Justia U.S. 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying safety-valve relief following defendant's guilty plea to distributing five grams or more of actual methamphetamine. The court concluded that defendant, while under an obligation to truthfully disclose his involvement in drug trafficking, chose to concoct a story to advance his own agenda and mislead the government about one of his drug suppliers. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that defendant was ineligible for safety-valve relief. View "United States v. McVay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was employed with Andersen from 2000-2018, was terminated for violating lock-out, tag-out (LOTO) safety procedures. After plaintiff filed suit against Andersen, he voluntarily dismissed four of his eight claims and the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining four claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that Andersen did not violate the Minnesota Whistleblower Act by terminating his employment in retaliation for his previous sexual harassment and falsified documentation complaint. The court explained that plaintiff failed to show causation between the protected activity and his discharge, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. The court also concluded that plaintiff was unable to establish the causal link necessary for a prima facia case of retaliation under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Family Medical Leave Act also failed for lack of causation. View "Lissick v. Andersen Corp." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the VA in an action brought by plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging race discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, and a hostile work environment she experienced during her employment at the Kansas City VA.Applying the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework, the court concluded that plaintiff's claims failed at the first step because she did not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, or constructive discharge. In this case, many of the events plaintiff presents as adverse employment actions—the decision not to "board" the Coding Document Improvement Program (CDI) position, inadequate training on CDI duties, assignment of additional coding work, her performance review, and the written counseling—are not adverse employment actions for purposes of Title VII. View "Watson v. McDonough" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in determining that a class of emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics has been properly paid overtime compensation in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime provision.The court also concluded that the district court did not err in determining that a separate class of dual-function firefighter/paramedics were properly classified as partially exempt from overtime compensation because its members are "employee[s] in fire protection activities" who have the "responsibility to engage in fire suppression" activities under 29 U.S.C. 203(y). View "Zimmerli v. The City of Kansas City" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The court concluded that petitioner's grant of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) did not obviate the need for him to demonstrate that he was "admitted" in order to be eligible for cancellation of removal. In this case, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(e) does not excuse section 1229b(a)'s admission requirement for TPS recipients.The court also concluded that petitioner's grant of TPS is not an "admission" for purposes of cancellation of removal. The court explained that its holding in Velasquez v. Barr, 979 F.3d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 2020), is thus limited to adjustment of status and does not bear on whether TPS is an admission for cancellation-of-removal purposes. Furthermore, the fact that section 1254a(f)(4) expressly provides that TPS time counts for these specific purposes indicates it does not apply for other purposes—like cancellation of removal. View "Artola v. Garland" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from CRC through its "no-fault" attendance policy, she filed suit alleging that her termination violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CRC and dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim where the undisputed evidence established that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position. In this case, many of plaintiff's duties as the sole office assistant required her physical presence at the office and she admitted that her absences burdened co-workers by detracting from the time they could spend on their own duties. Furthermore, because plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, her failure-to-accommodate claim necessarily fails. In regard to plaintiff's retaliation claim under the ADA, the court concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence of the required but-for causal connection.In regard to plaintiff's FMLA claims, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal because CRC did not deny plaintiff FMLA leave to which she was entitled because it was justified in assessing unexcused absence points. In regard to the FMLA discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between her requests for FMLA leave and her termination. Even assuming that plaintiff made a prima facie case of discrimination, the court concluded that CRC had a legitimate, non-discriminatory ground for termination that was not pretextual. View "Evans v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence in a case where he was convicted of reentry of a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The court concluded that the cooperation between the police officers and Border Patrol to detain defendant was within the authority conferred by Congress pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(10); the Border Patrol reasonably questioned defendant about his legal presence in the United States; and Border Patrol had authority to take defendant into custody because there was probable cause that he was illegally present in the United States and likely to escape before a warrant issued. The court rejected defendant's Brady challenge, concluding that defendant failed to explain how disclosure of text messages from a confidential informant to a police officer about a potential burglary are either favorable to him or material to his charged offense that requires showing he was a previously deported alien who was knowingly and voluntarily in the United States. Finally, there is no evidence of intentional deletion of the text messages. View "United States v. Puebla-Zamora" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a vehicle search and statements made to a task force agent. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant had not maintained control or possession of the vehicle while awaiting the tow truck's arrival. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant was under arrest and in the back of the patrol vehicle during the search, that no one else was present to take possession of the vehicle, and that the deputy made the decision to tow the vehicle. Furthermore, defendant's request that the deputy retrieve his cash and phone from the vehicle further indicates that defendant did not expect to retain custody over the vehicle and its contents during the towing process. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the need to conduct an inventory of the vehicle's contents did not constitute a pretext for an investigatory search. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against defendants alleging claims related to the kidnapping and murder of Jacob E. Wetterling. Jacob was abducted at the end of plaintiff's wife's driveway. Plaintiff asserted First Amendment retaliation, a derivative claim for municipal liability, and state law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in determining that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 was time-barred by the six year statute of limitations under Minnesota law. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in determining that the defamation claim and intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Minnesota law. In this case, plaintiff's claims accrued in 2010, when the alleged tortious acts of naming plaintiff as a person of interest and searching plaintiff and his wife's property occurred, regardless of when they believed they had enough evidence to convince a judge or jury and obtain relief. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's request to equitably toll the statutes of limitations where plaintiffs lacked diligence in filing, which was not prevented by invincible necessity. Furthermore, no factor outside plaintiff's control prevented the filing. View "Rassier v. Sanner" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs from a traffic stop and canine drug sniff. The court considered the totality of the circumstances and concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop so that his canine could conduct a drug sniff. In this case, the incongruity between defendant's statements suggested that defendant might be lying about his travel plans, defendant gave odd answers about his travel plans, defendant appeared very nervous even though the officer had informed him he would only be receiving a warning, and the officer testified that the rental vehicle had a lived-in look, suggesting that defendant was attempting to travel without making many stops. Furthermore, the officer had probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law