Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of actual methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, and six counts of distribution of a controlled substance. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853, the indictment also sought forfeiture of $13,400 in United States currency, which was seized from a residence in Davenport, Iowa.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the district court's factual findings are supported by the record and it did not err in concluding that the money was subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(2). In this case, the district court did not err in determining that the cash discovered inside the lockbox found in the same bedroom as the methamphetamine was subject to forfeiture. View "United States v. Sheley" on Justia Law

Excellent Home filed a claim against appellee in bankruptcy, arguing that its claim is excepted from discharge, as well as alleging three state law theories: fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's finding in favor of appellee, and concluded that Excellent Home, in submitting the full-credit bid, did not justifiably rely on appellee's misrepresentations, so its claim is not excepted from discharge. The court explained that Missouri fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and derivative civil conspiracy each require a plaintiff justifiably rely on defendant's actions. In this case, based on the findings of fact, Excellent Home's reliance was unjustifiable and its state law claims were thus properly dismissed. View "Excellent Home Properties, Inc. v. Kinard" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings in an action where defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted sex trafficking of children, one count of attempted enticement of minors, and one count of travel across state lines for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting four of defendant's internet searches for prurient pictures and videos of minor girls because it was relevant to his intent and purpose when he traveled across state lines to meet the girls. Furthermore, the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "United States v. Nordwall" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental and vacated the district court's declaration regarding the scope of Continental's duty to defend in nearly one hundred underlying lawsuits in which Daikin Applied is a defendant. Continental filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it has a duty to defend only those underlying asbestos-related suits expressly alleging in some manner that the named Subsequent Entity has been sued on account of McQuay-Perfex's liabilities, which is not true of any of the underlying lawsuits in dispute. Daikin Applied counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment to the effect that Continental owed it a duty to defend in all of the underlying lawsuits in dispute, arguing that the naming of a Subsequent Entity as a defendant was, by itself, sufficient to trigger Continental's duty to defend.The court concluded that the district court misapplied Minnesota law in its declaration regarding the scope of Continental's duty to defend by declaring that Continental's duty to defend arises only where an underlying suit alleges liability arising out of the predecessor's actions or where Daikin has been sued as successor to McQuay-Perfex. The court explained that by failing to declare the "arguably" standard applicable here, the district court erroneously heightened Daikin Applied's burden to trigger Continental's duty to defend. In this case, Daikin Applied need only show that the underlying complaints arguably allege McQuay-Perfex liabilities. The court also found that Daikin Applied's position requires too little to trigger Continental's duty to defend under Minnesota law. Because of its declaration, the court concluded that the district court did not analyze each underlying lawsuit to determine whether the complaint named a Subsequent Entity arguably on account of McQuay-Perfex's liabilities in light of the allegations therein or, if not, whether extrinsic facts proffered by Daikin Applied and known to Continental about that case clearly establish this. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to conduct this analysis in the first instance. View "The Continental Insurance Co. v. Daikin Applied Americas Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine; possessing, brandishing, and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The court concluded that where, as here, the defendant withdraws his objection to the career offender designation at sentencing, the argument is waived. The court also concluded that defendant's prior conviction for conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance (meth) under Iowa Code 124.401(1)(c)(6) was a serious drug offense for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and thus defendant was properly sentenced as an armed career criminal. Furthermore, the district court did not err in imposing a cross-reference to USSG 2A2.1 for attempted first-degree murder. Finally, defendant's within-Guidelines sentence was not substantively unreasonable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. View "United States v. Comly" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a complaint brought by plaintiff against Employers Mutual and Defendant Kelley, asserting a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff was a minority shareholder of EMC, a spin-off from Employers Mutual. Defendant Kelley was the CEO and director of both EMCI and Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleges that Employers Mutual structured EMCI as a shell company, preventing it from becoming a valuable company or acting independently from Employers Mutual. Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that, in the years leading up to the squeeze-out merger initiated by Employers to purchase EMCI's remaining shares, defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority shareholder of EMCI.The court concluded that plaintiff's claim did not arise in the context of a contractual relationship; his alleged injury arose only from his status as a shareholder of EMCI; and this was insufficient under Iowa law to plausibly plead a special duty arising out of a contractual relationship. Furthermore, plaintiff did not adequately plead that his injury arose from a special duty. The court also concluded that plaintiff did not allege that his voting rights were ever affected by Employers Mutual and Kelley's alleged mismanagement. Even if this were Iowa law, plaintiff would not meet this exception.Accordingly, because plaintiff's claim is derivative in nature, he must satisfy federal and Iowa requirements for a filing a derivative action, which he has failed to do so. In this case, the complaint did not state with particularity plaintiff's efforts to enforce minority shareholder rights in the years leading up to the squeeze out. Furthermore, the complaint did not allege that he petitioned the directors or other shareholders in writing, or that 90 days have expired since delivery of the demand and EMCI rejected his request, or irreparable injury would result by waiting for the expiration of the ninety days. View "Shepard v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a suggestion of death for his co-plaintiff. Because they can no longer marry, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the merits judgment is moot. The court explained that, in the absence of appropriate findings of fact—including prevailing party status, any acts by the parties between the entry of the merits judgment and its stay order, and the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded—the court will not address the attorney's fees judgment at this time. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's merits judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gillpatrick v. Frakes" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against numerous companies for violating the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) through their marketing of men's and women's antiperspirants. Plaintiff alleges that Conopco, Inc.—doing business as Unilever—discriminates based on gender in pricing two Dove product lines.The court concluded that plaintiff mistakes gender-based marketing for gender discrimination where she ignores the fact that the different scents, packaging, and labels make the products potentially attractive to different customers with different preferences. Because preference-based pricing is not necessarily an unfair practice, the MMPA does not prohibit defendants' pricing here. View "Schulte v. Conopco, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the Government's motion to retry him on the elements triggering his life sentences that were part of two of the counts on which he was previously convicted. Defendant argued that retrial would violate his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that defendant's double jeopardy claim is colorable and that the court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. On the merits, the court concluded that defendant's retrial on the resulting-in-death elements of Count One and Seven would not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court explained that defendant received habeas relief because of Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 208, 217-19 (2014), and thus the insufficiency in proof was caused by the subsequent change in the law, not the Government's failure to muster evidence to satisfy the former standard. Even assuming defendant is correct that the Government would, for one reason or another, be unable to prove on retrial the resulting-in-death elements under Burrage, the court rejected his conclusion that this brings his case within the "equivalent of an acquittal" principle in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Defendants Phillips and Cathey were convicted of two counts of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and one count of distribution resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The jury also found Phillips guilty of one additional count of distribution resulting in serious injury and Cathey guilty of two additional counts of distribution resulting in serious injury or death.The Eighth Circuit affirmed and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the heroin Phillips gave to two individuals was a but-for cause of their injury; the evidence was sufficient to support Cathey's convictions for conspiracy and distribution of drugs resulting in serious injury or death; the district court did not err when it admitted hearsay statements of a coconspirator; the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to take remedial steps to correct any possible violation of the sequestration order; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting NCIC records to establish Cathey's prior convictions for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Cathey" on Justia Law