Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant, a police officer, shot plaintiff in the course of investigating a potential domestic disturbance, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive force claim, agreeing with the district court that genuine issues of material fact precluded a grant of qualified immunity. Construing the disputed record in plaintiff's favor, the court concluded that a jury could conclude that no reasonable officer would have thought deadly force was necessary in that moment to protect plaintiff's wife from imminent danger. Furthermore, plaintiff's demeanor and conduct are in dispute. In this case, defendant opened the door and instantaneously shot plaintiff. Therefore, under these circumstances, no reasonable officer would have believed that he had probable cause to use deadly force. Furthermore, plaintiff's right to be free from excessive force under these circumstances was also clearly established at the time. View "Banks v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' pro se motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018. The court explained that Section 404(a) of the First Step Act says that covered offenses are those whose penalties "were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act." Before the Fair Sentencing Act, defendants' crack-cocaine quantity—over 50 grams—triggered a 10-year minimum sentence. It now triggers a 5-year minimum sentence. Therefore, the court concluded that the "statutory penalties for" one object of defendants' multidrug conspiracy offense "were modified" by section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. The court further explained that the statutory penalties for a drug-trafficking offense include all the penalties triggered by every drug-quantity element of the offense, not just the highest tier of penalties triggered by any one drug-quantity element. Therefore, defendants are eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendant, a police officer, used excessive force against him during a traffic stop. A jury found in favor of plaintiff, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant appealed.The Eighth Circuit concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, defendant's prolonged use of his taser was not an objectively reasonable use of force. In this case, although plaintiff initially resisted defendant's attempts to remove him from the car, he did not physically hit or verbally threaten defendant. Furthermore, plaintiff, who was 17 years old at the time, posed at most a minimal safety threat to defendant. The court also concluded that plaintiff's right to be free from excessive, prolonged use of a taser was clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the prolonged taser claim.The court rejected defendant's evidentiary claims of error, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from a vocational rehabilitation expert and testimony from an economist based on the vocational expert's opinion. Finally, the court concluded that the district erred in reducing the punitive damages award. While the court concluded that the district court correctly found that the jury's initial punitive damages award was disproportionate, the court disagreed that the reduced award of $236,500 sufficiently reflected the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct. In this case, the 9:1 ratio comports with due process while achieving the statutory and regulatory goals of retribution and deterrence. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Masters v. Runnels" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit dismissed the petition for review of the BIA's order finding petitioner inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C) based on lack of jurisdiction. Under section 1182(a)(2)(C)(i), a non citizen is inadmissible to the United States if "the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe" that the noncitizen is or has been either "an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance," or "a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others" in such trafficking.The court agreed with the BIA that section 1182(a)(2)(C)'s "reason to believe" language requires a finding of probable cause. In this case, the court concluded that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the BIA's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe petitioner was involved in illicit drug trafficking. Therefore, petitioner is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2)(C) and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over the petition for review. View "Rojas v. Garland" on Justia Law

After plaintiff tripped on an uneven sidewalk outside a veterans' hospital and was seriously injured, he and his wife filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence and loss of consortium.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government, concluding that evidence from the record demonstrates that a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would not have noticed the uneven sidewalk. The court explained that after-the-fact recognition of the uneven sidewalk is not dispositive of what would have been apparent to a reasonable person "exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment," and plaintiff and his wife produced evidence that the uneven sidewalk would not have been apparent to such a person. The court also concluded that the record is underdeveloped as to whether the hospital would have discovered the uneven sidewalk "by the exercise of reasonable care." View "Shanner v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1 based on his pre-plea conduct while incarcerated at the detention center. In this case, defendant and other inmates were involved in an assault of another inmate. The court explained that, under its precedent, it was entitled to rely on such criminal conduct in denying acceptance of responsibility based on a defendant's pre-plea conduct. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Defendant Spencer and Farah's convictions and sentences for Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The court agreed with the Government that defendants forfeited their objection to the Hobbs Act instruction. In this case, the only ground for objecting to the original instruction that defendants asserted with specificity before the district court was that the instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires a mens rea of knowledge with respect to the taking of the victim’s property. Therefore, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the right to object to the instruction on other grounds, including the ground that the instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce. Even if defendants' proposed instruction had been clearer than the district court's, the mere tender of an alternative instruction that avoids an alleged error in the district court's instruction does not preserve the error for appeal unless the party specifies the alleged error as a basis for objecting to the district court's instruction. However, it was not until this appeal that defendants argued that the district court's instruction failed to make clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce. Accordingly, defendants forfeited their objection even assuming their proposed instruction made clear that Hobbs Act robbery requires an effect on interstate commerce, and defendants' challenge to the jury instructions regarding Hobbs Act robbery fails under plain error review.The court also rejected defendants' claim of prosecutorial misconduct under plain error review. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not procedurally err in calculating the advisory sentencing guidelines, upholding the obstruction of justice enhancement under USSG 3C1.1 and the reckless endangerment enhancement during flight under USSG 3C1.2. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand a strict product liability claim against Mentor Worldwide to state court and the district court's subsequent decision to deny plaintiff's voluntary dismissal without prejudice and to dismiss her claim against Mentor Worldwide with prejudice. Plaintiff's claims relate to the silicone breast implants she received that were manufactured by Mentor Worldwide.The court concluded that plaintiff's claim that the district court erred in denying her motion to remand her strict product liability claim against Mentor Worldwide to state court was not properly before it. The court explained that, because the district court had diversity jurisdiction when it entered final judgment, there is nothing to remand. Because the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice, the court need not determine whether remand would be required if it reversed the district court's final judgment on the merits and determined that remand had been improperly denied. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice. View "Graham v. Mentor Worldwide LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, alleging that the University constructively terminated her and subjected her to a hostile work environment. Plaintiff, the head coach of the women's cross-country and track-and-field teams, resigned after the University threatened to terminate her following an outside-law-firm's investigation into her alleged misconduct.The court concluded that, although plaintiff's factual allegations show the University treated her and her teams differently from other coaches and teams, the complaint does not plausibly give rise to the inference of discrimination on the basis of sex as the reason for her termination. Furthermore, even if the stated reason for her termination was pretextual, she has not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. The court also concluded that plaintiff's allegations, though perhaps describing vile or inappropriate behavior, do not rise to the level of actionable hostile work environment as a matter of law. View "Warmington v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's 24-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his second supervised release. The court concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court adequately explained its reasoning for defendant's sentence, and the district court did not commit a Tapia error, much less plain error, by considering defendant's need for rehabilitation when crafting his sentence. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable based on the upward variance and the district court did not clearly err in weighing the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law