC's order did not discriminate against interstate commerce or impose excessive burdens, as it was not driven by economic protectionism and any negative effects were speculative.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the APSC's order. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb" on Justia Law

After the death of George Floyd, large-scale protests occurred in Kansas City, Missouri. On May 30, 2020, the Kansas City Police Department requested assistance from the Missouri State Highway Patrol to manage the protests, which turned violent. Law enforcement used tear gas and other munitions to disperse the crowd. Sergeant Jeffrey Spire deployed various crowd control measures, including smoke grenades and projectiles. Around 11:47 p.m., Spire fired projectiles indiscriminately into the crowd, one of which allegedly struck Sean Stearns, causing him to lose vision in his left eye.Stearns sued Sergeant Spire under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brought claims under Missouri law and a Monell claim against the Board of Police Commissioners. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity and that Stearns could not establish a Monell claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Spire was entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim because Stearns failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his injury and retaliatory animus. The court also found that Stearns waived his Fourth Amendment claim by not providing a meaningful argument. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court concluded that Spire's actions did not shock the conscience and thus did not constitute a substantive due process violation. Consequently, the Monell claim failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice, finding no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stearns v. Dean" on Justia Law

Derrick A. Davis sued the City of Little Rock, the chief of police, and three detectives for Fourth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a no-knock warrant was executed on his residence. The warrant was based on an email about drug activity, a controlled buy using a confidential informant (CI), and Detective Bell's affidavit. The SWAT team executed the warrant, finding marijuana inside Davis's home.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Davis appealed, arguing that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the detectives' responsibility for the SWAT team's actions, the veracity of statements in the warrant affidavit, and the existence of a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights. He also challenged the district court's handling of evidence and the imposition of sanctions for his failure to attend a deposition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Detectives Bell and Ison were entitled to qualified immunity because the right in question was not clearly established at the time of the warrant's execution. The court also found no Franks violation, as Davis failed to show that any false statements in the affidavit were made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, the court ruled that Davis's § 1983 conspiracy claim failed because the underlying Fourth Amendment claims were properly dismissed.The court also determined that the district court did not err in considering Detective Bell's affidavit or in disregarding Davis's expert opinions. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sanctions award because the district court had not yet fixed the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "Davis v. City of Little Rock" on Justia Law

Jerell Wilson was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The charge stemmed from an investigation into the shooting death of Dolorean Wade, during which law enforcement found a Smith and Wesson .40 caliber handgun at Wilson's residence. Wilson was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 96 months in prison. He appealed his conviction, sentence, and the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa handled Wilson's case. Wilson had several disputes with his counsel and requested to represent himself, leading to delays and a competency evaluation. The court found Wilson competent to stand trial and denied his motion to dismiss the indictment based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act. Wilson was ultimately convicted and sentenced, with the court granting an upward variance based on aggravating factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed Wilson's appeal. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, sufficient evidence to support Wilson's conviction, and no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The appellate court also upheld the substantive reasonableness of Wilson's 96-month sentence, noting the district court's consideration of aggravating conduct and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Jerell Wilson" on Justia Law

Following heavy snowfall in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the roofs of several chicken houses at ten poultry farms collapsed. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company, which insured the farms, sued Rogers Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer of the roof trusses used in the chicken houses, claiming strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranties. Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Norfolk’s claims were barred by the Arkansas statute of repose.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas agreed with Rogers and dismissed the complaint. Norfolk appealed the dismissal, arguing that the statute of repose did not apply to Rogers because the roof trusses were standardized goods, not custom-designed for the farms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Norfolk’s favor. The court found that Norfolk’s complaint plausibly supported an inference that the roof trusses were standardized goods, which would not be covered by the Arkansas statute of repose. The court emphasized that at this early stage, the complaint should not be dismissed if it allows for a reasonable inference of liability.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the facts and legal arguments could be further developed as the case progresses. View "Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Rogers Manufacturing Corporation" on Justia Law